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Cover
The Navy’s unmanned X-47B flies near 
the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roo-
sevelt (CVN 71) in the Atlantic Ocean 
in August 2014. The aircraft completed 
a series of tests demonstrating its ability 
to operate safely and seamlessly with 
manned aircraft. In “Lifting the Fog of 
Targeting: ‘Autonomous Weapons’ and 
Human Control through the Lens of  
Military Targeting,” Merel A. C. Ekelhof 
addresses the current context of increas-
ingly autonomous weapons, making the 
case that military targeting practices 
should be the core of any analysis that 
seeks a better understanding of the  
concept of meaningful human control.
Credit: USN photo by Liz Wolter
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FROM THE EDITORS
The post–Cold War era has been hard on the navies of the United States and its 
allies� This is so for two reasons: the disappearance of a great-power maritime 
threat, and the urgent needs of land-centric combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
beyond� In “Into the Abyss? European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era,” 
Jeremy Stöhs provides a succinct overview of how our NATO allies have coped 
with this situation� Emphasizing the negative impact of the financial crisis of the 
last decade and ongoing problems with manning and training, he is cautiously 
optimistic that a modest recovery is currently under way in the acquisition of 
modern naval capabilities, as well as a renewed appreciation of their utility, par-
ticularly in the face of a reemergent Russian threat� Jeremy Stöhs is an analyst at 
the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University�
In “Japan’s Defense Readiness: Prospects and Issues in Operationalizing Air 
and Maritime Supremacy,” Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi provides a similarly compre-
hensive survey of maritime defense–related developments in Japan over the last 
decade or so� Of particular interest is his focus on recent legislation designed to 
improve the readiness of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and ensure their ability 
to react to Chinese “gray-area” provocations� Also important is his discussion of 
recent improvements in the jointness of the Japanese military and in the devel-
opment of doctrine for operating in the air and maritime domains� Ryo Hinata-
Yamaguchi, a former noncommissioned officer in the Japan Ground Self-Defense 
Force (Reserve), is currently a visiting professor at Pusan National University�
Questions relating to the autonomous operation of advanced weapon systems 
continue to attract a great deal of attention, for reasons that are understandable; 
but the resulting debates too often have generated more heat than light� In “Lift-
ing the Fog of Targeting: ‘Autonomous Weapons’ and Human Control through 
the Lens of Military Targeting,” Merel A� C� Ekelhof offers a detailed and authori-
tative discussion of the targeting process as NATO countries currently practice it 
as a way to better inform these debates� She argues that military targeting often 
is identified simplistically with putting ordinance on specific targets, as distin-
guished from the “software” central to contemporary targeting practices� Such 
software is likely to be of increasing importance, given the inability of human be-
ings to process volumes of data on the scale we will see in the future (and indeed 
are seeing already)� She suggests that human control of the targeting process is a 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   5 5/1/18   11:10 AM
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manageable problem if this more holistic perspective is kept in view� Merel A� C� 
Ekelhof is currently a visiting researcher at the Harvard Law School Program on 
International Law and Armed Conflict�
In “The Role of the Human Operator in the Third Offset Strategy,” Adam 
Biggs and Rees Lee address another facet of the man-machine relationship� They 
argue that the ongoing efforts within the American military establishment to 
identify cutting-edge technologies that will enable the United States to preserve 
(or recover) its strategic advantage in the contemporary security environment 
(the so-called Third Offset Strategy) need to refocus on the ways in which human 
performance on the battlefield of the future can be enhanced through technology, 
as well as new approaches to talent management� Lieutenant Adam Biggs and 
Captain Rees Lee, USN, currently are serving with the Naval Medical Research 
Unit Dayton on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base�
It is fair to say that the primary mission of the Naval War College is to enhance 
the human performance of future military leaders through education� As David 
Kohnen shows us in “Charting a New Course: The Knox-Pye-King Board and 
Naval Professional Education, 1919–23,” it never was preordained that the Navy 
would accept the College’s mission so understood—or, indeed, the existence of 
the College itself� A small cohort of naval officers—inspired above all by Admiral 
William Sims—had to fight the civilian and military leadership of the Navy of 
the day, as well as the weight of Navy culture and tradition, to make that hap-
pen� David Kohnen is a retired USN commander and the director of the newly 
established John B� Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the 
Naval War College�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309, 
332)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main 
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236)�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   6 5/1/18   11:10 AM
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGES we foresee for the Navy and 
the nation in the decades ahead has resulted in a series of orga-
nizational changes and realignments at the Naval War College since the summer 
of 2016. As one approach to understanding better the myriad futures that may 
arise, we recently conducted the “Breaking the Mold: Strategy and War in the 21st 
Century” workshop. This event was conceived as a way to bring together a diverse 
set of critical thinkers, futurists, and seasoned operators to “break the mold” of 
conventional thinking and develop a series of recommendations for senior lead-
ers within the Navy and the Department of Defense.
The workshop, held in Newport in early March 2018, was sponsored by the 
Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Thomas B. Modly, who provided 
the broad outlines of the task and identified his desire to see innovative recom-
mendations put forward to address a host of future challenges. Sixty scholars, 
researchers, and proven maritime and joint-warfare operators were invited to 
gather at the College to spend two days engaged in free-flowing and uncon-
strained thinking and debate.
In this exercise, the “mold breakers” were empowered to consider options that 
some considered radical, controversial, and revolutionary. Such ideas deserved 
to compete in the intellectual arena—and could help shape the way ahead for 
America’s national security forces.
Under Secretary Modly traveled to Newport to kick off the event and to par-
ticipate in the working-group discussions personally. In his keynote remarks he 
stated, in part:
Whether on active duty, as a Navy civilian, or even in the private sector, we have all 
witnessed profound changes together during the past four decades. These changes 
Breaking the Mold
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will impact the U�S� Navy and our nation for years to come� The changes are coming 
at us fast—so we need to be prepared to break free of the organizational paradigms, 
behaviors, and biases that suited us in the last century� They are not well suited for 
today, and certainly not for the future�
Our National Defense Strategy � � � cannot be executed without a significant com-
mitment of national resources and, perhaps more importantly, a significant applica-
tion of national resolve and urgency—and an approach to maritime supremacy that 
“breaks the mold” of conventional thinking� Our maritime advantage is, and will 
continue to be, almost entirely dependent upon the quality of our people� It follows, 
therefore, that the agility of our future force will be almost entirely dependent upon 
the agility of the people we identify now to lead it� Therefore, I encourage you to 
think about breaking the mold in a way that allows us to recruit, train, equip, and 
educate the most quick-minded, flexible, collaborative, innovative, and transparent 
people we can find� If we do this, we will set the Navy on the course for maritime 
superiority well into this century.
Among the outcomes of this unique workshop was the development of a 
series of strategic and operational concepts that focused on four broad areas: a 
“porcupine strategy” of defense in Europe; a mobile maritime barrier in Asia; an 
increased reliance on special forces, unmanned systems, and cyber; and a pos-
sible reorganization of portions of the U�S� government to promote enhanced na-
tional security� Each of the ideas generated during this workshop will provide the 
Naval War College’s superb faculty with topics to research and refine, applying a 
bottom-up analysis to the group’s top-down formulations� The College is plan-
ning to conduct a larger, follow-on conference on these topics in October 2018�
In a related initiative, the College is taking another important step in pre-
paring our national security professionals—at the College and throughout the 
Navy—for the future� In early April 2018, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
John Richardson, USN, visited the College to announce the establishment of the 
College of Leadership and Ethics (CLE) under the Naval War College’s academic 
umbrella� This effort is an expansion of the Leadership and Ethics Department 
that has been operating under Dean Peg Klein’s direction since late last year� The 
mission of the new college is to imbue Naval War College students with a desire 
for continuous learning and development as leaders of character� In addition, the 
new college will supplement and support each Navy community in its commu-
nity leader development and maintain a strategy for leader development beyond 
major command�
In establishing the new CLE, Admiral Richardson noted that “[w]orld-class 
leadership is our Navy’s decisive advantage over our adversaries� Our operational 
and war-fighting success depends on developing leaders who learn and adapt to 
achieve maximum possible performance� Opening a College of Leadership and 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   10 5/1/18   11:10 AM
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P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  1 1
Ethics (and providing a fleet-centered development framework) will create op-
portunities for us to become better leaders, build winning teams, and maintain 
America’s maritime superiority�”
The workshop and the new college are just two examples of the ways in which 
your Naval War College is having significant impact on the Navy and the larger 
national security community� Watch this forum for discussion of other signifi-
cant initiatives as the calendar year progresses�
JEFFREY A� HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   11 5/1/18   11:10 AM
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Jeremy Stöhs is an Austrian American defense ana-
lyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel Uni-
versity and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy 
& Security. He is also a nonresident fellow of the 
Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and 
Security Studies. He has studied in Austria, Ger-
many, and the United States, holds a master’s degree 
in history and English, and has taught in both fields. 
He has contributed articles and chapters on various 
defense and security matters, and has authored the 
book The Decline of European Naval Forces: Chal-
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European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era
Jeremy Stöhs
INTO THE ABYSS?
 Since the end of the Cold War, European sea power—particularly its naval element—has undergone drastic change�1 The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
not only heralded a period of Western unilateralism but also put an end to previ-
ous levels of military investment� In fact, once the perceived threat that Soviet 
forces posed had disappeared, many Western governments believed that the era 
of great-power rivalry and major-power wars finally had come to an end�2 Rather 
than necessitating preparation for war, the security environment now ostensibly 
allowed states to allocate their funds to other areas, such as housing, education, 
and health care� As a result, for more than two decades, the majority of naval 
forces across Europe have been subject to declining budgets and far-reaching 
downscaling measures�
Although the post–Cold War era proved to be anything but peaceful, all 
military engagements throughout the 1990s involving Western states took place 
either at the lower end of the intensity spectrum or against enemies that posed 
a relatively limited threat to the overwhelming superiority of the NATO al-
lies� Combined-arms warfare, effects-based operations, and coercive air strikes 
against a series of state and nonstate actors underscored the West’s ability to apply 
military force with near impunity�
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, effectively put an end 
to this period of largely unchecked Western military interventions� The attacks 
not only marked the beginning of an ongoing struggle between the United States 
and its allies and radical Islamic terrorism; they also drew attention away from 
traditional concepts of the utility of naval forces, such as providing credible deter-
rence, buttressing collective defense, and maintaining sea control� Over the fol-
lowing decade, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as well as constabulary 
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operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Middle East, took center stage� 
Concomitantly, the land and air forces involved in these theaters received the 
lion’s share of funding, while naval power (again) was considered a mere sup-
porting element of twenty-first-century warfare� In Europe, these developments 
heightened the already-existing lack of appreciation for the significance of the 
maritime environment and the value of naval forces for a state’s security and 
prosperity—a political and cultural myopia often referred to as “sea blindness�”3
As defense spending continued to decline, so did the size of most Western 
fleets�4 By the end of the first decade of the new century, Europe’s naval forces 
were heading into the proverbial abyss� Smaller than at any time in recent history, 
naval forces across Europe had lost important proficiencies and capabilities� The 
shortfall in naval platforms had substantial bearing on the ability to deal effec-
tively with the growing range of naval tasks� The modernization of many navies 
has been hampered not only by shrinking budgets but by cost overruns, lengthy 
procurement processes, and major technical deficiencies� These problems were 
compounded by the fact that many armed forces across the continent have found 
it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain young men and women, while the 
overhead costs for personnel consume large parts of defense budgets�5 Conse-
quently, significant shortfalls in training and readiness—and hence the ability to 
use naval forces to pursue and achieve political ends—have arisen�
This article will outline the development of Europe’s naval forces since the end 
of the Cold War� It will address the challenges European naval forces have faced 
in an evolving security environment, and will argue that more than two decades 
of fiscal austerity measures have jeopardized Europe’s ability both to ensure good 
order at sea and to provide credible deterrence, and have limited its ability to 
promote common interests and shape events abroad�
This proposition is supported by Europe’s most recent efforts to strengthen 
its defense capabilities� Russia’s military actions along Europe’s flanks and mass 
migrations to Europe and the associated threat of terrorism, as well as the uncer-
tainty pertaining to America’s foreign policy objectives, have elicited responses 
from European states to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security� 
The extent to which these developments can lead to a lasting revitalization of 
European naval power will be discussed in the final section�
AFTER THE FALL OF THE WALL (1989–2001)
To many observers in the West, the quick and relatively peaceful demise of the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact came as a great surprise�6 Consequently, until 
the end, the naval forces of the European NATO partners were considered the 
fulcrum on which rested the West’s ability to deter—and, in the case of war, to 
defeat—Soviet forces�
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From Sea Control to Out-of-Area Operations
With the confrontation between the two superpowers relegated to the pages of 
history, most of Europe’s leaders were quick to interpret these events as nothing 
less than the end of great-power rivalry� No longer bound to the parochial contin-
gency plans postulated by the United States and NATO, the majority of Europe’s 
navies began shifting toward a peacetime posture�
The United Kingdom: Shifting of Priorities. For the British Royal Navy (RN), the 
most distinguished and most powerful among Europe’s naval forces, the Cold 
War by and large ended on a high note—followed almost immediately by a shift-
ing of priorities� Apart from the U�S� Navy, only the Russian navy—slowly rusting 
away in what used to be credible sea bastions—exceeded the fleet carrying the 
white ensign in size and capabilities� The Falklands War a decade earlier had 
provided the RN with painful yet invaluable insights, and substantial improve-
ments had been made to existing platforms and operational procedures to ad-
dress the apparent shortcomings�7 Furthermore, a number of large-scale naval-
procurement projects were under way� These included replacement of the navy’s 
ballistic-missile submarines (with four of the new Vanguard class), introduction 
of the capable Type 23 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates, and development 
of a common air-defense destroyer among France, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
(the Horizon project, later the Type 45 for the RN)�
On the other hand, the RN also faced some serious challenges� First and 
foremost, defense spending plummeted from nearly 4 percent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in 1991 to 2�5 percent in 1998� In other words, the military 
budget was cut by more than 20 percent in real terms�8 Second, the new strategic 
environment no longer required a fleet of nearly fifty surface combatants and 
twenty-two submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered)� “[Britain’s] 
Cold War mission of hunting Soviet submarines had vanished, and along with it 
the chief justification for large chunks of the Fleet�”9
Throughout the 1990s, the RN had to accept incremental reductions to its 
force structure, as well as curtailment of acquisition programs� To save money, 
the number of personnel was decreased from 69,000 to 50,000 within ten years� 
Still, the RN fared somewhat better than its sister services� One reason was the 
RN’s importance as a key enabler of Britain’s effort to “prevent or shape crises 
further away [from home] and [its ability] to deploy military forces rapidly before 
they get out of hand,” as the Strategic Defence Review published in 1998 empha-
sized�10 The procurement of two larger aircraft carriers to replace the three exist-
ing smaller ships underscored the continued relevance of the RN as an effective 
tool of foreign policy�
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Like other European navies, the RN increasingly shifted its focus from open-
ocean, sea-control operations along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
in the North Atlantic and homeland defense (in particular, ASW near the ap-
proaches to Britain’s ports) to power projection over great distances and into the 
littoral regions of the world� Projecting military force from the sea onto land (e�g�, 
carrier aviation and long-range cruise missiles) had proved expedient during 
military operations in the Balkans and the Middle East�11
Britain’s close relationship with the United States allowed the RN to acquire 
new systems and technologies, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing 
the navy with an important capability to fulfill these new roles� Yet while the 
Anglo-American defense partnership flourished, Britain’s collaboration with its 
European neighbors initially yielded rather mixed results�
France, Italy, and Spain: Consolidation of Forces. France and Britain share a rich 
history of both competition and cooperation� Over the centuries, the two great 
powers waged countless wars against each other, culminating in the battle of Tra-
falgar, the later defeat of Napoleon, and the provisions of the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815� Strategic competition and deep-seated suspicions persisted between the 
two countries� Neither fighting side by side in two world wars nor the looming 
threat of a Soviet invasion could obscure the fact that, during large parts of the 
twentieth century, Paris and London did not see eye to eye�
What is more, conflicting views on France’s status within NATO persuaded 
President Charles de Gaulle to withdraw from the alliance in 1966�12 As a direct 
consequence of that decision, the French military’s raison d’être to this day is 
based on providing France with capabilities with which to respond to crises that 
run the gamut of the intensity spectrum� Moreover, the state’s geographic loca-
tion, as well as its numerous overseas territories (remnants of its former colonial 
empire), has shaped the French fleet to a considerable degree�
By the time the Cold War drew to a close, the French and British had fashioned 
navies of similar size� However, the respective fleets were based on somewhat 
different strategic and operational concepts� Unlike the RN, which was designed 
principally for sea control (ASW) and the deployment of carrier strike groups in 
the North Atlantic, the Marine Nationale (MN), as the French navy officially is 
called, operated a mix of some “first-rate” warships and a significant number of 
“second-rate” surface combatants and patrol vessels� The latter are required to 
conduct constabulary duties, such as fisheries protection in the French exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ)� In fact, France possesses the world’s second-largest EEZ 
(more than 4�2 million square miles) and has naval forces continuously deployed 
to the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans�13 Furthermore, while the British 
submarine-based nuclear deterrent had to rely heavily on U�S� technological 
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assistance, all critical components of France’s force océanique stratégique (its sea-
based nuclear forces) were of domestic design�14
To this day, such diverging operational requirements represent a major 
stumbling block to establishing common European security frameworks and 
pursuing joint procurement projects� The aforementioned attempt to develop a 
new air-defense destroyer trilaterally for the British, French, and Italian navies 
failed largely over differences regarding the specific capabilities each stakeholder 
deemed necessary�15 Fortunately, France and Italy continued to pursue the proj-
ect, ultimately receiving two vessels each� Britain would go on to build six ships 
of similar design, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyers�
Throughout the 1990s, 
the MN held a decisive ad-
vantage over the RN (and all 
other navies of the time, save 
the U�S� Navy), despite its 
somewhat less capable surface 
component� In contrast to the 
British, Italians, and Spanish, 
all of whom operated relatively small short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) 
carriers, France had two flat-deck carriers fitted with steam catapults� This al-
lowed the French navy to deploy a well-balanced naval air wing more effectively 
and over greater distances� The naval air arms of the other navies had to content 
themselves with Harrier jump jets and helicopters, all of which had inherent 
limitations with regard to range / loiter time and capability�
Not being able to rely on NATO’s security guarantees, France remained some-
what more cautious in the early years of the post–Cold War era� Rather than 
implementing rash defense cuts or canceling construction programs outright, 
France put its navy’s organizational structure through a comprehensive stream-
lining effort�16 As part of the Optimar 95 program, large parts of naval command 
structures were disbanded and the fleet was divided between the naval bases 
in Toulon (carriers, expeditionary forces) and Brest (ASW, mine warfare, and 
strategic submarines)�17 In addition, major construction processes of warships 
were stretched to alleviate strain on the shrinking budget� Most noticeably, only 
a single carrier remained in service�
Meanwhile, both of France’s Mediterranean neighbors, Italy and Spain, found 
themselves in relatively comfortable situations in the early 1990s�
With the Italian Peninsula occupying a critical geographic position along 
Europe’s southern shores, Italy’s sphere of interest largely was confined to two 
main lines stretching across the Mediterranean Sea: starting from Gibraltar, “one 
In Europe, these developments heightened the 
already-existing lack of appreciation for the 
significance of the maritime environment and 
the value of naval forces for a state’s security 
and prosperity—a political and cultural myo-
pia often referred to as “sea blindness.”
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reaching the Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean 
Sea; the [other] moving southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian 
Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn of Africa�”18
While the Italian navy (the Marina Militare, or MM) had remained relatively 
hamstrung throughout the first decades of the Cold War, owing to political and 
doctrinal limitations, the Soviet naval buildup during the late 1970s and early 
1980s required the MM to establish a greater presence along NATO’s southern 
flank� Many new warships were built during this period, while existing platforms 
underwent modernization and refit� By the end of the Cold War, Italy was operat-
ing a well-balanced fleet of ships and submarines, most of which had been built 
domestically�
At the same time, the country’s military strategy transitioned from sea control 
and static defense against Soviet forces to power projection into regions farther 
from home�19 Italy’s military engagements in Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia (1993–97), 
Mozambique (1993), Somalia (1991–95), and Eritrea (1998) and against Serbia 
(1999) highlight the MM’s set of capabilities, as well as the country’s willingness 
to take action within its designated sphere of influence� Although the percent-
age of military expenditure slightly decreased between 1990 and 2000, the de-
fense budget as a whole remained relatively constant, owing to Italy’s economic 
growth�20
Compared with the strategic ambitions of Italy (which was a founding mem-
ber of both NATO and the Group of Seven), Spain’s aims were somewhat more 
limited� In its official statements, the country often refers to itself as a “medium 
power,” with its sphere of influence stretching from the western Mediterranean to 
the waters of the Atlantic between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands�21 
Even under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain received U�S� military 
assistance (mostly in the form of second-rate ships) to provide sea control vis-à-
vis the Soviet navy�
Franco’s death in 1975 sparked a period of increased naval spending that laid 
the foundation for today’s fleet� While Italy and France were adamant about 
using their respective shipbuilding capabilities and maintaining their military-
industrial prowess, Spain initially relied on American ship designs and combat 
systems� By the early 1990s, the Armada Española had evolved into a small yet 
modern multipurpose fleet, designed around a small STOVL aircraft carrier 
(based on the U�S� vision of a sea-control ship), nineteen other large surface 
combatants, and a flotilla of eight submarines�22
As did most other Western states, Spain experienced considerable economic 
prosperity during the 1990s� At the same time, it reduced defense spending 
steadily, to 1�2 percent of GDP by early in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century� Although the booming economy could compensate for the shrinking 
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defense apportionment, a number of large-scale shipbuilding programs were 
coming on line, consuming large chunks of the navy’s budget� Amphibious forces 
were at the top of the procurement list� As was the general trend among Euro-
pean defense planners, Spain’s considered expeditionary capabilities essential in 
the post–Cold War security environment� In line with this paradigmatic shift 
in the country’s naval strategy, two Galicia-class amphibious assault ships were 
procured, together with a pair of tank landing ships and a replenishment oiler�23
The funding for five new escort vessels—the F-100 or Álvaro de Bazán class—
was granted in 1997� This air-defense frigate benefited from the fact that, unlike 
some of its foreign counterparts, it incorporated the American-designed Aegis 
combat system, based on the SPY-1D radar and the Standard Missile 2 (referred 
to as the SM-2)� Combining these powerful yet off-the-shelf capabilities with a 
relatively attractive price tag would pay dividends nearly ten years later, when 
Australia chose the Spanish design over the more capable but more expensive 
American Arleigh Burke–class destroyer�24
Germany: From the Littorals to Blue Waters. Nominally the fifth-largest navy in 
Europe, the German navy has pursued a somewhat different course over the past 
decades� Over the centuries, Germany has remained a land power, only occasion-
ally showing greater naval aspirations�25 Given the geographic as well as historic 
realities (access merely to the Baltic and North Seas, and under constant suspi-
cion of militarist tendencies from its own population), the country has found it 
difficult to take a leading role in European defense and security matters� With 
the dismantling of large parts of the former East German navy after German 
reunification in 1989, the nation’s underlying strategic aims and needs had to be 
revisited�
Throughout the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Navy had 
been tasked with defending West Germany’s shores from amphibious assault and 
(together with the Danish navy) preventing Warsaw Pact forces from exiting the 
Baltic Sea via the Danish straits� Hence, the FRG Navy was designed primarily 
to conduct ASW and antisurface warfare (ASuW) in the confined and relatively 
shallow waters of the Baltic Sea, with a secondary escort role along the SLOCs in 
the North Sea and toward the English Channel�26 But by the end of the Cold War 
the German navy already had begun transitioning from a brown-water force that 
operated within its littorals to a blue-water fleet that was capable of sustained 
deployments on the high seas�27
Like most of its NATO partners, Germany cut defense expenditures over the 
following decade: the military budget shrank from U�S�$73 billion to $50 billion� 
Meanwhile, the navy decommissioned large parts of its aging fleet� Unlike its 
neighbors, the German navy refrained from acquiring any vessels specifically 
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designed for amphibious operations (for both doctrinal and political reasons)� 
Rather, a number of new surface combatants—still largely influenced by Cold 
War requirements—were accepted into service (the K-130 corvette and F-123 
ASW frigate)�
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany remained reluctant to deploy mili-
tary force outside NATO’s primary area of interest� Notwithstanding the young 
German state’s participation in so-called out-of-area operations in the Persian 
Gulf (mine clearing, 1990–91) and the Adriatic (embargo against Serbia, 1992–
96), a Federal Constitutional Court ruling was necessary to decide whether such 
deployments were in fact in accordance with German law�28 Still, irrespective of 
legal questions, the navy’s activities throughout the following decades remained 
limited to peacetime deployments as part of NATO’s standing naval groups and 
focused on relatively small operations in low-threat environments�
The Netherlands and Denmark: The Defense Industry as a Deciding Factor. The 
dramatic shift within the global security environment affected the remaining, 
smaller European navies to varying degrees�
The Royal Netherlands Navy, for example, tried to adapt to the new situation 
by promoting technological and operational defense cooperation with its Eu-
ropean partners� Examples of this effort are the Belgian-Dutch Naval Coopera-
tion (BENESAM); the U�K�/Dutch amphibious force; the Dutch iteration of the 
Galicia-class amphibious warfare ship (HNLMS Rotterdam, which joined the 
fleet in 1997); and the class of air-defense frigates, based on a trilateral frigate 
project among the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain�29 Similarly to the Royal 
Navy, large parts of the Dutch escort fleet had become superfluous in the absence 
of a traditional naval threat� At the same time, significant investments had be-
come necessary to replace the increasingly obsolescent subsurface fleet�
The Dutch navy also can be commended for investing in local ship designs 
and combat systems rather than acquiring foreign designs� A case can be made 
that if all European navies at the time had opted, for political or financial reasons, 
for American hardware (which in some cases was more advanced technologically, 
more readily available, or both), many industrial capabilities and proficiencies 
would have been lost outright� Clearly, the Netherlands was particularly keen on 
remaining competitive in the international defense market, given its large invest-
ments and expertise in the field of naval defense systems� For example, the active 
phased-array radars fitted on German, Dutch, and Danish frigates and the radars 
on French, Italian, and British destroyers (designated SMART-L) all are produced 
by the Dutch company Thales Nederland�
Also located in the North Sea, the Søværnet (Royal Danish Navy) provides a 
useful example for how smaller navies have dealt with shrinking defense bud-
gets and a widening scope of operational requirements� Faced with the difficult 
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question of how best to deal with these two diverging trends, Danish shipbuild-
ers came up with an ingenious solution: the Standard Flex (StanFlex) modular 
mission-payload system� Warships no longer would have to be designed for one 
specific task, but rather could swap standardized modules in and out, depending 
on the mission requirement� Considerable costs could be saved simply by fitting 
a platform with various guns and antiship and antiair missile-launching systems 
when operating in a contested environment, then swapping them for mine-warfare 
systems, sonars, or equipment for pollution control and hydrographic surveys 
once the threat had passed� Owing to the growing obsolescence of the Danish 
fleet, policy makers decided that the Danish navy, over time, would replace its 
seventeen surface combatants with six vessels based on the StanFlex system�30
Significantly larger than previous frigates, the Royal Danish Navy’s Absalon-
class command-and-support vessel (still in an early design stage during the late 
1990s) reflected the navy’s slow doctrinal shift toward power-projection and 
expeditionary capabilities� Like many of its European neighbors, Denmark in-
creasingly focused on deploying naval power over greater distances, alongside 
its NATO allies�
Opposing the General Trend: Navies and Territorial Defense
The majority of Europe’s naval forces underwent a strategic shift toward power 
projection, stability operations, expeditionary capabilities, and out-of-area 
deployments� But a handful of navies continued to adhere to the principles of 
territorial defense, control of SLOCs close to home, and sea-denial capabilities 
within the approaches to their shores�
The Nordic Countries. Finland, Sweden, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Nor-
way are examples of smaller European navies that placed a premium on defend-
ing their territories from invasion throughout the first decade of the post–Cold 
War period�
Recognizing Scandinavia’s inherent geographic vulnerabilities (in particular, a 
lack of strategic depth), political and military leaders alike stressed the fact that, 
despite fundamental changes in the international security order, caution was 
well-advised� “Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict [and] all nations do 
indeed value military strength� � � � Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable 
future, neglect the risks of war and that Sweden could be subject to an armed 
aggression,” Admiral Peter Nordbeck of Sweden reminded others�31 Therefore, 
these navies’ principal functions were to deny the aggressor use of SLOCs, gain 
sea control in territorial waters, and defend ports and naval bases�32
Aegean Rivals. For much of the past century, Turkish and Greek naval think-
ing has been based on similar principles� With their territories located on a po-
litical, cultural, and religious fault line, these two major antagonists have made 
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significant investments in their military forces� Many of these investments have 
been justified by the ostensible threat the two states pose to one another, despite 
the fact that they are NATO allies� Consequently, Greece and Turkey spent more 
than 3�5 percent of their GDPs on defense throughout the 1990s�
The bulk of both navies consisted of platforms capable of conducting sea 
control / sea denial and protecting SLOCs� This included a sizable element of 
surface combatants (either surplus U�S� ships or vessels of other foreign design), 
as well as numerous fast-attack craft� Furthermore, both navies commanded a 
powerful subsurface element, of German origin� While the Turkish fleet enjoyed 
a numerical advantage over the Hellenic Navy throughout the Cold War, it also 
faced the threat of a possible Soviet attack aimed at securing the exit to the Medi-
terranean via the Turkish Straits� Therefore, Turkey had to maintain a credible 
mine-warfare capability not only to control the straits but also to act as a coun-
terweight to the Soviet (later the Russian) Black Sea Fleet�33
Unlike many other European states, these two did not consider the ability to 
project power over great distances to conduct peacekeeping missions and stabil-
ity operations to be primary concerns� Although both Greece and Turkey par-
ticipated in naval operations outside their principal spheres of interest alongside 
their NATO allies, the basic tenets promulgated in both countries’ defense strate-
gies remained unchanged�34 Throughout the last years of the twentieth century, 
both navies were well financed and maintained a high level of readiness�
AFTER THE FALL OF THE TOWERS (2001–14)
Throughout the 1990s, many naval forces in Europe still were able to adapt read-
ily to the evolving security environment� For the most part, a sufficient number 
of trained personnel (many states retained conscription) and a sufficient amount 
of matériel allowed the Europeans to address the various security challenges 
with relative ease� Moreover, the overwhelming superiority of the U�S� armed 
forces compensated for the shortcomings and capability gaps that slowly emerged 
among European militaries� What is more, throughout the 1980s many navies 
had undergone comprehensive modernization efforts, receiving state-of-the-art 
aircraft, ships, and submarines� Therefore, most navies were in a good condition 
to fulfill the missions of a so-called postmodern navy, which include sea control, 
expeditionary operations, stability operations / humanitarian assistance, good 
order at sea, and cooperative naval diplomacy�35
Land Wars and Economic Woes
The twenty-first century barely had begun when the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, sent shock waves rippling across the globe� Although sea 
power played an important role during the opening phases of both the U�S�-led 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq two years later, the subsequent 
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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns had long-lasting conse-
quences for Europe’s sea services� As in previous military campaigns, American 
carrier strike groups took station in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea, 
from where they conducted air strikes against enemy forces and provided air sup-
port for allied troops on the ground� Other elements of the U�S� Navy and Marine 
Corps provided sea- and airlift capabilities and contributed elite ground forces to 
the fight (Marines and USN SEALs)�
Although some of the European navies (in particular the British and French) 
participated effectively in these campaigns, the evolving struggle against glob-
ally networked radical jihadi 
terrorism seemed to vindicate 
the theory that traditional 
concepts of high-intensity 
conflict and maneuver war-
fare against peer competitors 
largely had lost their rele-
vance�36 Following the general 
trend toward peacekeeping 
and stability operations in distant theaters, Europe’s armed forces progressively 
calibrated their capabilities accordingly� However, the necessary financial re-
sources were increasingly difficult to secure�
As the security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq deteriorated, many states 
involved in the conflicts felt compelled to make greater investment in protecting 
their troops on the ground and toward bringing the wars to a quick and satisfacto-
ry conclusion� However, simply increasing the defense budget to buttress national 
military commitments was in many cases politically unfeasible� The money for 
these contingencies had to come from either the existing defense budget or supple-
mentary and emergency funding� With army and air force components receiving a 
larger share of funding, many navies had to make do with even less money�
The global financial crisis of 2007, the subsequent eurozone crisis, and the 
economic downturn that ensued combined into a perfect storm buffeting armed 
forces across Europe� After the end of the Cold War, many states had been able to 
consolidate their militaries, despite fiscal restrictions; but against the backdrop of 
tanking economies, a failing financial sector, and soaring national debt, even the 
previous levels of defense spending and the corresponding force structures were 
considered unsustainable in many cases�
Doing More with Less: Austerity Measures and Growing Capability Gaps
The United Kingdom: Truncating a Fleet. The repercussions for Europe’s naval 
forces were arguably most noticeable in the case of the Royal Navy� Early in the 
The . . . reemergence of great-power rivalry . . . , 
one of the largest refugee crises since the end 
of the Cold War . . . , terrorist attacks by radi-
cal jihadists . . . , the U.S. rebalancing toward 
the Indo-Pacific region, and President Donald 
Trump’s “America First” policy have height-
ened the sense of uncertainty.
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first decade of the twenty-first century—still a time of relative plenty—the RN 
introduced two Albion-class assault landing ships and three Bay-class dock land-
ing ships, bringing the number of large amphibious-warfare ships up to seven� 
The Invincible-class carriers, although reduced to two ships in 2005, added a sub-
stantial power-projection capability and reinforced the concept of expeditionary 
warfare outside NATO’s previous area of operations�37 At the same time, a class 
of up to twelve new Type 45 air-defense destroyers was under construction and 
the first unit of the highly capable Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine 
was launched in 2007—just months before the economic crisis hit�
With that crisis taking full effect and the British government being pressed 
to reduce its budget deficit, the military became subject to draconian austerity 
measures� The Strategic Defence and Security Review, hastily published in 2010, 
called for the RN’s Harrier naval air arm to be disbanded and the flagship, Ark 
Royal, to be scrapped� The other ship of this class, Illustrious, was retained as a 
temporary amphibious transport helicopter carrier until the amphibious assault 
ship HMS Ocean was refitted�
The remaining legacy frigates were decommissioned, and because production 
of Type 45 destroyers had been cut off after six units and numerous cost overruns, 
the RN’s escort fleet shrank to only nineteen vessels� The replacement program 
for Britain’s maritime patrol aircraft was terminated, leaving a significant capabil-
ity gap to this day� Finally, only one of the two new Queen Elizabeth–class carriers 
was to become operational; the second would be sold or held in reserve�38
It would not take long for these measures to take their toll on Britain’s ability 
to shape events abroad� During the air campaign against the regime of Mu‘ammar 
Gadhafi in the summer of 2011, French, Italian, and American fixed- and rotary-
wing combat aircraft were launched from carriers stationed off the coast of 
Libya� Britain having axed its carrier capability, its Tornados and Typhoons had 
to deploy from land bases in England and Italy� Smaller and less capable than at 
any time in recent memory, the Royal Navy arguably had reached the nadir in 
its history�
France: Willing but Stretched. Although the Marine Nationale was able to deploy 
highly capable carrier-based combat aircraft against targets from Afghanistan 
to Libya, the first decade of the twenty-first century proved to be anything but 
smooth sailing for the French navy�
Already in the late 1970s the idea for the replacement of France’s existing 
flattops was floated� Consequently, the keel of the MN’s first nuclear-powered 
carrier, Charles de Gaulle, was laid down in 1989� However, the program ran into 
major difficulties� Key components had severe design flaws, and a lack of funding 
meant the ship became operational only after more than a decade of construction 
and retrofitting� To this day, Europe’s most powerful conventional naval asset has 
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been plagued with technical problems� Moreover, the absence of a comparable 
asset among the other European navies left the ship in high demand, causing sub-
stantial wear and tear� In light of the technical hurdles and increasing financial 
restrictions, a second carrier never was built� Moreover, although some progress 
was made circa 2005–10, the joint venture between France and Britain to build a 
class of carriers with similar layout did not materialize�39 Consequently, the MN’s 
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cycles of Charles de Gaulle� At the time of this writing, the ship was undergoing 
its midlife refit and upgrade and will not return to the fleet much before 2020�40
Over the years, military-to-military relations progressively matured between 
France and NATO, notwithstanding the political fallout with the United States 
over the invasion of Iraq� More importantly, in 2009 President Nicolas Sarkozy 
put an end to the “French exemption” and the country officially rejoined NATO� 
As a RAND study noted, “France today is much more integrated in NATO plan-
ning and operation than at any time since the mid-1960s�”41
In terms of naval capabilities, France’s expeditionary-driven foreign policy 
during the 1990s resulted in the construction of three Mistral-class amphibious 
assault ships / helicopter carriers, which not only act as a stopgap when the single 
carrier is unavailable but have provided the MN with credible power-projection 
capabilities since being introduced in the middle of the first decade of the new 
century�
Meanwhile, on the basis of their experience on their joint Horizon project, 
France and Italy set out to build a new multipurpose frigate, known as the 
FREMM�42 Both navies intended the class to replace their existing conglomera-
tions of older surface combatants; the French navy hoped to procure nineteen 
units� Although the program can be considered a success story, France had to 
limit its ambitions in the light of economic woes following the economic crisis� 
Ultimately the MN will receive only eight FREMMs, bringing the escort fleet 
down to fifteen vessels, five of which (of the La Fayette class) already were not 
intended to be principal surface combatants at the time of their commissioning 
in the 1990s�43
Italy: Within a Basin of Turmoil. The Italian navy has remained a powerful tool 
for Italian foreign policy throughout the twenty-first century� In fact, the coun-
try’s strategic goals have remained largely unchanged since their articulation in 
the late 1970s� In accordance with Italy’s strategic interests, the navy continued to 
enhance its expeditionary capabilities (the goal was to be able to deploy a brigade- 
level force); strengthen its naval airpower; acquire multirole platforms to counter 
all forms of threat; and promote national defense, maritime awareness, and mari-
time security�44
Throughout the last decade, the Marina Militare has maintained a very high 
operational tempo and has conducted a plethora of naval tasks� In doing so it has 
relied on a capable and well-balanced fleet and highly trained crews� The domes-
tically built aircraft carrier Cavour was brought into service in 2008, and will be 
capable of deploying the Lockheed Martin F-35B STOVL fighter in the future� 
Its predecessor, Giuseppe Garibaldi, meanwhile functions as a helicopter carrier� 
The demand for an Italian carrier air wing results from the shrinkage of the U�S� 
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Navy’s footprint in the Mediterranean over the last two decades� “[It] seems to 
be a reasonable assumption [that] the Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively 
going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle group in the larger Medi-
terranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated on 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans�”45
The escort fleet comprises two destroyers of the Horizon, or Andrea Doria, 
class, and a growing number of new FREMM frigates� In contrast to France’s 
curtailment policies, the Italian Ministry of Defense has decided to procure all 
ten frigates it initially planned� Italy’s submarine fleet has profited from close co-
operation with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and has received four 
Type 212A submarines with 
air-independent propulsion�46
Most importantly, both 
Italy’s navy and its coast 
guard have been burdened 
heavily with operations on 
the lower end of the intensity 
scale� Apart from everyday 
duties, such as making port 
calls, conducting search-and-
rescue operations, and main-
taining good order at sea, ad-
ditional challenges for Italy’s 
sea services have resulted from political developments along Europe’s southern 
and eastern shores over the past decade� Faced with thousands of refugees trying 
to escape poverty and war throughout Africa and the greater Middle East, both 
services have been engaged actively in countering human trafficking, as well as 
delivering humanitarian assistance across vast areas of the Mediterranean basin� 
Accordingly, the MM also has maintained a large contingent of offshore patrol 
vessels that are better suited for constabulary duties than their heavily armed sis-
ters� As one observer notes, “[t]he Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make 
it stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty—and by 
humanity—in respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea�”47
In combination with Italy’s numerous other military commitments, these 
developments have left a smaller number of platforms dealing with a greater 
number of tasks� With dwindling resources and fewer platforms, the MM hardly 
can maintain its tempo of deployment across a host of areas without risking fa-
tigue and accident� Perhaps even more importantly, since transitioning to an all-
volunteer force, personnel costs have placed a substantial burden on the defense 
[W]hile most navies have excelled at conduct-
ing operations at the lower end of the intensity 
spectrum and within largely permissive envi-
ronments, traditional war-fighting capabili-
ties . . . against near-peer competitors have 
atrophied severely in the quarter-century since 
the end of the Cold War. The shortage of plat-
forms, as well as the lack of mission-specific 
training and exercises, . . . finds its origin in 
strategic shortsightedness, political myopia, 
and the attendant fiscal austerity measures.
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budget, thereby limiting funding for maintenance and procurement�48 Italian 
naval leaders remain adamant that the MM will be able to “fulfill its national and 
international commitments�”49 But despite these protestations, the country may 
have to limit its ambitions: “For the navy, the longer-term consequence will likely 
be some re-orientation towards regional intervention capabilities at the expense 
of its current enthusiasm for extra-regional expeditionary deployments�”50
Spain: Creating a Balanced Fleet. Over the years, most European navies have 
streamlined their respective naval command structures while trying to modern-
ize their fleets� As new and more-capable platforms were introduced over time, 
older systems were phased out� Given the complexity and cost of many of these 
platforms, ships and aircraft rarely were replaced on a one-for-one basis� Rather, 
since the turn of the century, European naval forces have experienced what is 
arguably the most drastic decline of platforms in recent history�51 The eurozone 
crisis only exacerbated the strained situation in which many armed forces found 
themselves, which was particularly pronounced in states with relatively weak 
economies�
Spain’s economy, for example, was affected gravely by the crisis, and hence its 
armed forces were as well� Consequently, the Spanish navy has faced severe fi-
nancial pressure in recent years� Fortunately, the core of its current fleet was pro-
cured prior to Spain’s financial woes� This includes the 28,000-ton Juan Carlos, a 
“strategic projection ship”; a class of five Álvaro de Bazán Aegis frigates; and the 
Cantabria replenishment tanker� These projects also have had a positive effect on 
Spain’s domestic shipbuilding industry, which is building for foreign customers 
both the aforementioned frigates and the assault ship� However, while Navantia 
has made a name for itself as one of the leading shipbuilders of surface vessels on 
the continent, it did not cover itself in glory in providing Spain’s future underwa-
ter flotilla� Major technical difficulties led to cost overruns and the postponement 
of the introduction of the new S-80 Isaac Peral class, resulting in bad publicity�52
While from a purely platform-centric view the navy’s situation might have 
seemed quite satisfactory, the lack of funding had a negative impact on training 
and readiness� The number of military personnel continued to decline through-
out the first decade of the twenty-first century, adding to the shortage of trained 
officers and sailors� “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish � � � ensured continuity of 
capabilities in the face of spending constraints has been to reduce overall train-
ing levels,” a study points out�53 “Manning problems have hurt the Spanish Navy’s 
ability to deploy multiple units at a short notice,” the study adds�54
Overall, Spain is likely to find it increasingly painful to support its wide range 
of capabilities at current spending levels� It therefore remains to be seen whether 
the navy will be able to retain the well-balanced fleet it currently operates�
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Capabilities Lost—Some for Good
Other states that also had shifted toward more-comprehensive expeditionary 
capabilities during the 1990s, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, largely 
accepted the loss of specific naval capabilities while retaining smaller, still profi-
ciently skilled forces�55
The Netherlands. The Dutch, for example, went from having one of the largest 
and most capable Cold War fleets to what some observers believe to be a second-
rate navy, arguably too small to deal effectively with tasks across a wide portion 
of the intensity spectrum at the same time�56
Although in 2000, Dutch defense white papers had outlined the various func-
tions of the Royal Netherlands Navy, such as deploying a brigade-size element 
into high-intensity operations, one can concur with the assessment that by the 
end of the decade the “Dutch military [had] fallen well short of the 2000 white 
paper’s goals�” This comes as no surprise, given that over the course of ten years 
seventeen surface combatants were decommissioned, replaced by only four De 
Zeven Provinciën–class frigates� In contrast to these highly capable air-defense 
frigates, the four Holland-class large oceangoing patrol vessels that also were 
added to the fleet are designed with low-intensity operations in Dutch overseas 
territories specifically in mind� Despite their sophisticated sensor suite, they lack 
hitting power for force-on-force engagements� Moreover, by 2005 the remaining 
Dutch P-3C Orion maritime patrol planes were sold to Germany, leaving a void 
in the country’s maritime awareness capability�57
On a more positive note, the navy’s amphibious forces have benefited from the 
commissioning of two Rotterdam-class LPDs and the 28,000-ton joint support 
ship Karel Doorman over the last decade, and the submarines of the country’s 
small flotilla have demonstrated their proficiencies, both during exercises with 
NATO allies and while recently shadowing a Russian carrier group as it deployed 
to the Mediterranean�58
Denmark. Denmark was able to secure funding for two Absalon-class flexible 
support ships and three Iver Huitfeldt–class multipurpose frigates� Danish mili-
tary activities over the last decade ranged from deployments to Afghanistan and 
contributions to antipiracy operations, such as the European Union’s Operation 
ATALANTA and NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, to providing naval elements 
to NATO’s standing maritime groups and participating recently in NATO’s bal-
listic missile–defense effort�
However, Denmark’s newly won blue-water capabilities came at the expense of 
more-traditional elements of sea power; most prominently, all four of the navy’s 
submarines were phased out by 2004, leaving it without one of the most useful 
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naval assets.59 “Today the fleet has no submarines, no fast attack craft and no 
dedicated minelayers.”60
FIGURE 2
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Germany. Unsurprisingly, Germany, given its status as a world leader in conven-
tional submarine technology, retained its submarine force throughout the post–
Cold War period� Notwithstanding the addition of state-of-the-art platforms, the 
size of the German navy shrank in lockstep with the reductions to the defense 
budget� As an example, while twenty-three submarines were in service in 1990, 
the number had fallen to fourteen by 2000� Another fifteen years later, only six 
vessels were left� The surface fleet received capable F-124 Sachsen-class guided- 
missile frigates, which could provide fleet air defense for anything up to carrier 
strike groups; a new class of so-called stabilization frigates also was procured� De-
spite being larger in size, these F-125 stabilization frigates are less heavily armed 
than their predecessors� Therefore, a new crewing concept and modular design 
are intended to allow for longer periods of deployment over greater distances� 
These ships—as well as the next class of very large surface combatants, the MKS-
180s—are the navy’s answer to the requirements postulated in the defense white 
paper of 2006�61 The recent decommissioning of its last patrol boats (guided- 
missile craft) largely concluded the shift from a brown-water force to a blue-water 
navy� However, growing concerns over Russia’s military activities in the Baltic Sea 
have called this transition into question, and Germany again is looking to expand 
its naval capabilities in littoral waters closer to home�62
Over the last decades, Germany also has remained relatively reluctant to com-
mit greater resources to Europe’s common defense� Except for its contribution 
to the security mission in Afghanistan, Germany often has been unwilling to 
provide any form of hard power to recent NATO- or U�S�-led military operations, 
such as in Libya and Syria� Rather, its involvement abroad has been focused on 
peacekeeping missions and stability operations (such as with the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon [known as UNIFIL] from 2006 to the present) and de-
ployments as part of NATO’s standing maritime groups, as well as providing good 
order at sea more generally�63 With fewer vessels; the absence of large, amphibious- 
capable platforms; and the above-mentioned political caveats, “[Germany’s] 
cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection,” as one analyst has 
noted�64 Much less can it claim to command sufficient and readily available an-
tisurface and antisubmarine capabilities for high-threat environments� News of 
the entire German submarine fleet recently being out of action simultaneously 
is a case in point�65
Smart Solutions in the High North
Norway. Farther north, Norway gained public attention for making some clever 
choices when it came to modernizing its naval forces� Although the defense bud-
get plummeted from 3 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 1�4 percent in 2014, 
the Royal Norwegian Navy has kept its force at a high level of readiness�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   31 5/1/18   11:10 AM
37
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 3 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
As its Cold War–era frigates reached the end of their service lives, a class of 
larger and more capable surface combatants, based on the Spanish frigate design, 
took shape� The first ship and namesake of the class, Fridtjof Nansen, was intro-
duced into the navy in 2006� It is particularly well suited to perform a range of 
missions in Arctic conditions along Norway’s SLOCs� Noticeably, the frigate is 
the smallest warship to feature the Aegis combat system, while it can deploy the 
new NH-90 helicopter for ASW operations� Closer to shore, Norway relies on 
its Skjold class of stealthy, high-speed corvettes to counter symmetric and asym-
metric threats from the sea�
Sweden. Sweden showed similar technical ingenuity in commissioning five cor-
vettes of its own, of the Visby class, showcasing effective signature-reduction 
measures� Both Norway and Sweden disbanded their network of coastal-defense 
capacities during the first decade of the twenty-first century as the two countries 
continued to forge close ties with their Western partners; however, Sweden reac-
tivated its land-based, mobile, antiship missile systems in 2016�66
While territorial defense was not forgotten, participation within the frame-
work of multilateral peacekeeping operations under the aegis of NATO and the 
UN was promoted� “Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided fo-
cus on the conventional defense of Norwegian territory,” Norway’s defense white 
paper of 2004 stated�67 The close defense cooperation among the Scandinavian 
states (such as Northern Defense Cooperation [known as NORDEFCO] and 
Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation), as well as with other NATO members, not 
only has strengthened European and transatlantic ties; it has enhanced interoper-
ability and proficiencies among the respective navies�68
Divergences along the Southern Flank
Greece. Arguably, the Hellenic Navy has seen the fewest doctrinal changes over 
the past two decades� Even during a period when the majority of Europe’s armed 
forces sought more-comprehensive expeditionary capabilities, the Hellenic Navy 
remained focused on defending its adjacent waters and fulfilling its NATO obli-
gations� The relatively constant strategic framework in which the navy operated 
allowed it to strengthen its traditional naval elements (e�g�, ASW and ASuW)�
Despite the defense budget spiking at 3�3 percent of GDP in 2010, Greece’s fi-
nancial collapse during the eurozone crisis had far-reaching consequences for the 
country’s military� Coinciding with an important period of naval modernization, 
it caused “existing domestic construction � � � to be paralyzed whilst longstanding 
plans of new orders [were] stalled�”69 Although more recently there have been 
signs of improvement, the Hellenic Navy quite likely will be facing some difficult 
choices in the future� This is compounded by the fact that the balance of naval 
power in the region already has shifted, and continues to shift, toward its tradi-
tional regional competitor, Turkey�
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Turkey. Turkey has been able to create a powerful navy that continues to expand 
its capabilities—an exception among European naval forces� More importantly, 
it has built a domestic defense industry proficient in developing and fielding ev-
erything from main battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol craft and 
frigates�70
As the country tries to establish itself as a regional power, it also seeks to de-
ploy its military effectively beyond its borders� Its naval forces act as an important 
tool for gaining greater influence in the region� In the recent past, Turkish naval 
forces have shown an increasing level of ambition in contributing to international 
operations both within and beyond the Mediterranean (e�g�, Turkish ships have 
acted as the flagship of the counterpiracy Combined Task Force 151)� Yet, in light 
of the country’s recent coup d’état attempt and the subsequent purge within Tur-
key’s military, the navy, while a highly capable mix of foreign and domestic naval 
platforms, probably will not reach its full potential�
The Turkish navy provides an insightful example of how domestic turmoil can 
hamstring an expanding naval force� Since the turn of the century, the Turkish 
ministry of defense has set out on an ambitious procurement plan for the navy� 
This includes a number of highly sophisticated systems, ranging from domestical-
ly built Milgem- and Ada-class surface combatants to an amphibious assault ship 
based on the Spanish carrier Juan Carlos� Because of the complexity of modern 
warships, submarines, and aircraft, learning to operate them often involves very 
steep learning curves� Therefore, such systems require highly professional crews 
and astute commanders, as well as skilled engineers and other engineering per-
sonnel� Low morale, as well as widespread insecurities and suspicions within the 
armed forces, will leave some considerable doubt regarding Turkey’s more asser-
tive naval goals, such as the development of a carrier-based fixed-wing capability�71
AFTER THE FALL OF CRIMEA (2014 ONWARD)
In 2015, for the first time in more than two decades, Europe as a whole increased 
its defense spending�72 This reversal of trends can be attributed directly to a 
range of security-related concerns with which the European states see themselves 
confronted�
The most worrying is the reemergence of great-power rivalry� After a “hon-
eymoon period” of more than twenty years, Russia’s military intervention in 
eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have reminded Europe that it 
cannot take its security for granted� What is more, Russia’s irredentism and its 
increasingly assertive behavior along Europe’s northern, eastern, and southern 
borders coincided with one of the largest refugee crises since the end of the Cold 
War� Meanwhile, terrorist attacks by radical jihadists across the continent have 
caused a growing sense of insecurity within Europe� As if these challenges were 
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not daunting enough, the U�S� rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific region and 
President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy have heightened the sense of 
uncertainty�
Growing Pains
Against this backdrop of intersecting security challenges, European countries’ 
respective military strategies and defense postures (both national and NATO) 
are being revisited� It appears that, for the first time since the end of the Cold 
War, governments across Europe no longer can afford to reduce their own 
defense spending while readily investing large sums of money in their welfare 
states, all the while remaining utterly dependent on U�S� security guarantees� 
Consequently, all twenty-nine NATO member states have pledged to increase 
their financial contributions toward common security and defense�73 Meanwhile, 
neutral Sweden and Finland also have made concerted efforts to forge closer ties 
with their Western partners and strengthen their armed forces, not least in the 
maritime domain�74
Financial considerations notwithstanding, new concepts for closer coopera-
tion between Europe’s armed forces have been developed� Establishing bi- and 
trilateral defense agreements has proved expedient in compensating for and 
bridging the capability gaps created by years of austerity measures� The 2010 
defense agreement between the United Kingdom and France (the “Lancaster 
House treaties”) “provide[s] a road-map to more effective European defence 
cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency�”75 
For example, after more than half a decade of preparation, the Anglo-French 
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (a multiservice, scalable, power-projection 
force capable of high-intensity warfare) became operational in April 2016, and 
the force arguably has “set a new ‘gold standard’ for defence cooperation [in 
Europe]�”76 The German-Dutch Integrated Sea Battalion and the Spanish-Italian 
Amphibious Battlegroup mandated by the European Union are further examples 
of the efforts currently under way�77 It is safe to state that much of the coopera-
tion over the past decades has enhanced operational experience among European 
naval forces, and many naval officers have gained proficiencies in a broader range 
of naval operations than their Cold War predecessors�
However, there are caveats that merit close attention� First, while most navies 
have excelled at conducting operations at the lower end of the intensity spectrum 
and within largely permissive environments, traditional war-fighting capabilities 
(e�g�, ASW and ASuW) against near-peer competitors have atrophied severely 
in the quarter century since the end of the Cold War� The shortage of platforms, 
as well as the lack of mission-specific training and exercises, is the chief cause of 
this dangerous development, which finds its origin in strategic shortsightedness, 
political myopia, and the attendant fiscal austerity measures� In many instances, 
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navies find themselves unable to provide sufficient means to conduct their daily 
tasks, as “demonstrated by the ‘gapping’ of certain standing commitments to 
allow warships to be released for increasingly important NATO taskings�” Con-
sequently, oceangoing patrol vessels and auxiliaries fulfill missions traditionally 
conducted by potent frigates and destroyers�78 
Second, at the end of the Cold War, European powers were able to field, de-
ploy, and sustain division-size units in operations such as DESERT STORM� In 
contrast, today such an effort would be largely futile�79 Although they constitute 
the most-credible amphibious forces in Europe, French and British troops are 
“unlikely to be deployed in 
a high-threat environment 
without considerable U�S� 
force protection�”80 The mili-
taries have been “hollowed 
out to such an extent that the 
deployment of a brigade, let 
alone a division, at credible 
readiness would be a major 
challenge�”81 Ultimately, the 
European states barely manage to conduct basic peacetime (naval) duties at the 
desired rate, and have little to no surge capacity for emergencies�
Striking a Balance
For the above-mentioned reasons, each state must strike a balance between de-
ploying low-end military capabilities for daily tasks, on the one hand, and high-
end war-fighting capabilities for worst-case scenarios, on the other� With regard 
to naval power, the question remains to what extent “navies [should] invest their 
resources in high-intensity capabilities aimed at deterring or, if necessary, pros-
ecuting conflict with other navies, rather than in low-intensity capabilities best 
suited to the maintenance of good order at sea�”82
Arguably, the soundest solution to this problem is for European governments 
once again to provide sufficient funding for the naval branches to maintain 
relatively well-balanced fleets and operate them in a joint and combined fashion 
(i�e�, with land, air, and other sea forces)� These fleets need to be designed, first 
and foremost, to fight in contested environments, but, at the same time, must be 
configured to conduct many years of peacetime duties� If designed with sufficient 
room to grow, such naval forces would remain flexible enough to react to the 
ever-evolving security environment� Multipurpose surface combatants (ranging 
from two to seven thousand tons in displacement), amphibious-capable assets 
with substantial redundancies, small flotillas of modern submarines, and air-
borne maritime-surveillance platforms, in combination with the vital associated 
[D]efense cooperation among the European 
partners will need to encompass new common 
strategic guidelines, shared operational and 
doctrinal procedures, better training for mili-
tary personnel, and a much-improved mainte-
nance and readiness level of naval platforms, 
as well as greater industrial and technological 
collaboration.
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replenishment and sealift capabilities, are best suited to adapt to and conduct the 
various missions expected in the future� At the same time, defense cooperation 
among the European partners will need to encompass new common strategic 
guidelines, shared operational and doctrinal procedures, better training for mili-
tary personnel, and a much-improved maintenance and readiness level of naval 
platforms, as well as greater industrial and technological collaboration�
To list the multitude of measures European states are undertaking currently 
to strengthen their militaries is beyond the scope of this article� However, it is 
apparent that many have put a tentative end to the truncation of naval power and 
are reinvesting in capabilities at the upper end of the intensity spectrum� Nor-
way, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany all are modernizing or enhancing 
their underwater forces� Great Britain and Greece have decided to revive their 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities by reactivating and 
procuring maritime patrol aircraft� Italy and France will receive new, capable 
surface combatants over the coming years� The British government has recom-
mitted itself to operating two carriers, the first of which should be in service by 
2020—probably, initially, with a combined U�K�/U�S� F-35B air group� And over 
the next decade, Spain, Italy, and Turkey also probably will acquire this aircraft 
for their flattops�
If this trend continues over the coming years and the ties within the transat-
lantic community remain robust, there is a good chance that Europe’s naval forces 
will be better prepared and better equipped to perform the duties and fulfill the 
many functions with which they are charged� They will have arisen from the abyss�
N O T E S
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JAPAN’S DEFENSE READINESS
 Facing a fluid regional security environment and the need to strengthen its alliance role, Japan has worked to increase the capabilities of the Japan Self-
Defense Forces (JSDF)� It has adjusted the relevant bureaucratic, political, and 
operational frameworks and has made key investments in new force structures�
In December 2017, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced a budget bill 
for fiscal year (FY) 2018 of 5�19 trillion Japanese yen (JPY) (U�S�$45�76 billion), 
marking an increase for the sixth straight year� The new budget includes requests 
to make some key acquisitions and upgrades to the JSDF while also improving 
the management of the defense industry� The developments are taking place 
under the auspices of National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs), which 
identify air-sea supremacy, defense of remote islands, ballistic-missile defense, 
outer space and cyberspace, and large-scale disasters as the focal areas in which 
to strengthen the JSDF’s “effective deterrence and response to various situations�”1 
Furthermore, the Legislation for Peace and Security that came into effect in 
March 2016, combined with updated “Guidelines 
for Japan-U�S� Defense Cooperation,” has made 
Japan more like a “normal” ally and the JSDF more 
like a “normal” defense organization�
From Japan’s national security standpoint, the 
improvements in the JSDF’s capabilities are essen-
tial� The current Medium Term Defense Program 
(MTDP) states that air and maritime supremacy 
is a “prerequisite for effective deterrence and 
response to various situations, including defense 
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posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region�”2 Yet those developments also 
raise many questions concerning the actual readiness of the JSDF� This article 
assesses the state of Japan’s defense planning and JSDF readiness, focusing on 
air and maritime capabilities� Specifically, it will highlight the many gaps among 
policy, force structure, and operational readiness� It also argues that the JSDF 
lacks the operational and tactical doctrines essential to enhancing its readiness 
in the air and maritime domains�
DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN’S DEFENSE PLANNING
Since its inauguration in 1954, the JSDF—a special institution, constitution-
ally and politically—has served to defend Japan� Initially, despite the Cold War 
threats looming in the region, actual developments in the JSDF were incremental� 
The defense white paper (now issued annually) and the NDPGs that outlined 
the concept of basic defense capability did not make their debuts until 1970 and 
1976, respectively� Improvements in indigenous defense capabilities and strate-
gies came slowly, largely owing to the low-profile treatment of defense matters 
under Japan’s post–World War II Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasized economic 
development while relying on the U�S� security umbrella�3 Even with the demise 
of the post–Cold War order in the 1990s, developments in Japan’s defense plan-
ning remained minimal; the second NDPG, issued in 1995, barely changed the 
JSDF’s focus on homeland defense under the basic defense capability concept.
However, beginning in the late 1990s security challenges became more 
pressing for Japan, particularly with regard to North Korea’s weapons-of-mass-
destruction adventurism; growing concerns about China’s military buildup; and 
transnational terrorism, as epitomized by the September 11, 2001, attacks� The 
new threats served as catalysts for Tokyo to reconfigure its defense posture, lead-
ing to the establishment of the Defense Posture Review Board in September 2001 
and the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in April 2004� Discussions 
led to the formulation of the new NDPG unveiled in December 2004, which 
focused on “defending Japan” and “preventing threats by improving the interna-
tional security environment” through “i) Japan’s own efforts, ii) cooperation with 
the allies, and iii) cooperation with the international community�”4 The new focus 
called for a shift from the basic defense capability concept to response-oriented, 
“multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense forces�”5 The 2004 NDPG essen-
tially has served as the fundamental template for Japan’s defense planning since 
that time, not only by providing the basis for building the nation’s indigenous 
defense capabilities, but also by promoting its role with regard to alliance com-
mitments and international security�
The reconfiguration of the JSDF further accelerated in the 2010s� Cumulative 
developments in the regional security environment, combined with a landslide 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   42 5/1/18   11:10 AM
48
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
 H I NATA- YA M AG U C H I  4 3
victory by the Democratic Party in September 2009, led to the issuance of the 
2010 NDPG, which promised enhancement of “readiness, mobility, flexibility, 
sustainability, and versatility” to create a “dynamic defense force�”6 A notable ele-
ment of the 2010 NDPG was its focus on acquiring amphibious capabilities that 
were deemed pivotal to defending the Southwest Island Chain�7
The return of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power in December 
2012 led to further upgrades to Japan’s defense planning, particularly the estab-
lishment of the National Security Council and issuance of the National Security 
Strategy (NSS)� Under this new framework, the Japanese government issued the 
2013 NDPG and the MTDP in December 2013; they called for a “dynamic joint 
defense force” that would emphasize air and maritime supremacy, as well as joint 
readiness, as the key imperatives for the JSDF� In essence, the NDPG issued in 
2013 is an upgraded version of its predecessor, yet its greater significance lies in 
the fact that thenceforward Japan’s defense planning took place under the aus-
pices of the NSS�8 Then, in September 2015, the Diet passed the Legislation for 
Peace and Security� Its provisions included a statement of Japan’s right to exercise 
collective self-defense and a legal basis for the JSDF to respond more effectively 
to so-called gray-zone situations�9
While the JSDF certainly has undergone significant changes since the 2004 
NDPG, it is important to note that these developments did not represent a series 
of overhauls or 180-degree turns� Rather, they constituted a long-term, step-
by-step embodiment of key agendas and desired capabilities in Japan’s defense 
planning�
INCREASING JSDF READINESS
Japan remains in the midst of enhancing its force structure and capabilities and 
its operations readiness� While the JSDF’s force structure enjoys many compara-
tive advantages owing to its advanced technologies, important operational readi-
ness weaknesses and shortfalls remain, creating a classic example of the force 
structure–versus–operational readiness dilemma that Richard Betts outlined in 
a 1995 book�10 Japan will need to remedy these weaknesses by ensuring the cost-
effective use of current assets and the development of future capabilities to ensure 
both optimal force structure and operational readiness�
Force Structure Shortfalls
Enabled by Japan’s robust industrial capacity and advanced technology, the JSDF 
force structure incorporates a high concentration of cutting-edge platforms and 
equipment� This has enabled Japan to improve the JSDF’s capabilities in the 
areas prioritized in recent NDPGs by reducing significantly the country’s land 
warfare–based firepower, instead strengthening its capabilities in the air and 
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maritime domains, as well as in joint operations; command, control, communi-
cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and 
ballistic-missile defense (BMD)�
Notably, implementing the NDPGs over the past two decades has not required 
significant increases in personnel� Rather, improvements are taking place via ef-
ficiencies, such as streamlining the order of battle, making upgrades to enhance 
the longevity of existing platforms, and creating a networked system of assets�
The Maritime Domain. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) pos-
sesses powerful blue-water capabilities, including sea-based missile defense� 
The new provisional budget set reflects the 2013 NDPG’s proposal to increase 
the number of destroyers and submarines as part of the effort to form four-
teen escort divisions and six submarine divisions� The JMSDF already has six 
Aegis-equipped destroyers (of the Atago and Kongo classes) and is expected to 
introduce a new class in coming years� The existing Abukuma, Akizuki, Asagiri, 
Hatakaze, Hatsuyuki, Murasame, Shirane, and Takanami classes, with the new 
Asahi-class destroyers, will provide the core of JMSDF surface-warfare capabili-
ties, while the Hayabusa-class patrol boats complement Japan Coast Guard assets 
in dealing with spy vessels� The JMSDF submarine force comprises the Oyashio 
class and the air-independent-propulsion Soryu class (with the newer boats of the 
Soryu class being powered by improved lithium-ion-propulsion batteries), as well 
as investments in a new class of three-thousand-ton submarines for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations�11
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is another major JMSDF strength, centered 
on the employment of SH-60K, P-3C, and P-1 aircraft� Japan’s ASW capabilities 
have been enhanced significantly in recent years with the commissioning of the 
Hyuga-class and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers�12 Furthermore, the MOD is 
pushing for the construction of 3,900-ton “compact-type hull” destroyers with 
characteristics close to the modularity concept of the U�S� Navy’s Littoral Combat 
Ship, but with greater firepower and installable equipment for minesweeping and 
ASW capabilities�13
These various platforms and future acquisitions certainly will strengthen the 
JMSDF’s capabilities� However, while Japan’s maritime platforms have techno-
logical superiority, it remains debatable whether they are sufficient to deal with 
the changes the regional military balance is experiencing, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively� Such questions are likely to become increasingly pressing as 
the JMSDF expands its operational range beyond territorial waters to defend the 
country’s critical sea lines of communication�
The Air Domain. Key developments are anticipated in the Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force (JASDF)� In recent years, the F-15J’s warning-and-surveillance equipment 
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and the air-to-air combat capabilities of the F-2 have been upgraded to enhance 
further the JASDF’s airpower� The acquisition of additional aerial-refueling air-
craft—such as the KC-767J equipped with the flying-boom system and potential 
investments in KC-46As to increase the endurance of combat air patrol opera-
tions and expand fighter-coverage areas—is a key development� In September 
2016, Lockheed Martin rolled out the first of the JASDF’s F-35A Lightning IIs� 
The first domestically assembled version, by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was 
unveiled in June 2017; it will replace the F-4J and the older fleet of F-15Js�14 The 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries also currently are testing Japan’s first indigenous stealth jet technology 
demonstrator, known as the X-2� While many find the project exciting, it remains 
unclear whether the X-2 actually will become a successful fifth-generation JASDF 
fighter, given the high costs for research and development (R&D), as well as un-
certainties over the potential for exports to attract revenue�15 Moreover, the X-2 
project is reported to be delayed owing to defense-planning issues, raising further 
questions about the development and deployment of the aircraft�16 Despite the 
challenges, the acquisition of next-generation platforms is an essential step for-
ward in enhancing the JASDF’s air-superiority capabilities, particularly given that 
existing units are overburdened by operational demands�
The JASDF also has made substantive organizational improvements� In Janu-
ary 2016, the MOD established in Naha, Okinawa, the 9th Air Wing, which in-
cludes two F-15 fighter squadrons� The establishment of the new wing was driven 
by the exponential increase in scrambles (fighter intercepts) since 2010, peaking 
at 1,168 interceptions in 2016, 74 percent against Chinese aircraft and 26 percent 
against Russian aircraft�17 While the staging of the forward-deployed air units 
certainly enhances Japan’s air capabilities, the rapidly increasing quality of adver-
sary aircraft raises important questions about whether the transition into higher 
levels of readiness can be sustained against the growing burdens�
The JSDF’s ISR capabilities have improved significantly� Previously, this area 
was viewed as a major vulnerability in light of the numerous ballistic-missile 
provocations and territorial waters incursions occurring since the late 1990s� 
In maritime reconnaissance, the P-1 and the SH-60J/K continue to serve as the 
main maritime patrol aircraft, while some P-3Cs will be upgraded to extend their 
operational life spans� For airborne early warning capability, the JASDF currently 
operates the airborne warning and control system E-767 and the E-2C, and soon 
will introduce the E-2D� With respect to unmanned aerial systems (UASs), under 
the current MTDP Japan is due to acquire three RQ-4 Global Hawks to enhance 
the JASDF’s ISR capabilities� Important upgrades of ISR equipment installed 
in aircraft, destroyers, submarines, and radar systems, such as the FPS-7 fixed 
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warning-and-control radar system, also are being accomplished� These devel-
opments are essential to enhancing not only the JSDF’s communications and 
precision navigation but also its ability to detect, track, and target enemy assets� 
Further improvements are being enabled by strong investments in the enhance-
ment of outer space technologies for C4ISR and X-band communication�18
However, the issue with advancements in C4ISR capabilities is vulnerability to 
attacks from within the same domain, such as cyber and electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) attacks� Moreover, there is uncertainty over whether the acquisition of 
and upgrades to ISR assets will be sufficient to keep pace with regional develop-
ments� In particular, Chinese and Russian modernization programs that incor-
porate stealth capabilities, as well as North Korea’s diversification of its military 
capabilities (including a new class of submarines capable of launching ballistic 
missiles), pose new challenges for the JSDF� These diversifying challenges and the 
increased operational tempo will make it ever more vital for the JSDF to collect, 
process, and deliver decision-quality information in minimal time to enable it to 
take the right action�
The JSDF’s BMD capabilities also are improving steadily� North Korea’s launch 
of a Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998 served as the primary catalyst 
for installing a joint Japan-U�S� BMD system in Japan� The JSDF has Aegis-
equipped destroyers and Patriot missile batteries� However, North Korea’s contin-
uous developments and test launches of ballistic missiles have provoked anxieties 
over whether the current BMD systems are effective and sufficient� The FY2018 
budget will make significant investments in further development of the JSDF’s 
BMD capabilities, including joint Japan-U�S� development of the SM-3 Block IIA, 
to be carried by the Aegis-equipped destroyers, thereby expanding their cover-
age from three hundred to one thousand kilometers, and upgrades to the Patriot 
batteries by installing the PAC-3 missile segment engagement that boasts a range 
of over thirty kilometers� Japan also is moving forward with installation of the 
Aegis Ashore system to add another layer to its BMD capabilities and coverage�19
The Air and Maritime Domains. An important element of Japan’s air and mari-
time defense is the JSDF’s area-denial capabilities in the Southwest Island Chain� 
Currently, the JSDF is armed with Type 03 and Type 11 surface-to-air and Type 88 
and Type 12 surface-to-surface missiles� More importantly, recent realignments 
have deployed antiship and antiaircraft missile batteries along the Southwest Is-
land Chain to provide coverage for Japanese airspace and maritime territories in 
the East China Sea� The antiaircraft and antiship missiles are important not only 
to protect the offshore islands; they also should support and supplement JASDF 
and JMSDF units by easing their burden in dealing with intruders into Japanese 
territorial waters or onto Japanese islands, including the Senkakus� Certainly, 
the shore-based antiair and antiship missile batteries will be instrumental to 
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improving Japan’s area-denial capabilities�20 Realistically, however, the real effec-
tiveness of the shore-based area-denial arrangements will depend heavily on how 
well they are able to integrate with the JSDF’s air and maritime capabilities�
With regard to amphibious operations, steady improvements are being 
achieved in joint-operations capabilities for rapid deployment� In particular, the 
Osumi-class amphibious transport docks that accommodate air-cushion landing 
craft, as well as the Hyuga- and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, with their abil-
ity to operate CH-47J transport helicopters and tilt-rotor V-22 aircraft, constitute 
a key component of the JSDF’s amphibious capability� In fixed-wing airborne 
operations, the new C-2 transport aircraft boasts greater size, speed, and range 
than the current C-1� Taking advantage of such air and maritime transport assets, 
the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) increasingly is focusing on mobile 
platforms such as the maneuver combat vehicle, the assault amphibious vehicle, 
and the light armored vehicle, as well as the upgraded Type 96 armored personnel 
carrier� Moreover, the MOD in March 2016 signed ten-year contracts with civil-
ian charter vessels such as Hakuou and the high-speed catamaran Nacchan World 
to enhance the JSDF’s logistical capabilities�21
While the modernization of the JSDF is making steady progress, questions 
remain regarding how far it will go� The next MTDP, for FY2019–23, is due in 
2018, and the next NDPG is on the horizon� On December 15, 2017, Prime Min-
ister Abe stated that the next NDPG will feature major changes while continuing 
to conform exclusively to defense-oriented principles; however, he provided no 
specific details�22 Naturally, there are strong demands for further capability im-
provements to meet the diversifying and increasing mission requirements and 
to offset the existing burdens� Future considerations could include whether to 
acquire not only next-generation models of existing assets but also land-attack 
cruise missiles (LACMs) and light aircraft carriers, and to revamp the Izumo 
class to accommodate vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (i�e�, V/STOL) aircraft�
However, careful consideration needs to go into pursuit of force structure in-
vestments; they should not be made merely for the sake of building a larger force 
armed with superior power-projection capabilities and firepower, particularly 
given the capital-intensive nature of air and maritime platforms� Poorly planned 
hardware acquisitions not only would have massive fiscal implications, but would 
create imbalances and potential negative path dependencies in the JSDF’s overall 
force posture�
Instead, a significant part of the JSDF’s force structure developments con-
sists of the installation and upgrading of C4ISR equipment; command, control, 
communications, and intelligence (C3I) equipment; navigation equipment; au-
tomated systems; propulsion systems and engines; and precision armaments to 
strengthen the performance of existing platforms� The Medium- to Long-Term 
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Technology Outlook issued in August 2016 focuses on “unmanned technology,” 
“smart network technology,” “high-power energy technology,” and “improve-
ment of functional performance of existing equipment�”23 The FY2017 budget 
devotes JPY 24�5 billion (U�S�$230 million) for R&D of “autonomous surveil-
lance technology and sensor systems for unmanned underwater surveillance 
vehicles,” “cyber resilience technology,” and “future amphibious technology,” as 
well as new antiair and antiship missiles�24 Much of the R&D focus is on missiles 
and munitions� The third supplementary budget of FY2016 also included one 
billion yen for research on rail guns�25 The FY2018 budget includes JPY 8�7 bil-
lion (U�S�$81�5 million) for next-generation warning-and-control radars, JPY 4�6 
billion (U�S�$43�1 million) for high-speed glide bombs, JPY 5�4 billion (U�S�$50�6 
million) for antiship guided missiles with longer range and stealth capabilities, 
JPY 8�7 billion (U�S�$81�6 million) for research on high-power laser systems 
to be used against mortar rounds, JPY 6�9 billion (U�S�$64�7 million) for next- 
generation medium-range air-to-air missiles, and JPY 700 million (U�S�$6�6 
million) for research on EMP weapons�26 Advancements in these technologies 
could be significant game changers in the JSDF’s capabilities over the long term, 
particularly if they are enhanced further with the capacity to deal with heavier 
targets in the air and maritime domains�
More-sensitive questions arise regarding whether Japan will require offensive 
platforms to ensure effective defense and deterrence in the air and maritime 
domains� To date, the JSDF has focused on deterrence by denial rather than by 
punishment� Yet the absence of the ability to inflict strategic damage on aggres-
sors raises questions regarding the effectiveness of Japan’s deterrence capabilities� 
In particular, North Korea’s continuous launching of ballistic missiles and its 
nuclear weapons tests have triggered debates over whether Japan needs to ac-
quire capabilities for deterrence by punishment as well as denial� In March 2017, 
the ruling LDP recommended using assets such as cruise missiles to provide 
counterattack capabilities�27 Discussions over acquiring LACMs have surfaced 
on occasion since the early years of the twenty-first century, particularly with the 
Tomahawk land-attack missile available as a means of attacking ballistic-missile 
launch sites (and vehicles)� While the acquisition of LACMs still is being debated, 
in December 2017 Japan announced its decision to acquire the Joint Air-to- 
Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER), the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile 
(LRASM) for the F-15J, and the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for the F-35A�28
Yet while the acquisition of LACMs may make sense from a deterrence point 
of view, the possibility poses dilemmas� On the one hand, whether counterstrike 
capabilities provide a sufficient deterrent is open to question� On the other hand, 
under the current legal framework, the whole concept of employing preemptive 
and preventive measures would spark intense debates regarding whether such 
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measures are too strategically offensive in nature and go beyond a “minimum 
self-defense capability�”29
Mobilization and Operational Constraints
While the JSDF boasts many cutting-edge platforms, capabilities count only if 
they are truly operational� And there have been significant improvements to the 
JSDF’s operational readiness in recent years, not only because of better logistics, 
exercises, and training, but also owing to the increasing number of Chinese and 
Russian incursions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters and North Korean 
missile launches� Still, the JSDF’s operational readiness remains constrained, 
largely by legal and institutional factors rather than technical issues�
First, mobilization of the JSDF is constrained significantly by the positive-list 
bureaucratic and legal framework derived from the post–World War II con-
stitution�30 Under this framework, rules of engagement have been very tight, 
limiting the JSDF’s ability to respond to contingencies in a timely manner� These 
constraints have been raised as a major issue over the years, but developments 
have been piecemeal� The enactment of the Armed Attack Situation Response 
Act in June 2003 focused on “invasions,” “ballistic missile attacks,” “guerrilla/
special forces,” and “air attacks�” The legislation exempted the JSDF from civilian 
laws during contingencies to permit smoother mobilization� Measures issued in 
June 2004, based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Act, addressed factors 
ranging from civil protection to amending the Self-Defense Forces Act�31 The 
2015 umbrella Legislation for Peace and Security introduced new measures as 
follows:32
• Self-Defense Forces Act
• International Peace Cooperation Act
• Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situa-
tions That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security
• Ship Inspection Operations Act
• Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
• U�S� and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act
• Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities
• Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
• Prisoners of War Act
• Act for Establishment of the National Security Council
• International Peace Support Act
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Yet many of the revisions largely embodied versions of the 2003 Armed Attack 
Situation Response Act, which Jeffrey Hornung and Mike Mochizuki correctly 
describe as an “expansion of the existing defense-oriented mandate rather than a 
mandate to exercise the right of collective self-defense�”33
There were further adjustments to the MOD’s decision-making, intended to 
smooth bureaucratic pathways within the MOD by allowing the JSDF chiefs of 
staff to work on an equal footing with the directors general of the MOD bureaus 
and the secretariat in serving the minister of defense� Overall, significant im-
provements are evident� Yet, given the short-notice nature of contingencies that 
Japan faces, whether the current legal and structural framework can manage 
adequately the JSDF’s ability to respond effectively remains in question�
Indeed, the JSDF faces a central dilemma: How can it act effectively when de-
terrence fails? The “newly determined three conditions for the ‘use of force’” state 
that force may be used (1) “[w]hen an armed attack against Japan has occurred, 
or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship 
with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear 
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness”; (2) “when there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack 
and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people”; and (3) the “use of force [is 
limited] to the minimum extent necessary�”34 Dealing with aggression effectively 
yet with the minimum force necessary would be challenging, not only because 
of Japan’s highly constrained rules of engagement but also given its geographic 
proximity to other states in the region� For example, the JSDF must calculate 
whether the aggressor’s actions are hostile (or not), as well as the appropriate 
response measures against the aggressor, all within a tight time frame� Granted, 
the increasing number of incursions and other gray-zone situations has given the 
JSDF substantial experience with “hot” situations; however, to date these encoun-
ters have fallen short of actual combat situations� Hence, although Japan now 
is authorized to take a more proactive part in collective self-defense and other 
international security operations, the JSDF’s combat effectiveness after the first 
shot is fired remains untested—raising concerns about how well the JSDF would 
perform in actual armed conflict�
Second, further enhancing interbranch coordination and integration is es-
sential�35 While joint operations have been discussed since the formative years 
of the JSDF, actual developments did not take place until the 2004 NDPG�36 The 
JSDF long has suffered from chronic stovepiping, to a level that obstructed coor-
dination among the three branches� A key bureaucratic development took place 
in March 2006 with the reorganization of the Joint Staff Council into the Joint 
Staff, which now integrates and facilitates greater coordination among the chiefs 
of staff of the three JSDF services� But major readiness and experience deficits 
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within the JSDF remain� The lagging operational developments, combined with 
the nature of the security challenges, have resulted in imbalances in levels of 
combat readiness� For instance, the JASDF and JMSDF have conducted far more 
actual contingency operations than the JGSDF�37
To address such issues and promote greater effectiveness and efficiency 
through coordination, the three branches of the JSDF have been working on 
upgrading their doctrines, to sharpen their roles in joint maneuvers, and on 
improving C3I systems, such as introducing cloud technology and tactical data-
link capabilities�38 Furthermore, under the current NDPG, some improvements 
are being seen in personnel aspects, such as the stationing of liaison officers in 
the headquarters of each branch�39 Yet the development of true joint capabili-
ties is still nascent, and requires not only the integration of key capabilities but 
improvements in the quality and frequency of joint training and exercises to 
operationalize genuine coordinated readiness�
Formulation of Operational and Tactical Doctrines
The series of legal and strategic documents in recent years, such as the NDPG, 
MTDP, “Guidelines for Japan-U�S� Defense Cooperation,” and Legislation for 
Peace and Security, all have served as key ingredients to improve the JSDF’s 
effectiveness and efficiency� Still, much practical work remains to be done to 
operationalize these developments so as to improve the JSDF’s actual readiness�
Essentially, the recent changes have taken Japan’s defense planning to a higher 
level, forcing the JSDF to develop further its operational and tactical doctrines to 
operationalize the capabilities enabled to date� The fluid security environment, 
the developments in Japan’s defense policies, and the improvements in the JSDF’s 
capabilities inevitably lead to diversification of scenarios and operations� For 
the JSDF to execute its tasks effectively and efficiently, it is critical to formulate 
its concept of operations and tactical doctrines, particularly given the relevant 
specific legal conditions and constraints relating to the rules of engagement, 
use of force, and actions permitted when using force� Hence the development of 
operational and tactical doctrines is essential to adding sharpness to and func-
tional authority within the JSDF’s defense planning, so as to improve operational 
readiness�
However, this task is easier said than done, as operationalizing capabilities 
is seldom a short-term challenge, nor is any given situation a static one� Rather, 
the process is a long-term, sophisticated one, replete with recurring adjustments 
that produce, operationalize, update, and maintain the myriad developments in 
the armed forces� The U�S� Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) is a classic 
example of how an operational concept involves three components: institutional 
commitment, conceptual alignment, and managerial initiatives�40 While the 
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Japanese defense organization faces far fewer complexities than its U�S� counter-
part, there is little doubt that Japan also will face long-haul, complex realities in 
systemizing doctrines to enhance the JSDF’s readiness and capabilities� As Japan 
moves further toward ensuring air and maritime supremacy, new questions are 
bound to arise concerning the force generation, development, and employment 
necessary to improve JSDF readiness further�
Given the nature of recent JSDF doctrines as well as the major reconfigura-
tions in Japan’s defense planning, much remains to be done in improving the 
JSDF’s operational and tactical doctrines� Apart from ballistic-missile defense 
and cybersecurity, the defense of Japan relies heavily on ensuring air and mari-
time supremacy� Granted, amphibious capabilities are a crucial deterrent in the 
defense of remote islands; however, one should not become overcaptivated by 
the JSDF’s amphibious capabilities, as they essentially are emergency measures� 
As one defense official noted to the author, “A goalkeeper cannot be the only 
defense component�”41 A scenario in which an aggressor already has encroached 
on Japan’s shores, leading to mobilization of the JGSDF, would indicate the failure 
not only of Japan’s deterrence but also of the first line of defense in the air and 
maritime domains� Given the nation’s archipelagic nature and its other circum-
stances, supremacy in the air and maritime domains, through persistent denial 
and resilient response vis-à-vis threats, is essential to dealing with aggressors 
before they penetrate Japanese territory�
The air and maritime domains are intimately related� However, detailed dis-
cussions on an indigenous air-sea battle concept in Japan have not been conduct-
ed until recently�42 For instance, the basic JASDF doctrine was not issued until 
2001� Considering the new emphasis on air and maritime supremacy, devising 
an air-sea battle concept would be pivotal to enhancing not only the operational 
readiness of the JASDF and the JMSDF but also the efficiency and effectiveness 
of maneuvers during major contingencies�
The doctrinal culture in the JSDF also needs further development, with partic-
ular emphasis on interoperability, both technically and procedurally� To sharpen 
further the JSDF’s readiness to establish air and naval supremacy, the JSDF will 
need to work on shaping and maturing its air-sea battle culture and concept of 
operations�43 Promotion of an indigenous air-sea battle mind-set would sharpen 
the JSDF’s operational proficiency and readiness to meet various contingencies 
in the air and maritime domains� However, doctrines need tactical context, and 
building such aspects would be no easy task� While the JSDF is characterized 
by a high level of professionalism and expertise, those qualities are limited to 
the scope of existing assets and procedures� Thus, developing and applying new 
doctrines within the JSDF inevitably would take time�
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The task of systemizing doctrines also faces challenges owing to the array 
of new technologies expected to join the JASDF and JMSDF inventories�44 For-
mulating the concept of operations for the new technologies will require not 
only further studies but also the nurturing of expertise� The JMSDF Command 
and Staff College Strategic Study Group and the recently established JASDF Air 
Power Studies Center of Excellence in the Air Staff College play pivotal roles 
in conducting studies on developing and applying concepts such as sea basing, 
combat clouding, space situational awareness, and reconnaissance strike complex 
to enhance further the JSDF’s air and maritime superiority� Furthermore, recruit-
ment is experiencing innovative developments; the JSDF has begun employing 
direct-commission and noncommissioned officers with specialist backgrounds� 
The next step would be to bridge among the three branches by developing an 
integrated doctrine that emphasizes interoperability, connecting the capabilities 
of the three branches to maintain optimal joint readiness�
Admittedly, efforts to enable establishment of air and naval supremacy face 
their share of challenges, given that Japan is within China’s antiaccess range—
which could expand farther, considering developments in Chinese power- 
projection capabilities� While expansions to China’s area-denial coverage would 
press Japan to adopt sharper policies, here too there are dilemmas� Several ex-
perts have noted that an area-denial approach could lead to “trench warfare in 
the sea”—a disadvantageous situation for Japan, which has limited quantitative 
and logistical capacity to withstand attrition, especially considering the high-tech 
nature of the JSDF�45
Such problems have fueled discussions on the JSDF’s tactical options, in 
pursuit of more-responsive, resilient ways to deal with threats� In particular, 
gray-zone situations create challenges to crisis management�46 Given that Japan 
has treated crisis management as a domestic law-and-order problem rather than 
one of national defense, how can the JSDF respond to gray-zone situations? 
Moreover, the rules of engagement for armed action remain an open question�47 
While the Legislation for Peace and Security does grant the JSDF authority to 
mobilize against gray-zone challenges, Aihito Yamashita correctly argues that the 
occurrence of such scenarios is a clear indication that deterrence has failed—the 
aggressor has defied the status quo�48 Owing not only to laws and capabilities but 
also to general regional discomfort from neighboring states, the JSDF remains 
self-limited to exercising deterrence by denial, as opposed to deterrence by 
punishment� The challenges indicate that the key agenda for Japan must be to 
work on more proactive deterrence and crisis-management measures, consistent 
with current laws and capabilities� Such a task, however, would involve not only 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   53 5/1/18   11:10 AM
59
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
conducting debates within the government but also addressing the dilemmas 
inherent in the formulation of JSDF doctrines�
Political and Bureaucratic Facilitators
While further strategic and operational alignments are expected to improve JSDF 
readiness, these developments will face the sorts of strategic, political, economic, 
and bureaucratic questions that create defense-planning dilemmas for the Japa-
nese government�
First, despite the growing awareness of mounting national security con-
cerns, Japan’s defense planning often becomes embroiled in domestic political 
intrigues� While it was Japan’s recognition of increasing threats that instigated 
recent changes, it was the growing recognition by Japanese citizens of national 
security issues and the importance of the Japan-U�S� alliance that provided the 
government with sufficient political cover to implement the developments� Still, 
the tense political debates over the Legislation for Peace and Security passed in 
2015 were yet another example of how defense developments in Japan often are 
hamstrung by overpoliticization, poor conceptualization, and poor “marketing” 
of security matters� The contents of the security bills are logical and essential 
to improving Japan’s defense capabilities, yet arguably they were a significantly 
watered-down alternative to amending article 9 of the constitution�49 The heated 
political conflicts over the passing of the security bills not only highlighted the 
political fault lines affecting defense matters but also depleted Prime Minister 
Abe’s political capital�50 Such problems often exhaust the Japanese government’s 
political-bureaucratic capital and its bandwidth for coming up with innovative 
and pragmatic solutions to pressing national security developments� The political 
environment in Japan needs to move beyond yes-or-no partisan debates to prop-
er discussions of the means needed to achieve and sustain national security�51 
Abe’s latest proposal regarding constitutional amendment—keeping article 9 but 
adding a paragraph identifying the JSDF as the nation’s defense organization—is 
quite moderate, yet debates over national security remain controversial�52
Second, there are budgetary constraints on the financing of future major 
force and capability enhancements� Even though Japan has increased its defense 
outlays steadily to meet its readiness needs, issues remain� The current budget 
devotes 43�5 percent to “personnel and provisions expenses,” while 41�1 percent 
is allocated to “base measures, etc�,” which includes items such as community 
grants and host-nation support, as well as rent and compensation costs�53 While 
high operational and maintenance costs are no surprise, Japan’s defense budget 
remains highly constrained, the legacy of a previous, self-imposed 1-percent-of-
GDP limit for defense expenditures� As Yuki Tatsumi argues, the recent budget 
increases mostly constitute an effort by the Japanese government to make up 
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for the impact of defense budget cuts imposed between FY2003 and FY2012�54 
Prime Minister Abe has stated that (at least under the current administration) the 
1-percent-of-GDP cap no longer applies, owing to the imperative to strengthen 
the JSDF, and that capability demands will call for increases beyond that thresh-
old�55 Yet even so, realistically it will be challenging for the defense budget to 
experience major increases, particularly given Japan’s current political-economic 
climate, with its other crucial agendas, such as “Abenomics” and social security 
programs� As long as Japan’s defense budget maintains these current constraints, 
and particularly given the high costs of currently programmed equipment and 
munitions and domestic investments in R&D, future developments will need to 
take place through adoption of the most cost-efficient measures� Otherwise, it 
would be necessary to refine and, in some cases, to divest current assets to make 
budgetary space for high-priority investments�
Third, there are questions about future developments in Japan’s military-
industrial complex� The recently established ATLA will oversee key organs, 
such as the Technical Research and Development Institute and the Equipment 
Procurement and Construction Office, to ensure centralized management and 
processing of defense-related investments�56 As part of the ATLA’s Japan Defense 
Technology Strategy to “promote strategic initiatives to ensure technological 
superiority,” the budget has highlighted projects such as a funding program 
named the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security, as well as 
improvements in project-management programs and cooperation regarding 
defense equipment and technology�57 The new measures purport to streamline 
and enhance the management of procurements and defense-related R&D� Yet, 
despite the progress, questions remain regarding whether actual production from 
the domestic defense industry will keep pace with the JSDF’s growing capability 
demands, and whether the goods produced will be affordable within the tight 
budget constraints�58 The easing of statutory arms-export restrictions will pro-
vide greater rationales for developing Japan’s defense industry as a means of earn-
ing foreign revenue; however, while Japan’s technologically advanced platforms 
may attract interest, its arms exports are hampered by their high price tags and 
the country’s relatively recent entry into the defense market�59
The Regional Dimensions
The impact of JSDF developments will depend on the nature of those develop-
ments and the various responses thereto of countries in the region� China and 
North Korea will tend to view any improvement in JSDF capabilities as a threat, 
leading to various response measures, which in turn will raise new questions 
for Japan’s defense planning� Yet the largest question concerns Japan’s role in the 
alliance with the United States and Japanese participation in other international 
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security initiatives� JSDF developments certainly will allow the Japan-U�S� part-
nership to operationalize better the contents of the 2015 “Guidelines for Japan-
U�S� Defense Cooperation�” For example, the alliance continues to conduct 
complex missile-defense and ASW operations� Going forward, improvements in 
JSDF readiness would enhance significantly the alliance’s combined and coordi-
nated capabilities and operations in the air and maritime domains�60
Still, there is much to do, particularly in further enhancing ISR capabilities, 
interoperability, and the planning and conducting of combined maneuvers�61 
Moreover, developments also are needed in the formation of “Japan+U�S�+X” 
trilateral (or larger) partnerships, with each arrangement having specific value 
in its own context; trilateral cooperation with the Republic of Korea is the most 
important and urgent to be considered� While political sensitivities long have 
undermined the prospects for partnership between Seoul and Tokyo, capability-
based trilateral cooperation is essential for regional security and stability�62 Co-
operation with select Southeast Asian states in the form of maritime security and 
capacity-building efforts also has shown signs of promise in recent years and 
should be enhanced� Japan owes its success in enhancing cooperation with its 
Southeast Asian partners to its contributions to the region through noncombat 
military operations�63 Such efforts constitute evidence of the significant develop-
ment of Japan’s international security role and reflect major progress in Tokyo’s 
relations in the Asia-Pacific�
Of course, as in other areas, there are dilemmas here� While growing chal-
lenges in regional security press Tokyo to adopt more-proactive defense pos-
tures and roles, developments toward an overtly offensive posture may trigger 
hesitation among Asia-Pacific states to work with Japan, particularly given the 
historical animosities that persist� And the larger issue is that developments in 
Japan’s defense posture could be perceived as changing the status quo—a factor 
that would impact the partner governments’ relations with China, including by 
weakening their claims of participating in strictly defensive-oriented cooperation 
for the sake of regional stability�
The issues at stake warrant that Japan should engage in additional constructive 
initiatives with regional stakeholders to provide assurances and ensure sustain-
able reconciliation� For much of its history, the “Asia component” has been a 
weakness in Japan’s diplomacy�64 One important prerequisite for improving this 
area would be for Japan to minimize the profile of politicized and nationalis-
tic historical issues to prevent critics from associating them with the essential 
present-day developments in the JSDF� Furthermore, Japan must continue to 
strengthen and promote the role it plays in regional dialogues (e�g�, on arms con-
trol, export controls, codes of conduct, nontraditional security) and multilateral 
efforts to institutionalize cooperation and practice preventive diplomacy� Thus, 
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to prevent further deterioration in regional security, Japan’s developments in 
defense readiness must be combined with continued efforts to expand opportuni-
ties for regional cooperation�
Regardless of whether the Japanese constitution is revised, the JSDF’s essentially 
defensive orientation toward ensuring Japan’s security will remain unchanged� 
Developments to date have not altered Japan’s defense-oriented posture, and cer-
tainly have not revived the militaristic policies of the imperial years� Rather, re-
cent improvements have focused on smoothing the operation of the mechanism 
that allows Japan to exercise the necessary capabilities for self-defense within the 
nation’s strategic, political, and legal frameworks� Moreover, the developments 
further confirm that the JSDF is strong when measured within a context of close 
coordination with the United States and other like-minded states�
Still, Japan’s defense planning is at a crossroads� While significant progress 
has been made in improving JSDF combat power and readiness, as reflected in 
the series of policy developments and upgrades of JSDF capabilities and force 
structure, it will be some time before these can be translated into actual ability 
to achieve air and maritime supremacy, particularly given the nascent nature of 
many operational and tactical doctrines, as well as continuing readiness chal-
lenges� And even if air and maritime supremacy is achieved, this is only part of 
the solution to the full range of Japan’s defense challenges� Importantly, while 
Japan will need to refine further its operational and tactical doctrines to enhance 
the JSDF’s future readiness, it also will need to harmonize its defense develop-
ments with constructive political processes and diplomatic measures if it is truly 
to ensure the country’s national security�
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LIFTING THE FOG OF TARGETING
 Autonomous weapon systems (AWSs) have generated one of the most heated recent debates about the laws of war and military ethics� The issue of au-
tonomous weapons flows from the concern that human beings will lose control 
over the weapons they use, and hence no longer will be deciding matters of life 
and death� Consequently, most states, participants (e�g�, elements of civil society), 
and commentators agree that autonomous weapons require some level of human 
control� Different terms are introduced to reflect the premise that humans should 
control or interact with the autonomous system; meaningful human control, ap-
propriate levels of human judgment, and intelligent partnership are examples of 
this general concept� But there is no agreement on what these concepts mean, or 
what exactly should be subject to this control: the weapon itself, its critical func-
tions, or each individual attack�1
This article argues that, to gain a better understanding of what the con-
cept of meaningful human control (by whatever name) means in a context of 
increasingly autonomous weapons, we should 
focus our attention first and foremost on what 
should be considered targeting� Military target-
ing practices within which this human control 
is, or ought to be, exercised should be the core 
of any analysis� The context within which these 
systems are used and human control is exercised 
is essential to determining what human-machine 
relationship we require, now and potentially 
in the future� Therefore, the article discusses 
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autonomous weapons through the lens of military targeting—more specifically, 
the targeting process�
There seems to be a considerable lack of knowledge and understanding about 
targeting among individual members of the public, as well as many groups that 
represent the public in some way, such as lawyers, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, political leaders, industry, scientists, and the press� This lack of knowledge 
about targeting is reflected in the discourse on autonomous weapons—which 
is where it becomes particularly precarious, because of repeated calls to regu-
late and limit military practices�2 Although not all individuals engaging in the 
discourse on autonomous weapons need to understand targeting to the degree 
that military professionals should, the discourse would benefit profoundly from 
a more informed discussion regarding targeting practices, as this would provide 
insight into how the implementation of autonomous technologies will impact 
targeting decisions and human control�
This article will demonstrate that negotiating and exercising control occurs 
throughout the entire targeting process, and that introducing autonomous tech-
nologies into the process could lead to a loss of human control but does not inevi-
tably do so� The manner in which a concept such as meaningful human control is 
interpreted depends on the context within which it is or ought to be applied; thus, 
how does the targeting process inform our discussion about control?
Answering that question requires first gaining a better understanding of what 
targeting is and what it is not� The first section of the article discusses the six-
phase decision-making cycle that has developed over the course of history and 
has become embedded in the training for and execution of NATO (i�e�, mostly 
Western) military operations; Western militaries refer to this as the targeting 
process�3
The second section of the article discusses one phase of the targeting process— 
phase 2: target development—in more detail� This detailed analysis serves two 
purposes: (1) It demonstrates the complexity of the targeting process, including 
the different layers of decision-making involved; while target selection may seem 
to be a straightforward task, it requires much more deliberate planning than a 
game of Whac-A-Mole, in which one simply attacks anything one considers a 
target� (2) It reconsiders what qualifies as a critical function of targeting� In the 
discourse on AWSs, critical functions are related to the weapon itself, and mostly 
are described as those that require human control in their execution, owing to 
their importance for targeting (i�e�, their causal relationship to kinetic effects, 
and thus to potential death and destruction)� Yet I argue that a critical function 
such as target selection is considered during multiple phases of the targeting 
process and need not have any direct connection to weapons use or kinetic ac-
tion�4 Therefore, instead of focusing discussions on autonomous weapons—the 
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dominant approach of the past decade or so—we ought to be focusing on autono-
mous targeting�
Thus, the third section of the article addresses the development of autono-
mous technologies—not weapons (although practically any technology can be 
weaponized)—in the targeting process� There already are many ongoing military 
projects in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, autonomy, 
and automation that can provide case studies on how these technologies affect 
the processes in which they operate and how that relates to human control�5 
These developments appear to arise, first and foremost, within the intelligence 
branches of militaries, because of the massive increase in (and demand for) intel-
ligence, in both quantity and quality, and because rapidly changing battle spaces 
demand accelerated decision-making� Although intelligence often is considered 
targeting support, it arguably can be said that intelligence personnel perform ap-
proximately 85 to 90 percent of targeting�6 Thus, the role of intelligence and the 
development and use of autonomous technologies for targeting will be discussed 
together in the third part of the article to determine how these technologies affect 
human control in the process and what challenges we can identify already�
The article’s final section draws some tentative conclusions about how my ap-
proach informs the debate on human control� Autonomous technologies should 
not be conceived as replacements for humans; rather, their introduction to the 
targeting process changes the tasks and activities of human actors� On the one 
hand, humans might be able to increase their control, instead of losing it, owing 
to improved situational awareness and a better understanding of the operational 
environment� On the other hand, introducing autonomous technologies into the 
targeting process presents fundamental challenges, not only to military structures 
and the military mind-set, but most importantly to decision-making processes 
and the relationships between human actors and technologies in the targeting 
process� If these challenges are not considered carefully, the use of autonomous 
technologies for targeting could result in an unacceptable loss of control�
The article provides an in-depth analysis of military practices, procedures, 
and experiences that goes beyond that available from general, publicly accessible 
sources� It can be difficult for a civilian to gain access to materials concerning 
military targeting, owing to the obvious sensitivities concerning the subject and 
the resultant restrictions placed on related information� Nevertheless, I was able 
not only to access those documents but also to conduct field research by partici-
pating in conferences, targeting courses, and wargames; observing simulations 
and exercises; and conducting formal interviews and informal conversations 
with over fifty military practitioners� These practitioners came from different 
backgrounds, nationalities, command centers, and offices and represented a 
broad variety of experience in targeting; they included targeteers, operators, 
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military planners, intelligence officers, weaponeers, commanders, and legal ad-
visers�7 This methodology was necessary to address the matter at hand, since to 
comprehend targeting one must go beyond doctrine and include the experience 
of military specialists� It is through the prism of their experiences that we can 
begin to understand the complexity of targeting, current targeting practices, and 
contemporary targeting dilemmas—such as the control issue that autonomous 
technologies raise�
The article thus provides an insider’s perspective, yet is suitable for public 
release and relevant to both civilians and military practitioners� Its purposes are, 
first, to contribute to contemporary debates—primarily the discourse on au-
tonomous weapons—through a critical and honest analysis of military targeting 
practices in light of the demand for and development of increasingly autonomous 
technologies for targeting; and, second, to provide a more holistic assessment of 
the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on the human role within the 
targeting process, and the challenge of safely implementing these technologies 
while preserving human control�
TARGETING AS A PROCESS, NOT AN ACTION
Historically, targeting could be described essentially as the practice of destroy-
ing enemy forces and equipment� Classic targeting mainly focused on achieving 
victory through military kinetic lethal actions that were related directly to an en-
emy’s military wherewithal� Targeting was primarily a tactical exercise, a process 
that was executed predominantly on the battlefield�
Examples of this interpretation of targeting still appear in daily news reports� 
Popular news sources such as Al Jazeera, CNN, the BBC, and Reuters regularly 
publish headlines such as “Netanyahu: Strikes in Syria Targeted Hezbollah Arms,” 
“Air Strike on Mosque near Aleppo in Syria Kills 42: Monitor,” and “U�S�: ‘Jihadi 
John’ Targeted in Drone Strike�”8 For many, when confronted with awful images 
of bloodshed, the urge to point the finger too frequently triumphs over the need 
for a more measured, considered analysis of what actually occurred�9 Although it 
is difficult to generalize about the international media, such publications seem to 
adopt the historical approach to targeting, which focuses primarily on the effect 
of an attack� This tells us very little about contemporary targeting�
Arguably, targeting—in the contemporary meaning of the concept—did not 
evolve until the introduction of airpower in World War I�10 Today, targeting— 
after a long evolutionary process and enabled by technological developments—
has developed into a practice that aims to achieve specified effects on and beyond 
the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions (e�g�, employ-
ing bombs, guns, torpedoes) but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal 
activities (e�g�, financial effects, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and 
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information operations; the Russian interference in the American election argu-
ably could fall within this definition)�11 No longer did targeting aim to achieve 
effects on the battlefield only; it became increasingly important to achieve effects 
in all domains and on all levels—the strategic, operational, and tactical� Nowa-
days, it would be more appropriate to describe targeting as a decision-making 
cycle that is deliberate, not ad hoc; iterative; and methodical in planning actions 
against adversary targets to achieve the effects needed to meet strategic and op-
erational campaign objectives�12 This effects-based approach, with a particular 
focus on linking strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level effects, also is reflected 
in military doctrine, some of which is publicly accessible�13
In the following paragraphs this doctrine will be explored further, for two 
main reasons� First, if we continue to consider targeting according to the histori-
cal interpretation—as an isolated tactical act—rather than as a deliberate process, 
we will not be able to address effectively the control issue that technological 
innovation raises� Second, this “helicopter view” of the process is necessary to 
contextualize the next part of this article, which zooms in on phase 2 of the tar-
geting process to give a detailed analysis of the different considerations, tasks, 
and decisions that are made within this phase� It should provide well-grounded 
knowledge on how Western militaries currently exercise human control in the 
process within which, ultimately, increasingly autonomous technologies already 
are or will be employed�
One of the most significant documents on targeting—a cornerstone in NATO 
targeting operations—is the NATO publication Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Tar-
geting, AJP-3�9� It provides a framework of principles, practices, and procedures, 
the clear understanding and acceptance of which are a prerequisite for NATO tar-
geting operations�14 The publication aims to guide NATO military forces in their 
actions by explaining how targeting is planned, conducted, and assessed through 
six phases�15 Although aimed at guiding NATO military forces, this document 
also could and should be used to educate laymen, providing them with the (un-
classified) information necessary to grasp sufficiently the practice of targeting�
While AJP-3�9 is the authoritative conceptual basis for joint targeting, it clearly 
states that “it requires judgment in application�”16 Targeting is contextual, and 
hence any document, doctrine, or rule book requires translation into the specific 
context� Much like the laws of armed conflict, this doctrine is to be interpreted 
by professionals to ensure careful application of its principles and procedures in 
the practical world� Hence, reciting the doctrine as part of this article would be 
of little use� To understand targeting practices, difficulties, and challenges, one 
must include the experience of military specialists� It is through the prism of 
their experiences that we can begin to understand current targeting practices— 
the complexity of targeting, as well as contemporary targeting dilemmas� I 
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will incorporate their voices as well as my own experiences gained in targeting 
courses, exercises, and conferences into the analysis of the targeting process in 
subsequent parts of this article�
AJP-3�9 defines joint targeting as the process that “links strategic-level direc-
tion and guidance with tactical targeting activities through the operational-level 
targeting cycle in a focused and systemic manner to create specific physical and 
psychological effects to reach military objectives and the desired end state�”17 
More specifically, joint targeting can be described by the six phases involved (the 
number of phases can vary depending on the doctrine, but the steps are essen-
tially the same)� Together, these six phases form a cycle that may seem sequential 
but is, in reality, iterative and bidirectional; sometimes phases are achieved simul-
taneously, and they also can overlap�
Before this targeting process commences with the first phase and formal 
military planning is initiated, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprising 
permanent representatives of the member states, must decide that military inter-
vention is required by issuing a NAC initiating directive�18 Once strategic-level 
assessments have been made, the NAC will provide the Military Committee (the 
senior military authority in NATO) with political guidance, overarching military 
objectives, and the desired end state for a campaign, including any constraints 
and restraints it wishes to impose� This guidance is the framework within which 
military operations can take place� The political guidance from NAC incorpo-
rates diplomatic, economic, and military considerations and is often very broad 
and vague�19 These political and strategic objectives and guidance include ap-
proved target sets, as well as possible priority targets called time-sensitive targets 
(TSTs)�20 This guidance is passed down to the joint force commander (JFC), who 
is responsible for the execution of the campaign�21 Then the targeting process 
commences�
Phase 1: Commander’s Intent, Objectives, and Guidance
The impact of the political and strategic objectives and guidance will be experi-
enced first in phase 1� The JFC must identify clearly, at the operational level, what 
is to be accomplished, under what circumstances, and within what parameters, 
while following the political and strategic objectives and taking into consider-
ation any constraints and restraints imposed by the NAC and, if provided, the 
mandate� Because the JFC derives his or her military campaign objectives from 
the mandate of a particular operation, the political objectives should be unam-
biguously clear and well-defined to facilitate the development of feasible military 
objectives�22
Once the military campaign objectives are defined, the first activity of the joint 
targeting process is to take these objectives, guidance (including restrictions with 
regard to collateral damage), and intent and further translate them into a number 
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of discrete operational tasks�23 This is an iterative process conducted between 
the JFC and component commanders, one that allows objectives, tasks, and sup-
porting target nominations to be developed on every level (i�e�, both joint and 
component)�24 It ensures that each target can be traced back to clearly defined 
and attainable goals for military operations and, perhaps even more important, 
that everyone in the targeting process is aware of the objectives and guidance� 
But that is not always an easy task� As stated realistically in U�S� Air Force target-
ing doctrine, “It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become 
too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or 
other aspects of commander’s intent� When this happens, execution can devolve 
into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of 
enemy actions�”25
Hence, objectives and guidance are the cornerstone of the targeting process at 
each level� They should be clear, concise, measurable, and attainable, driving the 
targeting process effectively; but they may turn out to be vague and uninformed, 
presenting challenges throughout the targeting process�
Phase 2: Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization
Phase 2 covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and 
characterizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those 
targets� Target development can be described most accurately as having roughly 
five functions: target analysis, target vetting, target validation, target nomination, 
and target prioritization�
As mentioned previously, the NAC passes down political-strategic guidance 
and approved target sets to the JFC� Even though these target sets are relatively 
broad, it is clear that the selection of targets is controlled top down and begins 
even prior to the commencement of the targeting process�26 The essence and 
functions of target development will be explained in more detail in the next part 
of this article; for now, suffice it to say that the second phase identifies eligible 
targets that can be influenced to achieve the JFC’s objectives, and that the princi-
pal output is a joint prioritized target list�27
Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis
Once the actual list of targets that can be engaged has been developed, the next 
step is to determine the right asset with which to engage each target�28 Capabilities 
analysis is the process of analyzing the prioritized targets and matching to them 
the most appropriate capabilities, lethal and nonlethal, to generate the desired 
physical or psychological effects�29
This phase has two elements that deserve further deliberation� First, capa-
bilities analyses are sometimes referred to as weaponeering� Weaponeering is 
the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal 
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means required to generate the desired effect on a given target�30 What is the right 
asset (e�g�, manned asset, remotely piloted asset, or standoff attack munitions) 
or weapon (e�g�, Hellfire missiles, two-thousand-pound bombs, or nonlethal 
means) for engaging this target? Do we have enough of that capability? If not, is 
there perhaps another capability that can be substituted for it that still generates 
the desired effects?31 The output of weaponeering is a recommendation of the 
quantity, type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons needed to achieve the de-
sired effects while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage�32 It also can include 
precautions that must be taken to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects� This is the second 
element of phase 3, called a collateral damage estimation (CDE)�
Issues related to collateral damage already may become apparent during target 
development, but they are considered more prominently during the capabilities 
analysis� CDE often is confused with weaponeering (and weaponeering with 
CDE)� Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental physical damage 
to noncombatants, nonmilitary objects, or the environment resulting from an 
attack�33 It is estimated as part of the planning process so as to provide the com-
mander with an estimation—not a certainty—of collateral damage to inform his 
or her decision prior to target engagement�34 CDE plays a role in the proportion-
ality assessment, as the commander will analyze whether the expected incidental 
civilian harm is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated�35
Phase 4: Commander’s Decision, Force Planning, and Assignment
During this phase, targeting instructions are communicated from the operational 
level to the tactical level� The JFC issues a final approval of the prioritized targets 
and decides on matching capabilities against these targets� Consequently, the 
JFC assigns these targets to the different components for further planning and 
execution�36
Any relevant constraints and restraints, whether strict or lenient, that emerged 
during these four phases are passed on to the assigned unit�37 Although execution 
is assigned to different components (referred to as “decentralized execution”), the 
desired objective of the campaign remains centrally controlled�
Phase 5: Mission Planning and Execution
This phase deals directly with the planning and execution of tactical activities� 
Now that the prioritized targets have been assigned to the various components, 
the detailed mission planning will be performed for the execution of operations� 
Tactical-level planners will take similar steps to those described for phases 1–4, 
but on a more detailed level� Assessments in this phase take into account opera-
tional and legal standards, including the obligation to take feasible precautions 
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in attack�38 The component commander receives the prioritized targets on which 
he or she will be conducting further mission planning and, eventually, execution� 
Once the mission planning has been completed, execution can commence�
Mission execution follows a number of logical steps� This process is referred 
to most commonly as the F2T2EA cycle, which stands for “find, fix, track, target, 
engage, and assess�”39 It is during this phase that the selected lethal or nonlethal 
means will be used� Hence, when debating autonomous weapon systems and the 
critical functions of these weapons, this is the phase focused on most� Before the 
mission-execution phase, weapons use has been contemplated, but no weapon 
yet has been launched, fired, released, or used in any manner�
In the historical approach—which perceives targeting as the achievement of 
kinetic effects on the battlefield—focusing on this part of the process would make 
perfect sense� However, in contemporary targeting procedures, weapons use is far 
from the only critical function of targeting� Other decisions and tasks within the 
targeting process are particularly relevant to the discourse on autonomous weap-
ons, and therefore warrant even more attention� Hence, after brief consideration 
of the final phase of the process, the next part of this article illustrates this by 
providing a detailed analysis of phase 2, during which target development takes 
place—arguably the actual critical function of target selection�
Phase 6: Combat Assessment
The assessment seeks to evaluate the effectiveness and lawfulness of executed 
operations and aims to guide future operations� If targeting was no more than 
dropping munitions on targets, then a battle damage assessment would entail 
little more than taking a closer look at the target to see whether the munitions 
exploded on the correct coordinates�
However, most of the time effects are not easy to observe; for example, the 
destruction of a plane as a direct effect of an attack on an airfield—as part of si-
multaneous attacks on all the assets of an adversary’s air-defense system, aiming 
to, over time, degrade the legitimacy of the regime by portraying it as incapable 
of protecting the populace—would offer no easy assessment�40 Although the 
munitions’ effect can be assessed relatively easily, the change of popular attitude 
is unlikely to be measurable until it is reflected in the target’s behavior, and even 
then it is extremely difficult to conduct measurements of effectiveness�41
For similar reasons, it also may be difficult to assess the lawfulness of the 
operation� Collateral damage may not always be apparent, particularly in air 
campaigns; it might require ground-based assessments to acquire the necessary 
information about the weapon’s effects on the target and its surroundings�42
Either way, the results of these assessments feed back into phase 1 so that goals 
and tasks can be adjusted accordingly�
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A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PHASE 2 OF THE TARGETING  
PROCESS: TARGET DEVELOPMENT
Considering all six phases of the targeting cycle, phase 2 (target development, 
validation, nomination, and prioritization) is one of the more extensive phases, 
particularly in terms of time and resources and the involvement of different com-
mand levels� Target selection is controlled top down as the NAC passes down 
(from the political-strategic level to the operational level) approved target sets; 
targets might include ground forces and facilities, air defenses, ballistic missiles, 
military supplies and storage facilities, and military or political leadership�43 
Target sets even can include civilian installations, but these may be targeted only 
if they qualify as legitimate military targets in accordance with the law of armed 
conflict and relevant international law�44
Clearly, these target sets are still very broad; hence they require further de-
velopment in phase 2 of the targeting process� As mentioned previously, phase 2 
covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and charac-
terizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those targets� 
The five functions of this phase listed earlier—target analysis, vetting, validation, 
nomination, and prioritization—will be discussed individually in the paragraphs 
below� However, the reader should keep in mind that they are closely related and 
in practice not easily separable�
Target Analysis
During target analysis, the most relevant targets linked to strategic and op-
erational objectives are identified together�45 Once the commander’s guidance is 
received, the target system analysis (TSA) process begins�46 The TSA is a foun-
dational part of the target-development process, as it enables additional, more 
detailed stages of target development; potential targets are derived from the TSA 
process�47
TSA products are intended to provide a comprehensive and holistic as-
sessment of an entire target system so that, ultimately, they enable planners to 
comprehend a target system’s functions, capabilities, requirements, and vulner-
abilities so they can provide recommended targeting strategies�48 The TSA thus 
yields understanding of how components of the enemy system interact and how 
the system functions as a whole� This includes physical, logical, and complex so-
cial systems, as well as the interactions among them� The TSA approaches targets 
and target sets as systems (in keeping with what is known as a system-of-systems 
approach) to look at interdependencies and determine vulnerabilities between 
systems and exploitable weaknesses that, if disrupted or affected in a specific 
manner, will create effects that achieve the commander’s objectives�49 It, thus, 
looks beyond the characteristics of a single target; a target’s real importance may 
lie in its relationship to other targets within a particular operational system�50 
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This is an incredibly challenging task that can take up many months and may 
require expertise that goes beyond that normally available�
Consider the task of conducting a TSA for an oil refinery� If you strike the 
wrong point, the effects may be devastating� For instance, kinetically attacking 
an oil refinery might ignite a large fire, causing additional risks to the popula-
tion and damaging the refinery beyond repair� Even aside from the high risk 
of collateral damage, the costs of striking the refinery itself may be extensive 
since, essentially, “you buy what you break�”51 An alternative approach might be 
to strike the oil refinery using nonlethal means� Now you need not only experi-
enced targeteers plus someone with extensive knowledge of the oil refinery you 
intend to strike, but also experts on nonlethal targeting (an expertise that is still 
relatively rare in NATO)�
In short, certain targets require more time and expertise to plan for than oth-
ers� But in any case, TSA is a lengthy process that can take many months, and 
hence should begin well in advance of operations—preferably in peacetime�52 
Therefore, strictly speaking, TSA might not be considered part of the targeting 
process, since the targeting process (within NATO, at least) does not commence 
until the NAC determines that military intervention is required and issues its 
guidance and objectives� According to a senior defense analyst at the Pentagon, 
this is far too late for a true NATO emergency such as a surprise invasion of the 
Baltics or Poland; as a result, NATO always will be behind the power curve un-
less planning can be done earlier, with approved, clear draft objectives already 
developed well in advance for particular scenarios�53
However, it is politically sensitive to conduct target system analysis on nations 
with which you are not currently in conflict�54 This restricts the ability to con-
duct TSAs on a national—but mostly a NATO—level, impairing the preparation 
process from an intelligence perspective� This could mean that at the start of an 
operation there would be no, or very few, prepared targets to strike� As a result, 
forces might run out of prepared targets within the first few days or weeks after 
the initiation of hostilities and be forced into a mode of primarily reacting to 
unanticipated events� At that point, targeting could turn into a game of Whac-
A-Mole� Fortunately, there are ways to conduct TSAs on an individual national 
level so that, once a NATO operation begins and the coalition commences the 
planning process, nations can contribute their information to an integrated data-
base, although often with strict limitations� Other opportunities to enhance the 
planning process lie in the technological domain, which will be addressed later�
Target Vetting
Target vetting assesses whether the intelligence used to develop the target is cor-
rect and ensures that the target performs the specified function for adversaries 
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or other actors�55 Consequently, intelligence for target development needs to be 
updated and refined continually, making target development an ongoing process 
rather than a discrete task�56 Although this may seem a relatively easy task—a 
mere “checking” of the target intelligence—the importance of this task must not 
be underestimated� As previously explained, target analysis can take a long time� 
It is therefore important to vet all the targets before they can be nominated for 
engagement� Not doing so could lead to inadvertent engagements and violations 
of the laws of armed conflict�
Target Validation
Target validation ensures that the vetted targets are in line with the JFC’s objec-
tives and desired effects, that they are in compliance with relevant international 
law and policy, and that the all-source analysis used to develop the targets is ac-
curate and credible�57 During the process of target validation, certain questions 
are asked� Does the target meet the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent? Is the 
target consistent with the laws of armed conflict and the rules of engagement? Is 
the desired effect on the target consistent with the desired end state? Is the target 
politically or culturally sensitive? What are the risks and likely consequences of 
collateral damage? What are the consequences of not attacking the target?58
Finally, during target validation targets also are coordinated and deconflicted 
with other operations� Coordination with many other agencies and activities may 
be necessary to prevent friendly-fire accidents, collateral damage, or propaganda 
leverage for the enemy�59 Coordinating operations, integrating joint fires, and 
ensuring deconfliction are all parts of a complex process, especially in a coali-
tion in which national caveats, rules of engagement, a low tolerance for collateral 
damage, political constraints, and various legal issues must be taken into consid-
eration on a multinational level� This is not even to mention the challenges that 
arise out of the collaboration among and organization of numerous actors from 
different military branches and services, and in joint operations from different 
nations, resulting in a conglomeration of cultural, organizational, educational, 
and linguistic differences�
Target Nomination
Once potential targets are validated, they are nominated by components (air, 
land, maritime, and special ops) for approval via the joint coordination process 
and identified to be included and prioritized within the joint target list (JTL)�60 
The JTL is the master list from which all other lists are produced; the joint pri-
oritized target list (JPTL), restricted target list, and no-strike list are all subsets 
of the JTL� The JTL provides all known targets within the NAC-approved target 
sets considered for engagement� That does not mean, however, that all targets on 
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the JTL are already selected for engagement; they still need to be cleared against 
the rules of engagement, NATO caveats, and relevant international law�61 For 
example, the principle of distinction plays a vital role in this phase, to ensure that 
offensive action is directed only against military objectives and combatants, mak-
ing a clear distinction between them and civilian objects and civilians�62
Target Prioritization
The final clearances discussed above take place during target prioritization, of 
which the principal output is the JPTL� Targets on this list have been legally scru-
tinized, risk assessed, and validated and prioritized in line with the JFC’s desired 
effects and guidance� Before targets are placed on the JPTL, they are presented 
and discussed in target working groups and boards�
The short version of this process is as follows: Targets are developed and 
reviewed multiple times by many different staff and different commands in the 
Joint Targeting Working Group� Once fully developed, these targets are presented 
to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, which typically consists of functional 
advisers (e�g�, legal, political, information-operations, and electronic-warfare 
advisers, as required), representatives of the different components (land, mari-
time, air, and special operations), national representatives, and the commander�63 
Different military representatives (e�g�, the chief targeteer, legal adviser, director 
of operations) will provide the commander with the relevant information� In the 
end, the commander will decide whether to approve the presented targets and 
place them on the JPTL, or disapprove or suspend them (e�g�, owing to a lack 
of intelligence)� The JPTL includes the proposed means of prosecution (lethal 
or nonlethal) and the components responsible for engaging the targets (includ-
ing recommendations covering intelligence collection and additional weapons 
restrictions relating to collateral damage estimation analysis)�64
Because targets and the environment within which they are located change 
continually and because military planners never will know everything there is to 
know about a target or a target solution, target development is an ongoing pro-
cess� The process takes time: to enable proper planning and to perform course 
checks, legal reviews, proper target vetting, and more�65 An experienced targeting 
professional comments, “More time has not always equated to greater success, 
but nearly any U�S� or NATO targeting planner would see it as a significant plus�”66
As important as time, or perhaps even more important, is the intelligence 
that supports target planning; the indispensable role of intelligence and the im-
portance of time deserve separate attention� As part of that discussion, the para-
graphs below elaborate on autonomous technologies for targeting, with a specific 
focus on the intelligence branch and its role in target development�
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AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES FOR TARGETING
Although autonomous weapons have sparked serious debates about human con-
trol over the past five to ten years, autonomous technologies—some of which are 
even weaponized—have been part of military processes for much longer� They 
range from simple algorithms that support calculations to complex autonomous 
technology that is used in modern unmanned combat aircraft (not to be confused 
with “regular” remotely piloted aircraft systems, commonly known as drones)�
An illustration of the former is the Capability Analysis Tool, an automated 
weaponeering system that provides the standard automated methodology for 
estimating the employment effectiveness of most nonnuclear, kinetic weapons�67 
Another example is the software program called DCiDE, which is used for esti-
mating collateral damage�68 Examples of an application of complex autonomous 
technology in military systems are the American X47-B and the comparable 
British system called Taranis, the Russian MiG Skat, the European nEUROn, and 
the Chinese Anjian� These are unmanned combat air systems that can autono-
mously perform complex tasks, such as taking off from and landing on an aircraft 
carrier, conducting midflight refueling, and taking evasive maneuvers� Some of 
these systems are said to be capable of automatically identifying and targeting a 
threat as well, after which the system will send the data back to a human opera-
tor to be verified and to (dis)approve the engagement�69 Autonomous behavior 
is inherent in many defensive responses, such as defensive cyber autonomy and 
defensive countermeasures in airplanes� Examples include aviation electronic 
systems that respond immediately to jamming indications, up to and including 
the deployment of defensive countermeasures, such as releasing chaff and flares, 
with the aircrew only flicking a “consent” switch at the beginning of the mission�70 
Additionally, defensive systems that can operate in a fully automated mode to 
engage preprogrammed threats such as incoming missiles already have existed 
for decades� Examples include the American Phalanx close-in weapon system 
and well-known defensive ground systems, such as the surface-to-air Patriot mis-
sile battery and the Israeli Iron Dome; all can autonomously perform their own 
search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions to defend 
ships or ground areas against fast-moving and highly maneuverable threats�71
However, in circumstances of self-defense, no elaborate targeting process 
is used to engage the target� There is reduced planning time and fewer policy 
constraints� Therefore, situations of self-defense are not an adequate reflection 
of targeting, and hence autonomous systems that are used for self-defense are 
not included in this analysis� The scope of this article is limited to the tasks and 
decisions that are made within the targeting process and are or could be consid-
ered critical functions of targeting� Consequently, the previously mentioned un-
manned combat air vehicles that can autonomously perform tasks that generally 
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are considered less critical (e�g�, those that relate to flight or navigation) also will 
not feature in the analysis that follows�72
Examples exist of both complex and relatively simple technologies that play a 
role in the targeting process� Sometimes these technologies are called automated 
or autonomous; sometimes they are described as learning, or as representing 
some other form of artificial intelligence. Interpretational issues are at the heart 
of this debate� The meanings of these technological and sometimes even philo-
sophical terms are far from settled; they can have diverging meanings within 
different disciplines and in different contexts, and most of them are just inher-
ently complex�73 I am under no impression that this semantic dispute can and 
should be solved here and now� Therefore, I will refer to all these technologies 
(irrespective of whether they are considered automated, learning, autonomous, 
or some other form of AI) as autonomous technologies� Regardless of what type 
of technologies are already existent or under development, the principal concern 
should be to consider these technologies within the decision-making processes 
within which they will be used; how we as humans decide to deal with these 
technologies is more important than debates about the technologies themselves� 
In the paragraphs that follow, for each technological development discussed, the 
relevant context of targeting will be clarified so the impact of the technology can 
be assessed within an analysis of the process by which it will be used�
The Indispensable Role of Intelligence
Intelligence plays a role in each phase of the targeting process� In some, intelli-
gence takes the lead (e�g�, target development); some phases involve a mix of in-
telligence and operations (e�g�, weaponeering); and in others the intelligence role 
is one of true support (e�g�, force planning and assignment or monitoring tasks)�74
Most often, intelligence is described as providing targeting support� This is a 
correct statement; however, it does not do justice to the real value that intelligence 
provides to the targeting process� Generally, the most important role of intelli-
gence in targeting is to provide commanders and their staffs with analysis of key 
aspects of the operational environment to assist them in their decision-making 
process�75 As mentioned above, although this role may seem merely “supportive,” 
some estimate that targeting is 85 to 90 percent an intelligence job�76 Irrespective 
of whether these percentages accurately reflect the actual role of the intelligence 
branch, it is clear that intelligence plays a vital, continuous, and often decisive role 
in the targeting process�
The value of intelligence has been an ever-present subject in military discus-
sions� Sun Tzu wrote that if you know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred 
battles you will never be defeated�77 George Washington agreed: “The necessity 
of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further argued�”78 
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Throughout history, no one indeed has seemed to argue the point, although 
Clausewitz was somewhat critical, writing, “Many intelligence reports in war are 
contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain�”79 From these obser-
vations it can be concluded that intelligence is of great importance, but good-
quality intelligence can be hard to come by� In addition, having more intelligence 
at one’s disposal does not guarantee strategic success� The quality of intelligence 
matters at least as much as the quantity�80
About fifteen years ago “[w]e moved from ‘Industrial age’ to ‘Information age’ 
targeting � � � as the combination of new aircraft that could carry large numbers 
of smaller precision-guided weapons, better and more multi-source intelligence, 
and the ability to pass dynamic target updates from multiple sensors to airborne 
aircraft in minutes vastly increased the number of targets that could be struck 
on a given mission,” says Lieutenant General John N� T� “Jack” Shanahan, Di-
rector for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) at the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence�81 The transformation to the information 
age implied, and became manifested in, information becoming the driving factor 
in warfare�82 The advent of unmanned vehicles carrying improved sensors not 
only increased transparency on the battlefield but also enhanced the precision of 
weapons systems and the speed of command by compressing the time to com-
plete decision-making loops�83
This capability increased the demand for intelligence for targeting, while con-
currently the use of these unmanned platforms vastly increased the amount of 
data produced� When this was combined with increases in other types of data—
most significantly, the data from open sources such as the Internet—analysts 
began to be overwhelmed by the constant flow of vast amounts of data, which 
made it impossible for them to analyze it all and convert it into information and 
intelligence�84 Simultaneously, battle spaces are changing rapidly and contested 
areas demand accelerated decision-making—now, and likely even more so in the 
future�
Practice has taught us that, whether referring to NATO as a whole or to 
individual member states, current targeting enterprises are not prepared to 
handle the demands of future conflicts, beyond perhaps a counterterrorism or 
contingency operation that is limited in both scope and scale� NATO member 
states learned in the Balkans in the late 1990s, in Libya in 2011, and again at the 
beginning of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE that it is far too easy to overestimate 
targeting capacity, and as a result to run out of prepared targets to hit within days 
or at most weeks of commencing an operation� To bring NATO’s targeting capac-
ity up to speed and solve the multiple challenges the organization is facing today, 
nations cannot simply throw more people at the problem� Although having more 
and more-experienced personnel would definitely improve targeting, it will not 
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be nearly sufficient� As General Shanahan explains, “The reality is that the supply 
will never equal the demand� Not now� And definitely not five years from now�”85 
The U�S� Joint Chiefs of Staff also acknowledged this in Joint Vision 2010, which 
explained that “instead of relying on massed forces � � � , we will achieve massed 
effects in other ways� Information superiority and advances in technology will 
enable us to achieve the desired effects�”86
So if human personnel—even assuming they have the requisite expertise—
are not expected to be sufficient to solve the problem, autonomous technology 
becomes a major driver� This has caused militaries worldwide to invest in these 
technologies for military purposes�87
Artificial Intelligence for Intelligence
Militaries recognize that, among other benefits in both the intelligence and 
operations fields, technology enables commanders and their staffs to access—
sometimes in near-real time—large amounts of intelligence about the operational 
environment, which can assist them in planning, deciding on, and executing 
an attack effectively and in accordance with the relevant law and policy� The 
technology also enables analysts to convert raw data into actionable intelligence 
that can be used for targeting� Hence, intelligence is of the greatest value when 
humans and technology join forces� In this information age, the intelligence 
branch seems to be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects 
of this technology on both the quantity and quality of its work—both positively 
and negatively�
Although the massive increase in data available might seem a positive develop-
ment, the positive results remain limited if the data cannot be processed for use� 
With over 1�8 billion images captured on mobile phones daily, we can speak of a 
real data explosion�88 Last year, Cisco (a company that provides Internet traffic 
forecasts) presented a white paper claiming that “[i]t would take an individual 
more than 5 million years to watch the amount of video that will cross global IP 
[Internet protocol] networks each month in 2020� Every second, nearly a million 
minutes of video content will cross the network by 2020�”89 This estimate cov-
ers all IP traffic, not just the data relevant to military operations; even so, open 
sources are becoming an increasingly relevant data source in modern operations� 
Furthermore, information overload is also experienced through other intelli-
gence sources that are strictly military� For example, the amount of full-motion 
video (FMV) produced by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has risen sharply 
over the past ten to fifteen years� The amount of footage from 2008 already would 
take a single human being—who never slept or blinked—twenty-four years to 
watch�90 Analysis of all this material is performed by hundreds of young military 
personnel, mostly Air Force airmen at present, but increasingly soldiers, sailors, 
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and Marines who view each video as it comes in�91 Yet even then only a small 
amount of the data (10–15 percent) can be processed�92 The estimate of footage 
from 2008 already made people wonder: How long will humans be used to review 
these videos? Today, almost a decade later, very little about this manual process 
has changed, even though technology has continued to evolve, thereby amass-
ing more and more data—without assisting in the processing, exploiting, and 
disseminating thereof� Presently, monitoring, messaging, and reporting on one 
FMV feed from a single UAV takes a minimum of three military technicians (not 
counting additional personnel for supervision, maintenance, and the like)�93 This 
is a strenuous, labor-intensive effort that would be more effective if supported by 
technology�
This is one of the reasons the U�S� Department of Defense (DoD) established 
the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (AWCFT), also known as Proj-
ect Maven� The overall aim of this team is to accelerate DoD’s integration of AI, 
big data, and machine learning across operations to maintain advantages over 
increasingly capable adversaries�94 Its first task is to field technology to automate 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) for theater- and tactical-level 
UAVs collecting FMV in support of the Defeat-ISIS campaign�95 Currently, ana-
lysts spend 80 percent of their time doing mundane administrative tasks associat-
ed with staring at FMV (e�g�, look, count, characterize) and typing data manually 
into a spreadsheet�96 Although it is necessary to conduct such tasks, commanders 
and Pentagon leaders do not consider them a good use of their analysts’ time�97 So 
instead, they are introducing autonomous intelligence processing to help reduce 
the burden on the human analysts, augment actionable intelligence, and enhance 
military decision-making�98 An example would be technology that can identify 
relevant activity and then label the data� It is a small portion of what General 
Shanahan—the man tasked with finding the new technology—expects the proj-
ect will be able to accomplish in the future, but it is a first step that is necessary to 
demonstrate the utility of AI for targeting�99 “You have to go after a manageable 
problem, solve it, show early wins and then start to open Pandora’s box and go 
after all of these other challenges across the department,” says Shanahan�100
One of the main challenges that could be tackled next is the automation of 
TSAs�101 As mentioned previously, conducting TSAs is a very critical task— 
potential targets are derived from them—but it is also very complex and time-
consuming� Target systems such as air-defense forces, lines of communication, 
enemy leadership, and ideology exist and operate within a complex system-of-
systems context having numerous interrelationships and dependencies that may 
not be readily apparent, may require analysis of large amounts of data, and may 
not conform to preconceived notions and biases�102 TSA therefore requires thor-
ough analysis of a broad variety of intelligence sources and rigorous objectivity 
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to reveal vulnerabilities in one seemingly unrelated system�103 In addition, this 
needs to be a continuous process to enable adjustment to dynamic circumstances� 
This is even more difficult when combating insurgents; for example, a hospital 
may be used as a command center, but a week later the command center may 
have moved and the local population may have begun to reinhabit the facility�104
Thus, TSA constitutes a substantial task—and with the limited number of 
targeteers that Western armed forces, particularly NATO, have now, it is almost 
impossible to perform� This would be even more problematic in a scenario in 
which NATO was at war against a near-peer opponent� As stated previously, 
states cannot bring NATO’s targeting capacity up to speed and solve the multiple 
challenges the organization faces today simply by throwing more people at the 
problem� Autonomous technology, however, could speed up the process, process-
ing large amounts of data so as to discern interrelationships and dependencies 
that human beings would fail to recognize� Additionally, AI is expected to play 
a vital role in planning; it would make it possible to run hundreds, or even mil-
lions, of simulation exercises to understand the potential effects of actions against 
targets across a given network�105
Because the TSA process not only entails the objective assessment of data for 
generic target system analysis but also recommends targeting strategies tied to 
the commander’s objectives and guidance, any autonomous technology conduct-
ing this process would have to be capable of performing complex assessments or 
assisting a targeteer in doing so� So far, no such military technology is in use, but 
the importance of TSA for target development, and targeting more broadly, and 
the many ways in which autonomous technologies could support the process 
mean that TSA is an area that soon could see demands for, or even application 
of, autonomous technologies�
A different, but similar, project of the U�S� Intelligence Community focuses 
on finding mobile missile launchers, then flagging them for analysts anytime 
they transition from a benign to a threatening posture� Basically, this means 
that the program must be taught what “normal” looks like to be able to flag the 
difference� According to former U�S� Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, 
this type of automation could prove most beneficial at the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), which gathers images from America’s satellites, 
analyzes them, and feeds the information to the military and the Intelligence 
Community for targeting and other purposes�106 The NGA also deals with data-
sets so large and complex that they are difficult to process using traditional data- 
processing applications (so-called big data)� To conduct tasks such as making 
maps, knowing the environment, and navigating the planet, as well as under-
standing activity, threats, and changes, the NGA too is exploring technological 
solutions� For example, the NGA is developing a software program that can 
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determine a geolocation from a picture that was taken of the area of interest� 
This technology would enable faster searches of the data to determine a subject’s 
location�107 In practice, this could mean that a social-media picture of an area in 
which, say, a missile launcher is identified could be used to search through mas-
sive amounts of data to determine the location of the launcher within minutes 
(depending on the search box)�
These types of technologies are often neglected in the discourse on autono-
mous weapons owing to the fact that they are not weaponized�108 However, to dis-
regard such technologies would be to ignore their potential� These technologies 
will be vital for target development; in particular, they will be closely connected 
to target selection, since the actionable intelligence produced by the human-
machine collaboration very well could result in targets being selected for engage-
ment on the battlefield� These technologies are designed to give the military a 
better understanding of what is happening on the battlefield, helping humans to 
react more quickly than their adversaries, thus giving them a better chance to win 
a war—or, better yet, to deter an enemy from attacking at all�109 Automating deci-
sions that have a direct causal link to weapons release might be most sensitive— 
authorizing machines to kill humans is “a bridge too far” for most political and 
military leaders—but technologies that can have a substantial effect on which 
specific targets end up on the approved target list or technologies that determine 
what data humans see and how they should conceive the battlefield can be just as 
influential, potentially even more so�
Consider the effect of autonomous technologies that decide, out of large 
amounts of data, what specific data to show to their operators and what data to 
ignore, thereby influencing or shaping situational awareness� Another consider-
ation relevant to assessing human control in the targeting process would be the 
effect of data labeling on target selection� What labels are being applied (e�g�, 
weapon, attack, combatant, hostile intent)? And how is this information presented 
to the human; is there a risk of either automation bias toward or mistrust of the 
system? One step further would be for target-support systems to suggest spe-
cific targets for engagement� Although a human being still would make the final 
decision to approve or disapprove a proposed attack, the role that autonomous 
technologies would have in target selection no longer can be ignored�
More importantly, if we fail to consider these types of technologies for intel-
ligence tasks and the manner in which they are implemented within the military 
architecture, we risk losing a valuable opportunity to examine potential ways to 
manage them� A lot is being said about what the fight looks like now and what it 
will look like in the future, but too little time is being spent on the middle piece—
the actual steps necessary to get there�110 The aforementioned projects constitute 
such steps; they are the first attempts at integrating autonomous technologies 
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into existing military architectures and processes—specifically the targeting 
process� It is vital that we learn from these first attempts, understand the chal-
lenges they raise, and anticipate the ramifications thereof, because the next steps 
certainly will seek ways to expand the use of such technology into areas beyond 
intelligence�111
THE CONTROL ISSUE—NOW AND IN FUTURE TARGETING
In view of the targeting process and surveying current developments in the field 
of autonomous technologies for targeting, a few main tentative conclusions about 
the control issue can be drawn� These conclusions relate to implementing and 
incorporating autonomous technologies in (1) the military mind-set, (2) mili-
tary structures, and (3) decision-making processes� These areas of concern are 
expected to be collectively relevant to solving the control issue�
However, as this article focuses on the targeting process, the next part of this 
analysis will focus primarily on the effect of implementing autonomous tech-
nologies into that process� But before beginning this concluding analysis, let me 
briefly address the challenges that arise out of implementing autonomous tech-
nologies into the military mind-set and the military structure�
Changing the Military Mind-Set
The military is well-known for its focus on hardware such as aircraft, satellites, 
missiles, and other platforms and munitions� But advanced software technologies 
are becoming more and more crucial to the success of today’s military� As a U�S� 
Air Force general explains it, “The B-52 lived and died on the quality of its sheet 
metal� Today our aircraft will live or die on the quality of our software�”112
Currently, there is a wealth of potential innovation in the commercial sector 
that the military (at least Western, particularly U�S�, armed forces) finds difficult 
to identify and introduce into the defense system�113 If military services want to 
take advantage of technological developments in the commercial field, they will 
need to be fast and agile in identifying and incorporating emerging technologies, 
as these commercial developments will be equally exploitable by many other states 
and nonstate actors� This is a challenge for an institution that takes a slow and 
deliberate approach to the acquisition and fielding of technologies�114 Further-
more, there is a need for militaries to change from having a hardware mind-set— 
a platform-centric innovation and acquisition process—to being software-minded 
and understanding the potential contributions and risks that autonomy and AI 
can bring to military missions�115
This will require a fundamental change in mind-set, one that will be most 
difficult to achieve; military historian Basil H� Liddell Hart famously observed 
that “the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to 
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get an old one out�”116 Even though the military’s mission likely will never be fully 
compatible with the commercial culture—which defense analyst Peter Singer 
describes as “fast, flat in structure, and happy to fail and fail rapidly”—the ability 
of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical to retaining a military edge 
in this new environment�117
Dealing with the Military Structure
Transitioning from a hardware mind-set to a software mind-set will require some 
significant changes to the military structure, as any step in the process would need 
to be implemented across military branches to promote interoperability and ef-
fectiveness� However, military organizations often are very “stovepiped” and dis-
jointed in structure� By way of illustration, a Pentagon official from the Joint Staff 
Targeting Division explained that when DoD acquires new software it generally is 
not compatible with the existing system�118 Continuing, he noted that every geo-
graphical combatant command (known as CENTCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM, 
etc�) has different architectures and can be developing tools to improve these 
architectures independently�119 Thus, different developments are occurring at 
different commands and within different services because they use different base 
systems that are not compatible with another service’s or command’s systems�120
According to Dr� Bernadette Johnson of the Defense Innovation Unit Experi-
mental, “Part of our problem is a legacy problem of the historical foundation of 
our independent services, and if we were a fresh brand-new country standing up 
today then we wouldn’t design the military in the way that we currently have it�”121 
Clearly, this existing military structure makes implementing new technologies 
across the board and achieving interoperability difficult�122
The Effect on Human Control in the Targeting Process
The third area of concern—but the primary one of this article—that should be 
considered when implementing autonomous technologies is the process within 
which these technologies operate� Current discussions focus on autonomous 
weapons and ignore the type of autonomous technologies that this article dis-
cusses� One of the reasons for this exclusive and narrow focus on weapons and 
the platforms that carry them seems to be that, like intelligence, these autono-
mous technologies are considered to have “supporting” functions, implying that 
they support but do not replace a human decision� As a result, it is expected that a 
human being remains accountable for any violations of the applicable law, policy, 
or military ethics�123 Also, the level of risk in the event that the technology makes 
a mistake is considered to be lower because the human will act as the ultimate 
decision maker�
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if these technologies are playing 
a supporting role, and even if a human being ultimately makes the decisions, 
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the technologies can influence critical targeting decisions—which could be 
both positive and negative� On the one hand, autonomous technologies could 
be beneficial, for example, in terms of speeding up the process and processing 
large amounts of data to discern interrelationships and dependencies that hu-
man beings would fail to recognize� Western armed forces are struggling to keep 
their targeting capacity up to speed, and the complexity, scope, and scale of the 
targeting process mean that mistakes happen� Autonomous technologies provide 
opportunities to improve this process and its results� On the other hand, imple-
menting these technologies in the targeting process gives rise to additional and 
new challenges with regard to human-machine interfaces, (incompatible) ethical 
frameworks, trust issues, training, and more� These are all fundamental discus-
sions that influence the manner in which the control issue is perceived� Although 
solving all of them is beyond the scope of this article, some operational effects can 
be identified that are relevant from a human-control perspective�
With the targeting process as the reference framework, one could conclude 
that an effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that 
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a long chain within which 
decisions made by one link in the chain almost definitely will affect the control or 
limit the decisions of others in the chain�124 In short, implementing autonomous 
technologies will affect the control that human actors further down the chain 
(i�e�, within the targeting process) can exercise� This could result in a shift of 
responsibilities that, for example, might generate an increase in responsibilities 
for certain superiors or the developers of systems, but also could result in a lack 
of accountability if the effects of implementing these technologies are not con-
sidered adequately before the technologies are introduced into the process� (This 
issue is also closely related to the military structure�)
Even without autonomous technologies, the targeting process is an inher-
ently complex process within which many individuals make numerous decisions 
on a daily basis� Hence, responsibility for critical decisions typically is spread 
across the entire process� On the one hand, this provides multiple opportunities 
to exercise control and apply checks and balances� On the other hand, it should 
be no surprise that such complex processes—within which a conglomeration of 
cultural, organizational, educational, and linguistic differences are at play—are 
prone to human errors� Mistakes are made; the question is whether autonomous 
technologies can reduce these mistakes or ultimately will cause more, or perhaps 
different, mistakes�125
Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of autonomous technologies 
changes the activities of human actors; such technologies do not simply supplant 
the human beings, who simultaneously relinquish all the responsibilities and 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   83 5/1/18   11:10 AM
89
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 8 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
control they exercised previously�126 To the contrary, the proper use of autono-
mous technologies may lead to improved situational awareness and a better un-
derstanding of the operational environment that may even enable human beings 
to enhance their control� Nevertheless, this is not without risk; the redistribution 
of existing tasks and the creation of new ones change the relationship between 
human actors and technologies, which can give rise to a transformation in 
decision-making processes�127 If these transformations are not considered thor-
oughly, the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately result in an unac-
ceptable loss of human control� Whether humans remain in control of critical 
targeting decisions depends on how well they succeed at creating a framework 
within which this control can continue to be exercised alongside the use of in-
creasingly autonomous technologies�
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively� 
However, some first attempts at creating a framework can be observed on the cur-
rent political landscape, where a significant number of states seem to be open to 
prescribing self-imposed restrictions on the development and use of autonomous 
weapons, with specific reference to human control�128 In fact, some states already 
have gone one step further and implemented certain requirements in their na-
tional policies� The U�S� DoD, for instance, published a policy that directs that 
“autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment 
over the use of force�”129 And according to the Netherlands, “meaningful human 
control is required in the deployment of autonomous weapon systems�”130 Even 
though the number of such government policies currently is small—most gov-
ernments merely commit to official statements or working papers presented in 
expert meetings held under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weap-
ons (CCW)—the majority of these policies or statements include a reference to 
the relevance of human control�
Hence, nations seem committed to keeping human beings in the decision-
making loop for important targeting decisions—at least for now� However, it 
could very well be that, if a major conflict arises, all bets will be off, with states 
feeling forced into more reliance on autonomous systems because their adver-
saries are willing to take more risk�131 Considering warfare’s historical action-
reaction cycle, algorithm-versus-algorithm warfare between two adversaries may 
not be too far off�132
However, this is not an inevitable result of these technologies; rather, it is a 
choice that human beings make if they decide to introduce these technologies into 
the targeting process without considering—or after deliberately accepting—the 
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consequences� In the current situation and for Western armed forces, this is not 
likely to be a deliberate choice, but it very well could be the result of a misun-
derstanding of the issue that leads to an erroneous method of dealing with these 
new technologies� For example, by focusing merely on weaponized technologies, 
states, participants, and commentators fail to take into account other significant 
phases of the targeting process and the technologies that affect critical targeting 
decisions in other ways� What they do not seem to realize is that focusing solely 
on weapons employment is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle while staring only at 
one corner—through a soda straw�
Therefore, this article advises taking an expansive view, considering the tar-
geting process as a reference framework under which to examine holistically the 
effect of autonomous technologies on human control� While doing so, govern-
ments could learn from current projects that aim to implement autonomous 
technologies in targeting, such as Project Maven�
They also should consider learning from previous experiences with imple-
menting new technologies in the targeting process� For example, the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA) concluded in its report on mitigating civilian casualties 
resulting from the use of drones that “[f]ailure to recognize and mitigate factors 
besides the platform in the targeting process resulted in an increased risk to 
civilians from the use of drones, despite some desirable characteristics of those 
systems�”133 Research into operational data from U�S� drone missions in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan confirmed that “reducing civilian casualties depends on the 
entire engagement process, including planning and training considerations, not 
simply on characteristics of the weapon platform�”134 Although the platforms 
under discussion in this article are not the same, much of the decision-making 
process is� Hence, these assessments could help states understand the changing 
dynamics in the targeting process caused or exacerbated by the introduction of 
new technologies�
To conclude, the reality is that autonomous technologies already are and will 
continue to be important for targeting� Therefore, safely incorporating these 
technologies into targeting is not a concern for the future but a challenge that 
should be addressed today rather than tomorrow� States that claim that human 
control or judgment is essential to making proper targeting decisions often 
simultaneously pursue autonomous technologies, claiming that these technolo-
gies represent the future of targeting� It could be concluded from this article that 
one approach does not need to preclude the other, but we ought to be mindful 
of the effects that autonomous technologies will have on our decision-making 
processes�
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The development and use of autonomous weapons have created a host of legal, 
political, and ethical questions and concerns that continue to be scrutinized, pri-
marily within the CCW process� However, the annual deliberations that are held 
under this framework convention have resulted in little progress over the past 
four years� Nonetheless, so far over two dozen states have endorsed the notion of 
“meaningful human control” or a similar concept that ought to prevent humans 
from losing control over autonomous weapons� Yet how the concept should be 
interpreted and applied remains vague and disputed�
This article has argued that the principal concern should be to consider these 
autonomous technologies within the decision-making processes in which they 
will be used, because that is the primary context within which their effects can 
be assessed properly� The reference framework that I propose is the targeting 
process� Yet there appears to be a considerable lack of knowledge about target-
ing among many groups and individuals, many considering it to be merely the 
practice of destroying enemy forces and equipment� This historical approach is 
no longer suitable for describing contemporary targeting�
Today, targeting should be perceived as a deliberate, analytical, and iterative 
process, rather than an isolated tactical action� It aims to achieve specified effects 
on and beyond the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions 
but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal activities�
This process begins on a political-strategic level, at which military interven-
tion is decided on and political guidance and overarching military objectives are 
formulated� This guidance is passed down to the operational level, at which time 
the targeting process commences� Through the six phases that follow, military 
forces formulate operational objectives, select and prioritize targets, match them 
with the appropriate response, consider operational requirements and capabili-
ties, execute the mission, and assess whether the desired effects were achieved�
The targeting process provides an appropriate and holistic framework to 
consider concepts such as “meaningful human control” or “appropriate levels 
of human judgment�” Human control and judgment are exercised within this 
process, and hence the targeting process should be considered in its entirety to 
determine the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on human control� 
Also, inquiry should not be limited to weapons deployment but expanded to 
the entire targeting process; such an expansive view demonstrates that critical 
targeting decisions are made throughout the process, so the scope of the control 
issue exceeds the mere use of autonomous weapons� In this context, the detailed 
analysis of phase 2, target development, not only demonstrates the complexity of 
the targeting process; it moreover confirms that critical targeting functions need 
have no direct relation to weapons or kinetic action� It also redirects attention 
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to the targeting role of a military branch—intelligence—that largely has been 
ignored in the debate on autonomous weapons�
With the advent of the information age, the intelligence branch appears to 
be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects of technology on 
both the quantity and quality of its work, both positively and negatively� Western 
armed forces cannot deal with the targeting challenges they face simply by throw-
ing more people at them, so states are driven to invest in technological solutions� 
The U�S� DoD’s AWCFT—tasked with integrating AI, big data, and machine 
learning across operations—provides an example� One of its first efforts has been 
to automate intelligence processing to reduce the burden on human analysts, 
augment actionable intelligence, and enhance military decision-making� This 
is only one of many ongoing research and development projects that Western 
states—and most certainly many others—are pursuing�135
Nevertheless, these types of technologies often are neglected in the discourse 
on autonomous weapons because they are not weaponized� This article estab-
lishes that disregarding these technologies is a mistake� First, these autonomous 
technologies used for target development have an effect on which specific targets 
end up on the approved target list by determining what data humans see and 
how they should conceive the battlefield� The fact that these technologies are 
not weaponized is irrelevant, as their tasks are potentially even more critical for 
targeting than those of their weaponized cousins� Second, these projects provide 
an opportunity to examine challenges and potential ways of dealing with the im-
plementation of increasingly autonomous technologies in the targeting process�
A closer look identifies three main challenges� First, as advanced software 
technologies become more and more crucial to the success of today’s military—
assuming the various services want to take advantage of these technological 
developments—militaries need to change from a hardware to a software mind-
set, since the ability of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical for 
retaining an edge in this new environment� Second, the military structure is very 
stovepiped and disjointed, making it difficult to implement new technologies 
across the board� Third, implementing autonomous technologies in the military 
targeting process will be a task of significant difficulty� Even without autonomous 
technologies, the targeting process is an inherently complex process within which 
many individuals make numerous decisions on a daily basis, inescapably result-
ing in mistakes�
Although imperfect, the targeting process serves as a reliable basis on which to 
analyze the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies, work toward better 
protection of civilians, and preserve military effectiveness� Autonomous tech-
nologies could improve this process, while, at the same time, there is a risk that 
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the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately still result in an unaccept-
able loss of human control because we were not sufficiently mindful of the con-
sequences of these technologies with regard to our decision-making processes�
One effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that 
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a joint chain in which the 
decision of one almost certainly will affect the control or limit the decisions of 
others involved in the chain� Also, autonomous technologies change the activities 
of human actors; they do not supplant those actors while simultaneously reliev-
ing them of all the responsibilities and control they exercised previously� The 
use of autonomous technologies prompts a change in the relationship between 
human actors and technologies that will require a transformation in decision-
making processes� If these changes and transitions are not considered properly 
or are ignored altogether, the use of autonomous technologies for targeting could 
ultimately result in a loss of human control�
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively, 
but some states have made initial, minor attempts at creating a framework� Such 
states seem to be open to prescribing informal and formal self-imposed restric-
tions on the development and use of autonomous weapons, with specific refer-
ence to human control� However, if a major conflict arises all such self-imposed 
restrictions—such as the need for meaningful human control—very well may be 
discarded, potentially resulting in an unacceptable loss of human control over 
critical targeting decisions in the targeting process�
This concern may turn out to be justified, but, as I argue in this article, this is 
not an inevitable result of the development and use of these technologies� Instead, 
whether humans remain in control of critical targeting decisions will depend on 
how well they succeed at creating a framework within which this control can 
continue to be exercised alongside the use of increasingly autonomous technolo-
gies� Even though the targeting process creates a structure that provides a basis 
for negotiating, exercising, and maintaining this control, we also should be hon-
est about our targeting capacity—and the limitations thereof—and about the 
complexity of organizing and executing military operations—and the mistakes 
that result from that� Using the targeting process as a reference framework thus 
creates opportunities for human beings to remain in control of increasingly au-
tonomous technologies, as long as we assess it holistically and do not ignore the 
complexities and challenges inherent in these complex enterprises�
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conferences; or welcoming me to their of-
fices to hear their firsthand experiences and 
collect the data that was indispensable to its 
completion�
 1� The pluralistic terms and inconsistent use of 
terminology in the discourse on autonomous 
weapons often result in lengthy semantic 
disputes� What is meant by terms such as 
autonomous, targeting, human control, or even 
weapon? The meanings of most such terms 
can diverge between and within different 
disciplines; they often have different labels 
that are used interchangeably; some terms 
represent parts of broader concepts; and some 
of the concepts in question are just inherently 
complex� This significantly complicates the 
debate� Read more about the complications of 
a common language in Merel A� C� Ekelhof, 
“Complications of a Common Language: 
Why It Is So Hard to Talk about Autonomous 
Weapons,” Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 22, no� 2 (July 2017), pp� 311–31�
 2� Ibid�, pp� 316–17� In international discourse, 
most references to targeting are actually to 
target recognition, focusing on the ability 
of the autonomous weapon to differentiate 
combatants from noncombatants� Com-
monly, functions considered critical to target 
selection and attack relate to the weapon 
itself, not the more deliberate planning phases 
of the targeting process�
 3� There are two types of targeting: deliberate 
targeting and dynamic targeting� This article 
focuses primarily on deliberate targeting, but 
in large part also applies to dynamic target-
ing� Dynamic targeting consists of the same 
steps, but is more responsive than deliber-
ate targeting, since the process is used to 
prosecute targets that are identified too late to 
go through the deliberate targeting process� 
The dynamic targeting process is compressed 
in time� North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
[hereafter NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Joint Targeting, AJP-3�9 (n�p�: NATO Stan-
dardization Office, 2015), p� 2-4� With regard 
to autonomous technologies, dynamic target-
ing raises some distinct issues that fall outside 
  the scope of this article but may be addressed 
in a later piece�
 4� In 2016, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) introduced critical func-
tions as a concept to describe the challenges 
that autonomous weapons raise, and states, 
participants, and commentators have used 
the concept since then� The ICRC refers to 
critical functions in relation to the weapon 
itself� ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
Implication of Increasing Autonomy in the 
Critical Functions of Weapons (Versoix, Switz�: 
Expert Meeting, 2016)�
 5� Examples include the Algorithmic Warfare 
Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven); 
research into military autonomy at the Neth-
erlands Organization for Applied Scientific 
Research (TNO); scouting by the Defense 
Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) for 
emerging technologies; many commercial 
projects that are relevant to the military, such 
as learning algorithms used by Facebook and 
Google; and National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency research into geolocation software� 
Earlier investigations into fratricide with 
automated weapon systems, such as the U�S� 
Army and Navy investigations into the Patriot 
shoot-down of a Navy F-18 in Iraq in 2003, 
continue to be relevant� Larry Lewis, Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom: Ground-to-Air Fratricide, 
CNA Research Memorandum D0008910�A4 
(CNA, July 2004)�
 6� Intelligence operations specialist in the office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intel-
ligence at the Pentagon, interview by author, 
May 18, 2017�
 7� The information in this article was cleared for 
public release by the Netherlands Ministry 
of Defense� The personal information of the 
interviewees remains confidential; however, 
an overview of the different command centers 
and offices that were consulted during this 
research can be provided on request�
 8� “Netanyahu: Strikes in Syria Targeted Hezbol-
lah Arms,” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2017, www 
�aljazeera�com/; Angus McDowall and Idrees 
Ali, “Air Strike on Mosque near Aleppo in 
Syria Kills 42: Monitor,” Reuters, March 16, 
2017, www�reuters�com/; Jim Sciutto, “U�S�: 
‘Jihadi John’ Targeted in Drone Strike,” CNN, 
November 13, 2015, edition�cnn�com/�
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Operations and Planning (Montgomery, AL: 
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 18� A request for the development of an opera-
tional plan will follow by Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Powers Europe, known as 
SHAPE—prepared at the level of the JFC and 
adjusted and approved by the NAC— 
after which the NAC issues a NAC execu-
tion directive and the targeting process can 
commence� Targeting experts, interview by 
author, February 22, 2017�
 19� See, for example, S�C� Res� 1973, Libya 
(March 17, 2011), and Chris De Cock, “Tar-
geting in Coalition Operations,” in Target-
ing, ed� Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga, pp� 
238–39�
 20� A TST is a target that requires immediate 
response because it poses (or soon will pose) 
a danger to friendly forces or is a highly lucra-
tive, fleeting target of opportunity� TSTs are of 
such high priority that their effective engage-
ment can make or break the campaign, so the 
JFC is willing to divert assets away from other 
targets to find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess them� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Joint Targeting, p� Lexicon-9�
 21� These objectives and guidance are passed 
down from the NAC to the JFC, through the 
Military Committee and Strategic Command� 
Ibid�, p� 3-1�
 22� De Cock, “Targeting in Coalition Opera-
tions,” p� 238�
 23� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-3�
 24� Ibid�
 25� U�S� Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, p� 42�
 26� Mark Roorda, “NATO’s Targeting Process: 
Ensuring Human Control over (and Lawful 
Use of) ‘Autonomous’ Weapons,” in Autono-
mous Systems: Issues for Defence Policymakers, 
ed� Andrew P� Williams and Paul D� Scharre 
(Norfolk, VA: Headquarters Supreme Allied 
Commander Transformation, 2015), p� 155�
 27� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, pp� 2-3–2-4�
 28� Targeting expert, interview by author, De-
cember 1, 2016�
 29� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-4�
 30� U�S� Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, p� 70�
 31� Targeting expert interview�
 32� U�S� Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, p� 70�
 33� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 1-10�
 34� Thus, collateral damage issues are considered 
not only in phase 3 but also in phase 1 (com-
mander’s objectives and guidance), phase 2 
(target development), and phase 5 (mission 
planning and execution), and therefore are 
a good example of considerations that play a 
role in different phases�
 35� No attack is to be launched that is expected 
to cause collateral damage excessive to the 
concrete and direct military advantage an-
ticipated� Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts arts� 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)
(iii), June 8, 1977�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   90 5/1/18   11:10 AM
96
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
 E K E L H O F  9 1
 36� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-4�
 37� Roorda, “NATO’s Targeting Process,” p� 159�
 38� Precautionary measures include doing every-
thing feasible to ensure the target is a lawful 
military target; taking all feasible precautions 
in the choice of means and methods of attack, 
with a view to avoid or minimize collateral 
damage; canceling or suspending an attack 
if it becomes apparent that the target is not a 
lawful military objective or the attack will be 
disproportionate; and giving effective warn-
ing, if the circumstances permit� Protocol Ad-
ditional art� 57; Roorda, “NATO’s Targeting 
Process,” p� 160�
 39� This cycle also is used to describe dynamic 
targeting� It applies even to the deliberate 
process because operations, by their nature, 
are dynamic�
 40� U�S� Joint Forces Command, Commander’s 
Handbook for Joint Battle Damage Assessment 
(Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 2004), 
p� I-8�
 41� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-7�
 42� Larry Lewis, Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Rea-
sons to Assess Civilian Casualties (Arlington, 
VA: CNA, 2014), pp� 17–20�
 43� Some of these can be targeted both kineti-
cally and nonkinetically, while others, such 
as political leadership, can be targeted only 
nonkinetically� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine 
for Joint Targeting, p� B-1�
 44� Ibid� If the JFC wishes to appoint targets 
from categories that are not included in the 
NAC-approved target sets, the JFC has to seek 
approval�
 45� Ibid�, p� 2-3�
 46� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Target Development 
Standards, CJCSI 3370�01 2011 (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Chairman, 2011), p� C-4� 
Besides the TSA process, there is also a target 
audience analysis (TAA)� TAA is defined as 
follows: “The systematic study of people to 
enhance understanding and identify acces-
sibility, vulnerability, and susceptibility to 
behavioral and attitudinal influence activity�” 
Rita LePage and Steve Tatham, NATO Strate-
gic Communication: More to Be Done? (Riga: 
National Defense Academy of Latvia, 2014), 
p� 10�
 47� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Target Development 
Standards, p� B-10�
 48� Ibid�, p� C-2�
 49� A target system most often is considered as 
a collection of assets directed to perform a 
specific function or series of functions� U�S� 
Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, pp� 7, 11, 61�
 50� Ibid�, p� 11�
 51� Experienced targeteer, interview by author, 
during NATO exercise, February 2017�
 52� U�S� Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, pp� 35, 
61�
 53� Intelligence operations specialist interview�
 54� John N� T� “Jack” Shanahan [Lt� Gen�], 
interview by author, May 17, 2017; targeting 
experts interview�
 55� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-3�
 56� Target development begins in phase 2 after 
receipt of the commander’s objectives and 
end state, but it continues in phase 3 (ca-
pabilities analysis), phase 4 (force planning 
and assignment), and phase 6 (assessment)� 
The focus on continual target development 
in these phases should ensure that the most 
current and accurate target intelligence is part 
of the commander’s decision process� Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Target Development Standards, 
p� B-6�
 57� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-4�
 58� U�S� Air Force, Annex 3-60 Targeting, p� 63�
 59� Ibid�, pp� 63–64�
 60� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 2-4�
 61� Ibid�, p� 4-7�
 62� Ibid�; Protocol Additional arts� 48, 51–52�
 63� NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Target-
ing, p� 4-6�
 64� Ibid�, p� 4-7�
 65� Phillip R� Pratzner, “The Current Targeting 
Process,” in Targeting, ed� Ducheine, Schmitt, 
and Osinga, p� 82�
 66� Ibid�
 67� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, JP 3-60 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, 
2013), p� B-3�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   91 5/1/18   11:10 AM
97
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 9 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 68� Joint Targeting School, “Collateral Damage 
Estimation Course Syllabus,” October 2015, 
available at www�dtic�mil/�
 69� Frank Slijper, Where to Draw the Line: 
Increasing Autonomy in Weapon Systems—
Technology and Trends (Utrecht, Neth�: PAX, 
2017), p� 10, available at www�paxvoorvrede 
�nl/�
 70� John N� T� “Jack” Shanahan [Lt� Gen�], e-mail 
to author, December 30, 2017�
 71� Ekelhof, “Complications of a Common Lan-
guage,” p� 2�
 72� Military transformation has been a U�S�-led 
process that, among other aspects, has cen-
tered on the exploitation of new information 
technologies� Therefore, the examples and 
descriptions of developments in the field of 
autonomous technologies that feature in this 
analysis primarily reflect U�S� projects and 
procedures� European states simply have been 
unable to match the American level of invest 
ment in new military technologies� Chinese 
and Russian developments are not included 
in the analysis owing to a lack of sufficient re-
liable sources� Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, 
“Military Transformation in NATO: A Frame-
work for Analysis,” in A Transformation Gap? 
American Innovations and European Military 
Change, ed� Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and 
Theo Farrell (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ� 
Press, 2010), p� 1�
 73� Ekelhof, “Complications of a Common Lan-
guage,” p� 13�
 74� Targeting expert interview�
 75� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-0 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, 
2013), p� I-27�
 76� Intelligence operations specialist interview�
 77� Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed� and trans� Lionel 
Giles (New York: Race Point, 2017), p� 12�
 78� John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge 
of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda 
(Sydney: Random House, 2010), p� 9�
 79� Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed� and trans� 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Univ� Press, 1976), p� 117�
 80� The Vietnam War was instructive for the 
United States in this respect, as the 2006 
Israel-Hezbollah war was for Israel� Pratzner, 
“The Current Targeting Process,” p� 83�
 81� John N� T� “Jack” Shanahan [Lt� Gen�], “The 
Future of Targeting” (paper presented at the 
NATO ACO Targeting Conference, Stras-
bourg, Fr�, February 7, 2017)� Also see Osinga 
and Roorda, “From Douhet to Drones,” pp� 
43–44�
 82� Frans P� B� Osinga, Science Strategy and War: 
The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), p� 245�
 83� Ibid�
 84� Intelligence is not the same as information or 
data� When data are collected and processed 
into an intelligible form, the end result is 
information� Information can be of utility to 
the commander, but when related to other in-
formation about the operational environment 
and considered in the light of past experience, 
it gives rise to a new understanding of the in-
formation, which may be termed intelligence� 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, p� I-1�
 85� Shanahan, “The Future of Targeting�”
 86� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010: 
America’s Military; Preparing for Tomorrow, 
p� 17, available at webapp1�dlib�indiana�edu/� 
Also see Frans Osinga, “The Rise of Military 
Transformation,” in A Transformation Gap?, 
ed� Terriff, Osinga, and Farrell, p� 24�
 87� See, for example, the U�S� Third Offset Strat-
egy, the Chinese national-level AI develop-
ment plan, and Russia’s political response to 
these developments and continuing discus-
sions� Robert O� Work [Deputy Secretary of 
Defense], “Third Offset Strategy” (remarks, 
Brussels, April 28, 2016), available at www 
�defense�gov/; Elsa B� Kania, “Battlefield 
Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military 
Revolution, and China’s Future Military 
Power,” Center for a New American Security, 
November 28, 2017, www�cnas�org/; Patrick 
Tucker, “Russia to the United Nations: Don’t 
Try to Stop Us from Building Killer Robots,” 
Defense One, November 21, 2017, www 
�defenseone�com/�
 88� Technical director and big-data specialist at 
the NGA, interview by author, May 16, 2017�
 89� “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and 
Methodology, 2015–2020,” Cisco, 2016, p� 3, 
www�cisco�com/�
 90� Aaron Saenz, “US Military Drowning in 
Drone Data,” Singularity Hub, January 22, 
2010, singularityhub�com/�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   92 5/1/18   11:10 AM
98
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
 E K E L H O F  9 3
 91� Ibid�
 92� Shanahan interview�
 93� Ibid�
 94� U�S� Deputy Secretary of Defense, memoran-
dum, “Establishment of an Algorithmic  
Warfare Cross-Functional Team (Project 
Maven),” April 26, 2017, available at www 
�govexec�com/�
 95� Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) PED specialist and AWCFT manager 
at the Pentagon, interview by author, May 15, 
2017�
 96� Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Al-
gorithmic Warfare Cell Gets Its First Mission: 
Hunt ISIS,” Defense One, May 14, 2017, www 
�defenseone�com/�
 97� Ibid�
 98� U�S� Deputy Secretary of Defense, memo-
randum, “Establishment of an Algorithmic 
Warfare Cross-Functional Team�”
 99� Shanahan interview�
 100� Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Algorith-
mic Warfare Cell�”
 101� Shanahan interview�
 102� Joint Chiefs of Staff, Target Development 
Standards, p� B-6�
 103� Ibid�
 104� Targeting experts interview�
 105� Shanahan e-mail�
 106� Marcus Weisgerber, “The Increasingly Auto-
mated Hunt for Mobile Missile Launchers,” 
Defense One, April 28, 2016, www�defenseone 
�com/�
 107� NGA technical director and big-data special-
ist interview�
 108� The CCW (discussed below) is an umbrella 
agreement that discusses prohibitions or 
restrictions on the use of certain conventional 
weapons, not certain technologies� Thus its 
focus on weapons makes sense� However, to 
address the specific challenges that the tech-
nologies might raise, one needs a different 
approach�
 109� Colin Clark, “The War Algorithm: The 
Pentagon’s Bet on the Future of War,” Breaking 
Defense, May 31, 2017, breakingdefense�com/�
 110� Pentagon official from the ISR division,  
e-mail to author, July 20, 2017�
 111� Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Algorith-
mic Warfare Cell�”
 112� Christian Hagen, Steven Hurt, and Jeff 
Sorenson, “Effective Approaches for Deliver-
ing Affordable Military Software,” CrossTalk 
(November/December 2013), p� 26�
 113� Jesse Ellman, Lisa Samp, and Gabriel Coll, As-
sessing the Third Offset Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2017), p� 6� In past years, the U�S� 
DoD responded to this difficulty by creating 
several new organizations to address those 
deficiencies and meet current and projected 
operational needs� Examples are the Stra-
tegic Capabilities Office, the DIUx, and the 
previously mentioned AWCFT� Larry Lewis, 
Insights for the Third Offset: Addressing Chal-
lenges of Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence 
in Military Operations (Washington, DC: 
CNA, 2017), pp� 10–20�
 114� Lewis, Insights for the Third Offset, p� 8�
 115� U�S� Air Force software specialist, interview 
by author, May 18, 2017; ISR PED special-
ist and AWCFT manager interview; senior 
intelligence officer at U�S� DoD Joint Staff 
Targeting, interview by author, May 17, 2017�
 116� B� H� Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1944)�
 117� Jeremy Hsu, “Despite Trump, Silicon Valley’s 
Pentagon Ties Stay Strong,” Wired, February 
10, 2017, www�wired�com/; Lewis, Insights for 
the Third Offset, p� 8�
 118� Senior intelligence officer interview�
 119� Ibid� See also Lewis, Insights for the Third 
Offset, p� 26�
 120� Senior intelligence officer interview; Lewis, 
Insights for the Third Offset, p� 26�
 121� Bernadette Johnson, remarks for “Innova-
tion and the Future Force” panel discussion 
(Center for a New American Security, May 
17, 2017, Washington, DC), video available at 
www�cnas�org/�
 122� Lewis, Insights for the Third Offset, p� 22�
 123� For an assessment on distributed responsibil-
ity within the context of the military chain 
of command, see Marcus Schulzke, “Autono-
mous Weapons and Distributed Responsibil-
ity,” Philosophy and Technology 26, no� 2 (June 
2012)�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   93 5/1/18   11:10 AM
99
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 9 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 124� On responsibility practices and unmanned 
systems, see Merel Noorman, “Responsibility 
Practices and Unmanned Military Technolo-
gies,” Science and Engineering Ethics 20, no� 3 
(September 2014), pp� 809–26�
 125� It is relevant to note here that there is an im-
portant difference between discussing which 
human-machine relationship would be most 
beneficial for achieving a desired goal (i�e�, 
how AI can improve the targeting process) 
and determining what we would consider 
ethically acceptable�
 126� The effects of their introduction into the 
targeting process will vary, but the under-
standing that autonomous technologies are 
not simply human replacements could be 
illustrated by the introduction of UAVs� Al-
though often perceived as taking the pilot out 
of the cockpit, the actual effect of UAVs has 
been much more significant than that� Armed 
UAVs still need a substantial crew, includ-
ing the pilot, a sensor operator, a mission-
intelligence coordinator, and several analysts 
to deal with tasks at hand� In fact, it can 
take up to 168 people—including operators; 
coordinators; advisers; analysts; crews for 
landing, takeoff, and flight; technicians; and 
maintenance personnel—to keep a Predator 
in the air for twenty-four hours� Noorman, 
“Responsibility Practices and Unmanned 
Military Technologies,” p� 818�
 127� Ibid�, p� 817�
 128� This mostly refers to statements made during 
the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons 2013–16 expert meetings on lethal 
AWSs, during which a majority of states 
pointed out—frequently—the need for some 
form of human control� See Ekelhof, “Com-
plications of a Common Language�”
 129� U�S� Defense Dept�, Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems, Directive 3000�09 (Washington, DC: 
November 21, 2012), p� 2�
 130� Government of the Netherlands, “Govern-
ment Response to AIV/CAVV Advisory Re-
port No� 97, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
The Need for Meaningful Human Control,’” 
March 2, 2016, available at aiv-advies�nl/�
 131� Shanahan interview�
 132� Shanahan e-mail�
 133� Lewis, Drone Strikes in Pakistan, pp� 1–2�
 134� Ibid�, p� 28�
 135� See note 72 for a methodological clarification 
of the author’s primary Western/U�S� focus�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   94 5/1/18   11:10 AM
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   95 5/1/18   11:10 AM
101
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
Lieutenant Adam Biggs, USN, is a research psycholo-
gist currently stationed on Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio, with the Naval Medical Research 
Unit Dayton (NAMRU-D). He received a bachelor’s 
degree from McKendree University in 2006 before 
attending the University of Notre Dame, where he 
received a master’s degree in 2010 and a doctorate 
in 2012. His postdoctoral work at Duke University 
included theoretical advancements in visual search, 
with a particular emphasis on security screen-
ings, through projects funded by the Department of 
Homeland Security. In 2015, Biggs joined the USN 
Medical Service Corps. He currently is in charge of 
numerous government projects evaluating mixed- 
reality simulations and how motion impacts shoot-
ing performance, and theoretical investigations of 
medical issues related to simulator sickness.
Captain Rees Lee, USN, spent five years as a line offi-
cer, serving consecutively as communications officer 
and navigator in USS Goldsborough (DDG 20) and 
training and readiness officer for Destroyer Squad-
ron 35, both units homeported in Pearl Harbor, Ha-
waii. Captain Lee deployed twice to the Persian Gulf 
in support of Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT 
SHIELD, and DESERT STORM. He is a qualified sur-
face warfare officer. In 1991, Lee transferred to the 
Medical Corps and received a Navy scholarship to 
return to Stanford University for medical school. He 
graduated from Stanford with honors and contin-
ued his medical education at Naval Medical Center 
Portsmouth as a pediatric intern and resident. Cap-
tain Lee’s extensive research portfolio includes serv-
ing as government sponsor of the Health Outcomes 
Research Center of Excellence, a public-private coop-
erative research program that uses military health-
system data to analyze health-care outcomes. From 
September 2013 to June 2014, Captain Lee was the 
acting executive officer of USNS Comfort (T-AH 20), 
then executive officer and currently commanding of-
ficer of NAMRU-D.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3
7187_Biggs&Lee copy.indd   96 5/2/18   9:33 AM
102
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
Adam Biggs and Rees Lee
THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR IN THE 
THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
 The Third Offset Strategy has become a common topic of discussion in De-partment of Defense (DoD) circles� In these debates, people regularly throw 
around new ideas about research and development (R&D) priorities, as well as 
about the often-desired deliverables, the shiny new toys—people love widgets 
they can hold or capabilities they can see in the form of new equipment� But these 
research initiatives are about more than the technology� Like its predecessors, the 
Third Offset Strategy is truly about maintaining American military superiority—
a critical point sometimes lost amid fascinating debates about artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and swarms of learning machines on the battlefield� Specifically, the 
Third Offset Strategy is not about securing future battlefield capabilities in the 
twenty-second or twenty-third century; it is about securing our advantage for the 
next ten or twenty years� Today’s active-duty personnel need to see these benefits 
for battles they will fight but that have not yet begun�
This defined timeline is not a simple discussion point; it is the linchpin that 
keeps the conversation focused� Third Offset discussions regularly are given a 
wide berth when it comes to potential technologies, so a second point becomes 
critical to maintaining good order and discipline in the debate: that military R&D 
does not begin or end with the Third Offset Strategy� The initiative is a guidepost 
that will point to a series of research priorities for the near future� Not all R&D 
projects will fall under this initiative, nor should we ignore futuristic science that 
falls completely beyond its current scope� Instead, we can use the Third Offset 
Strategy to define a series of plausible research priorities to guide resource al-
location, funding, and desired deliverables or outcomes� A related consideration 
is that the goals cannot be research-only deliverables� It is not enough to deliver 
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a buggy prototype or to push the science forward; these initiatives must yield 
tangible battlespace advantages for our personnel�
Already we have not started this article in the way that most Third Offset 
Strategy discussions begin� We did not lead by outlining technology objectives or 
descriptions of the previous offset strategies—and there are several good reasons 
why� First, lists of technological objectives split off in many different directions 
more quickly than a company of young sailors or Marines on their first special 
liberty� Second, this offset is not actually about the technology� The new gadgets 
will prove useful, but our focus should be on the human operators—our person-
nel are the most critical component to continued operational success� Moreover, 
we have a near-unique opportunity to leap forward in optimizing human per-
formance� Third, the current offset strategy is not like its predecessors� It will 
become necessary later in this discussion to contrast and compare the different 
offset strategy examples, but right now—at the onset of this offset—the purpose 
of discussion must be to establish priorities, tangible deliverables, and a timeline� 
• Our priorities are determined by the resources we have and the adversaries 
we face�
• Our tangible deliverables are determined by the realistic improvements and 
advancements that are possible within the relevant time frame�
• Our timeline covers the first half of the twenty-first century� 
Now we can get started; we can move on to the question that must be answered 
before the Third Offset can move forward—the multibillion-dollar question: 
What should our Third Offset Strategy actually be?
ENHANCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE:  
THE GOAL OF THE THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
We propose that enhancing human performance should be the ultimate goal of 
the Third Offset Strategy� To clarify this point: we are not suggesting a minimal 
or irrelevant role for technology within this agenda; technology will prove just 
as critical as in the previous offset strategies� Instead we are saying that the tech-
nologies developed should provide new operational capabilities or enhancement 
opportunities for the human operator�
This approach builds on a theme that we will mention again and again, be-
cause it should be a critical underlying philosophy of the Third Offset Strategy: 
let the computers do what they do best, and let the humans do what they do 
best� Computers are much better than humans at processing raw information, so 
let the computers crunch the numbers and feed that information to the human 
operators� However, computers cannot clear rooms or steer ships� Human opera-
tors remain the backbone of our operational capabilities, so human performance 
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remains crucial to our tactical success� Let the computers give better information 
to our human operators and improve the human operators’ capabilities, and the 
combined effect will be increased operational effectiveness�
Although the human performance element has been the one constant in five 
thousand years of warfare on this planet, what has changed is the capabilities 
and opportunities that are emerging or newly available—i�e�, just at our finger-
tips—today� We divide these opportunities into three overlapping areas: (1) cyber 
initiatives, (2) human-machine integration, and (3) precision selection/training�
We suggest—somewhat counterintuitively—that consideration of cyber initia-
tives, although they represent the most technological thrust of the Third Offset, 
can remain within the scope of human performance considerations� These as-
pects remain amenable to the theme of “let the computers do what they do best�” 
The various initiatives can create better information-processing systems so the 
most useful, most accurate, and most reliable information is delivered to the hu-
man operator who makes the critical decision�
Human-machine teaming represents a subject often considered within the 
scope of Third Offset Strategy projects� This category involves a wide array of 
opportunities to enhance human performance by integrating machine products 
and programs directly into critical tasks� For example, augmented-reality (AR) 
systems can improve performance by delivering updated information directly 
into a heads-up display (HUD)� We now have the ability to integrate humans 
and machines in complex ways that result in true interdependence and yield 
superior performance attributes that neither the machine nor the human alone 
could achieve�
This article is set apart from most other Third Offset Strategy discussions by 
its consideration of the third opportunity: precision selection/training� Together 
with improving the machines (cyber initiatives) and improving the integration of 
machines into human performance (human-machine teaming), this aspect com-
pletes our triad of enhanced human performance by directly improving the way 
we select and train the humans in the loop (precision selection/training)� In this 
area, we recommend using various initiatives such as so-called big data to inform 
our selection procedures, thereby taking advantage of the wealth of information 
that modern technology makes available�
Additionally, we recommend some large “cultural” changes in training proce-
dures� Recent scientific advancements have opened new training opportunities, 
enabling us to begin training individuals on the basis of their individual needs� 
Rather than every Marine receiving the same training, individualized training 
protocols can address specific performance deficiencies or help an individual 
reach a particular goal or acquire a particular skill set required for a specific duty� 
This approach would make some training assessments more akin to medical 
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assessments, with their related individualized treatment plans. There is already a 
model in place on which we can build: special operations. Our proposed preci-
sion selection/training ideas would use individual assessments and special opera-
tions forces (SOFs) training as the models for applying these techniques more 
widely, to the military at large.
These three components (cyber initiatives, human-machine teaming, and 
precision selection/training) represent our Performance Enhancement Triad, the 
overall model we recommend to guide Third Offset Strategy R&D. The article 
will now delve more deeply into each aspect of the triad.
Cyber Initiatives
Modern warfare no longer is limited to the physical battlefields of the sea, sky, 
and land. The ability to use global communication and data networks to disrupt 
directly the energy, financial, political, and military sectors of a nation is a reality. 
The most effective warrior of the future battlefield may not be the Marine with 
the rifle but the sailor or airman at a computer in Colorado. The conception of 
enhanced human performance needs to broaden enough to include these cyber 
warriors.
Achieving the human-performance goals articulated by the Third Offset Strategy will require R&D initiatives on 
three fronts: (1) information-technology and cyber initiatives, especially in the areas of effective use of multiple, big 
datasets and assisted decision-making; (2) precision selection and training of human operators to ensure that the 
right operator is assigned the right task and receives task-specific training individualized to his or her needs; and (3) 
optimized human-machine integration, including simulated environments such as virtual and augmented realities.
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One illustration of enhancing human performance in the sphere of cyber 
warfare involves deep-learning systems� Machines can be used for cyber defense 
and electronic warfare; this may involve analyzing, for example, tens of thou-
sands of social-media posts to identify critical data patterns that might be of 
use� Other technologies may sense unknown radar signals and help pilots sort 
tremendous amounts of information in real time without needing to return to 
base to conduct the analysis�1 Either example represents a cyber initiative that 
attempts to circumvent the traditional limits of human performance� However, 
both systems actually are providing valuable information to the human opera-
tor to enable an eventual decision and reaction� Third Offset technologies, even 
seemingly cyber-only investments, fundamentally enhance human performance 
by creating new capabilities for the operator� The deep-learning systems remain 
a good example of a single “machine” that quickly can perform an operation that 
otherwise might take a single human operator weeks, thereby allowing real-time 
decision-making based on the most complete data analysis ever delivered to a 
combat environment�
Another emerging cyber initiative centers on antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities, or operations in denied and degraded environments� Any major 
operation depends on the ability to move forces rapidly in theater� Some analysts 
have even referred to operational warfare as an empty concept if forces are unable 
to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea, and in the air�2 Classic A2/AD 
methods have been aimed at denying a human operator access to some location; 
scenarios ranged from medieval caltrops stopping a cavalry charge to the use 
of various forms of land mines� In any such case, the goal involves protecting 
friendly forces, blocking enemy forces by denying them access, or both� Anti-
A2/AD initiatives attempt to overcome these area-denial strategies� They can 
take one of two approaches: breaching the enemy’s A2/AD systems or enhancing 
friendly A2/AD capabilities� Third Offset substrategies could focus on enhanc-
ing the human operator’s ability to breach an area’s defenses� For example, new 
exoskeletons could reduce the danger to a human operator while he or she physi-
cally breaks through the enemy’s front lines�3 In the cyber arena, Third Offset 
technologies could extend the ability of the human operator to analyze quickly 
the status of global networks, then develop strategies to deny enemy forces access 
to the networks controlling energy, communications, navigation, and other criti-
cal infrastructures vital to waging war� On the flip side of the cyber coin, other 
Third Offset initiatives could pursue new technologies to ensure unimpeded 
cyber access by friendly forces� New A2/AD systems will need to survive cyber 
attacks and other enhanced defensive capabilities if our human operators and 
Second Offset technologies are going to continue to have the same impact on 
future operations�
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Human-Machine Integration
Augmented performance through human-machine integration represents per-
haps the most commonly cited component of the Third Offset Strategy� Aug-
mented performance would enhance the human operator by providing more 
information, increasing functional capability, or maximizing performance and 
endurance in austere environments� The goal is to enhance situational awareness 
and operational performance by giving the operator directly everything he or she 
needs in the most convenient and expedient manner possible�
The foremost example of this idea is already well into development� Specifi-
cally, helmets can be equipped with AR aspects to create better HUDs than any 
prior system� The best-known example at present is the F-35 helmet, which can 
allow the pilot to “see” through the aircraft�4 This capability was made possible by 
advances in AR, which differs in several ways from virtual reality (VR) systems� 
With VR, the technology creates a self-contained world; all stimuli are created 
within that visual system, with no reliance on the physical world around the 
operator� In comparison, an AR environment does not create a self-contained 
world, but merely augments the world around the user by introducing computer- 
generated elements� Pilots wearing AR helmets still can see their cockpits, but 
other information will appear on their visors, such as current heading and 
altitude� The F-35 helmet uses this technology and cameras embedded in the 
skin of the plane to create a view for pilots that is unobstructed by the physical 
aircraft—they can “see” through the floor because they actually are looking at 
the camera images integrated into their visors� In a similar manner, Navy engi-
neers are developing futuristic HUDs capable of embedding information on the 
inside of a diving helmet�5 The underlying concept is the same: to provide an 
operator—particularly an operator in a harsh environment or wearing protective 
gear—critical information that otherwise might be difficult to access or track�
Use of AR technology is not limited to the operational environment� In 
the training field, the Fleet Integrated Synthetic Training/Testing Facility 
(known as FIST2FAC) blends live action with virtual assets and adversaries�6 
Thanks to this unique blend of live action and AR capabilities, sailors can stand 
aboard actual ships and simulate using machine guns to engage multiple fast-
attack craft� The combination yields new training capabilities that otherwise 
would be possible only via an untenable financial investment� In other words, the 
blended training yields maximum training efficiency at minimal cost� This capa-
bility certainly falls under the general umbrella of an offset strategy, by creating 
a new and economically viable military advantage, while also fulfilling the Third 
Offset Strategy intention of enhancing human performance�
To demonstrate the effectiveness of human-machine teaming beyond merely 
providing information to the operator, we will draw on a now-classic example 
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drawn from the game of chess� It once was assumed that machines never would 
be able to outthink humans in this field, but a computer system named Deep 
Blue shattered this assumption when it beat world champion Garry Kasparov in 
1997�7 Now computer systems regularly beat human players—which has spawned 
another evolution� The new format has different names (including three-play 
chess, freestyle chess, centaur chess, and so forth), but the premise is that dur-
ing game play a computer aids the human�8 The human player can ask questions 
of the computer, which then compares various scenarios faster than the human 
could� The human player still makes the decision, but the computer provides 
invaluable aid during the process� The combination is not as simple as a HUD, 
because it involves comparing strategic moves and their consequences before the 
operator actually has to make the move� It is quite possible that future command-
and-control equipment will integrate such technology platforms further into our 
operations� This is in keeping with the theme of “let the computers do what they 
do best, and let the humans do what they do best�”
The development of combined human-machine efforts faces other challenges, 
though, especially as the outcome performance can depend entirely on the spe-
cific machine involved and the specific human in the loop� Thus, the greatest 
challenge in human-machine teaming is trust� Although this phenomenon is not 
new, it remains a pervasive issue� Everyone is enamored of the capabilities of the 
newest computer—until it unexpectedly crashes and you get the “blue screen of 
death�” The driverless car currently is careening toward a wall of passenger mis-
trust that will have to be overcome�9 Third Offset technologies will face similar 
trust issues� Human operators must trust the accuracy and validity of the equip-
ment they are using, or the entire synthesis becomes untenable� For example, the 
U�S� Naval Aviation Safety Center cites spatial disorientation as the number one 
human causal factor of Class A mishaps—the worst category of aviation mishaps, 
those involving more than two million dollars in damage and loss of aircraft, life, 
or both�10 Spatial disorientation can occur in a number of ways, with visual illu-
sions often listed as a primary factor� In a visual-illusion scenario, operating in 
dark environments (or without visual reference points for some other reason) can 
disorient pilots� Despite instrument indications to the contrary, pilots continue to 
trust their eyes over their machine to fly safely—even when their eyes could be 
lying� Unfortunately, this is merely one example; human-machine trust issues are 
all too common� As new technologies are introduced to aid the warfighter, the 
issue has the potential to become much more significant�
Precision Selection and Training
While cyber initiatives will provide superior “machines,” selection and training 
initiatives will be pivotal in ensuring that those machines are integrated with the 
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best possible human operators� The key to success for these selection and train-
ing initiatives will be precision� Traditional military selection and training have 
been a matter of mass production, in which sailors and Marines are treated as 
identical cogs in a giant machine� Current screening tools, such as the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (known as ASVAB), are notoriously blunt 
instruments that ignore the developing science of incorporating physiological, 
neurological, and cognitive components� Furthermore, the military has a long, 
proud tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of 
background or aptitudes, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor, 
Marine, or airman� While this approach may have worked in the era of mass 
armies and large-unit tactics, the fluid battlefield that is characteristic of fourth-
generation warfare and cyber warfare makes this selection and training approach 
obsolete—and risky�
It will not be sufficient to have just any sailor pushed through a training pipe-
line; for the Third Offset Strategy to succeed, the military must push the right 
sailor through the pipeline� In other words, decisions regarding selection and 
training must be made with a precision never seen before in the U�S� military� 
In the world of the Third Offset Strategy, selection and training decisions would 
be more similar to those a doctor makes in treating a patient, involving creating 
an individualized plan designed to achieve the optimal outcome� In fact, the re-
search techniques designed to discover the biomarkers to be used in this new era 
of precision medicine also may help usher in the precision selection and training 
approaches necessary for the success of the Third Offset Strategy�
The difference in warfare environments between current and future opera-
tions further makes this “precision challenge” both timely and apropos� A large, 
blunt training procedure cannot deal with the nuances that the conduct of mul-
tigeneration warfare creates�11 Fortunately, a model already exists for conducting 
this style of military training� The SOFs template is the ideal base on which to 
build� SOFs already embody several aspects that are essential to meeting current 
operational-flexibility demands, including the need to conduct smaller, dispersed 
engagements and perform expedited responses� SOF operators are among our 
best-trained and most capable military personnel� If we are going to build a mold 
from which to cast future operators, SOFs offer an ideal subset to consider in 
determining how to select and train human operators�
The template begins by adopting some of the basic truths applied to special 
warfare for application across a wider segment of the military� The U�S� Army 
Special Operations Command dictates five truths about SOFs, which can serve 
as a philosophical guide for selection and training� The first truth states that 
“[h]umans are more important than hardware�” The fourth truth states that 
“[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
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occur�”12 Preparation during peacetime aligns well with the spirit and general 
purpose of an offset strategy� So, from a philosophical perspective, SOFs already 
apply the template for human operators that will be needed to carry out a Third 
Offset Strategy�
Of course, the general purpose of personnel selection and screening is noth-
ing new� For especially important duties, the different service branches long have 
sought better means of selecting and screening personnel, ranging from combat-
readiness evaluations to special-operations training� The question remains the 
same—How will we achieve this end goal?—but the difference now is the tools 
we have at our disposal to make these evaluations� For example, deep-learning 
systems take advantage of “big data” analytics, which can crunch numbers far 
more quickly than human analysts� These advanced analytical approaches can be 
used to enhance our existing selection procedures by using as a starting point the 
personnel we have already, along with the requirements of the duty in question�
This idea sounds rather vague until one considers a specific application� One 
example is that big-data analytics and new research could be used to develop 
a combat-readiness profile (CRP)�13 The CRP would identify numerous physi-
ological, cognitive, and neurological components to predict which individuals 
will have the highest likelihood of performing well under particular combat 
conditions� Physiological variables to be measured might include heart-rate vari-
ability, cognitive factors, and response inhibition; neurological variables might 
include event-related potentials in the brain�14 These rich sources of information 
provide an insight deeper than does outward behavior alone, because they liter-
ally identify activity going on in the hearts and minds of our personnel� Recent 
technological developments have continued to make sensors of these various fac-
tors smaller, more durable, and more practical to employ in otherwise difficult-
to-access environments� By taking advantage of this available yet underused data 
source and big-data analytics, we could evaluate combat readiness in a manner 
never attempted before in military history� The ability to quantify combat readi-
ness on the basis of objective factors could supplement training officer decisions 
by identifying precisely those individuals who are and are not ready for combat—
no matter how they appear to behave under pressure during training�
The potential to select personnel precisely represents an interesting new way 
to enhance operator performance in the Third Offset Strategy: by matching 
the right operator to the right duty at the right time� There is an opportunity 
to take these selection mechanisms one step further by developing new train-
ing methods that are based on human abilities that current military training 
underemphasizes—specifically, cognitive abilities� The idea stems from a con-
cept called “Sharper Minds, Sharper Sailors�”15 Essentially, we currently train 
the bodies of our personnel through physical training and we give them new 
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procedures to execute and new technology to operate� However, the thing that 
operates that body, executes the procedures, and uses the technology—the 
mind—receives no directed training� But if we enhance the mental capabilities 
of our personnel, we could expect to improve operational effectiveness� Thus, 
the Third Offset Strategy takes a rather direct approach to enhancing human 
performance of military duties: by enhancing the human who will be perform-
ing the duty�
The challenge is in identifying how to enhance the individual operator� So-
called brain-training initiatives have purported to cure everything up to and 
including Alzheimer’s disease by having subjects perform a few minutes of 
directed cognitive-training tasks each day� However, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) slapped key elements of the brain-training industry with fines for 
making such grandiose claims with no empirical evidence�16 Even the scientific 
community is somewhat split over the issue, with many lining up to denounce 
the entire brain-training industry, while others proffer the simpler criticism that 
so far the industry has overstepped any reasonable conclusions�17 Scientists still 
are learning which cognitive training platforms can be used as interventions for 
which problems, and how the training methods should be applied� Nonetheless, 
the field holds substantial potential, with promising preliminary results being 
replicated in new studies� For example, alcohol-consumption behaviors can be 
altered by increasing response inhibition for alcohol-related stimuli (e�g�, pictures 
of beer)�18 This example demonstrates how sound science paired with specific 
intent can achieve a worthwhile goal� The success comes from careful applica-
tion of validated scientific methods� In comparison, the brain-training industry 
rushed an idea forward for immediate profit without generating any supportive 
evidence for its claims�
Military research cannot make the same mistake� Developing new training 
techniques must be an evidence-based endeavor� As noted above, response inhi-
bition appears to be a trainable cognitive function, and this cognitive ability has 
direct relevance to combat operations�19 Classic response-inhibition experiments 
often use a “go/no-go” task, in which one stimulus is paired with making a re-
sponse and another stimulus is paired with withholding a response� For example, 
participants in these experiments might hit a key (i�e�, a “go” response) whenever 
they see a green square, but withhold a response (i�e�, a “no-go” response) when-
ever they see a red square� The transition to a military operational environment 
can be very direct—shoot a hostile in a combat zone (i�e�, a “go” response), but 
do not shoot an ally in a combat zone (i�e�, a “no-go” response)� Such a link 
between inhibitory control and either friendly-fire incidents or civilian casual-
ties already has been demonstrated in the psychology literature and, in a more 
direct application to the training issue, there is at least one demonstration that 
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response-inhibition training could reduce the likelihood of inflicting a civilian 
casualty�20
These examples demonstrate how the Third Offset Strategy should pursue 
new training methods to maximize human performance� Specifically, any novel 
approaches should be (1) based on sound science, (2) demonstrated in a context 
relevant to military operations, and (3) replicated in different experiments be-
fore the proof of concept is turned into a concept of operations� For example, we 
should not hesitate to explore novel technologies, such as transcranial stimula-
tion, to enhance human cognitive performance, as well as to leverage our under-
standing of the neurobiology of fatigue to mitigate its adverse cognitive effects�
A REALISTIC BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN OPERATORS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL GOALS
Our argument is that an agenda that addresses enhanced human performance 
would satisfy best the timeline, priorities, and deliverables that our current op-
erators face� Still, any Third Offset Strategy argument should not address simply 
satisfying these criteria; rather, the discussion should hinge on these criteria 
themselves� Anything discussed should focus on realistic R&D goals that achieve 
some measure of increased operational readiness or expanded force capabilities� 
For example, consider two novel technologies currently under discussion for 
fulfilling future naval purposes: AR and AI� The question then becomes whether 
AR or AI systems meet our three needs of priorities, tangible deliverables, and a 
timeline (i�e�, which technology should be our focus?)�
AR technology exists today in an ever-growing commercial market, and it 
would be easy to program the scenarios to fulfill military requirements� But how 
well does AR match up against our three needs—does it match our priorities? 
Yes� One of our greatest challenges at the moment is that our new strategies must 
be flexible and must adapt to a wide array of adversaries, including the “4+1” 
concept that identifies four potential adversary states (Russia, China, Iran, and 
North Korea) and various nonstate actors (e�g�, terrorist organizations)�21 Each 
possible adversary presents different challenges, so our training and operational 
activities must be flexible enough to adapt to and overcome those challenges� AR 
training can be programmed to mimic a wide array of situations, from operat-
ing a gunner platform firing at fast-attack craft to planning high-volume troop 
movements� AR also can provide advanced operational capabilities, such as the 
various information displays within the F-35 helmet� Does AR provide tangible 
deliverables? Yes� In the near future new technological capabilities could be 
demonstrated that would provide the needed equipment, and we can measure 
human-performance differences to determine their operational impact� Can AR 
meet a realistic timeline? Yes, the technology as it exists today can be adapted to 
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fit any of these suggested purposes� AR systems represent an ideal technological 
template for Third Offset improvements and investments�
AI systems could alter the battle space dramatically, with thinking machines 
adapting to overcome new problems faster than communication signals could be 
relayed to an operator� An entire army of thinking machines could overwhelm an 
enemy battalion without ever losing a human life� The idea already is swimming 
about in the conceptual seas of both allies and adversaries; Russian general Valery 
Gerasimov recently predicted a future battlefield populated by learning machines 
rather than humans�22
But as interesting as these possibilities may be, would drones or some other 
form of AI meet our three needs? Is overwhelming our enemies a priority? Ab-
solutely� Does AI offer tangible deliverables? Yes—but in enough different forms 
that an acquisitions officer could go from butter bar (O-1) to full bird (O-6) 
before seeing a final, delivered product� Is such a timeline acceptable? Defi-
nitely not� We should continue to invest in these capabilities—their potential is 
nearly endless and the technology could revolutionize warfare� But will swarms 
of drones dominate the battlefield by 2030, or even 2040? Given the challenges of 
technology development, infrastructure, manufacture, and acquisition, the safe 
answer is no�
Typically from this point, Third Offset Strategy writings would continue down 
the road of discussing technological opportunities, but we are focusing on en-
hancing human opportunities� However, confusion can arise when discussing the 
source of these enhancements� We are not suggesting that human performance 
should be enhanced separate from advancing technology; we are suggesting that 
human performance should be enhanced through technology� Advanced tech-
nological capabilities will provide new opportunities to achieve optimal human 
performance� This approach adheres to the theme of “let the computers do what 
they do best, and let the humans do what they do best�” Computers can process 
information faster than human operators, so let the computers crunch the num-
bers; human operators can make decisions that incorporate a level of context and 
consequence that computers cannot, so let the humans make the decisions�
A CULTURAL CHANGE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING 
HUMAN-PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
The ideas introduced thus far largely are novel in and of themselves, and inte-
grating them into our ongoing operations—making them a reality—will require 
changes in the areas of personnel, equipment, and funding� But several sugges-
tions would require more: major cultural changes�
One important issue deriving from the advancements in cyber capabilities was 
referred to earlier: that the most effective warriors may be the sailors, airmen, 
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or others who remotely pilot vehicles that have a direct battlefield impact� This 
idea seems to conflict with our advocacy of a SOF-type approach to personnel 
selection and training, but the two elements actually dovetail quite well� Preci-
sion selection procedures can be applied to both realms; the difference is in the 
abilities assessed to select operators to fill various roles� Some selection proce-
dures will focus more on the overtly physical (e�g�, physical fitness evaluations, 
long-distance swims, etc�), whereas others will focus more on response speed 
and fine-motor control (e�g�, hitting buttons quickly, making microadjustments 
with joysticks)� However, this differentiation merely reflects variations in specific 
procedures; the greater challenge will require effecting cultural changes in how 
we view certain training and procedures�
The first cultural change involves an emerging trend regarding the battle 
space, not the battlefield� Battle space quickly is coming to be defined by multiple 
entities operating in multiple locations across multiple platforms� Whereas we 
once fought the battle of Saratoga in upper New York State, a future “battle of 
Saratoga” may involve airmen in Saratoga operating remotely piloted vehicles 
to survey a land area in Iran, causing fighter jets (or maybe even other drone 
aircraft) to launch from an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf to strike a location 
in Syria� This is battle space, not a battlefield—multiple domains coordinated in 
real time to conduct operations across the world�
This aspect is actually the cultural change that most in the military will accept 
readily� The real cultural change will be to take those same procedures and ideas 
that we have applied only to special operators and apply them to our larger force� 
If drone pilots may be launching aircraft from Colorado to aid special operators 
in the Middle East, we must hold those operators to the same standards as our 
special operators in theater—perhaps not in the number of push-ups performed 
or the marksmanship exhibited, but in remaining in the top 1 percent for reaction 
time or fine-motor control�
More than that, the same principles applied to special operators could apply 
elsewhere� For example, consider the special operations truth cited earlier that 
“[h]umans are more important than hardware�” Our best and most advanced tac-
tical aircraft—manned or unmanned—are nothing but expensive paperweights 
without their operators� As noted earlier, “[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces 
cannot be created after emergencies occur�” If we need a flexible force operating 
aircraft from stateside to fight overseas, then its personnel must be ready before 
the emergency occurs� Those operators may not have to sleep in camp tents 
or fend off desert bugs at night, but they still have to be ready when the alarm 
sounds� We still train for the top 1 percent of operators; why should the underly-
ing selection and training principles for our special drone operators be different 
from those applied to our special operators in the field?
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To employ a common metaphor, we are talking about changing how we view 
the “tip of the spear�” The spear no longer is hurled at the enemy by one person� 
Many highly trained operators from many different locations are coordinating 
to throw “spears” that are far more sophisticated� However, if the tip of the spear 
is no longer isolated to one physical location—the battlefield as we knew it—
then sharpening that spear means keeping it sharp everywhere it will be lifted� 
Personnel-wise, this includes the special operator on the ground, the drone op-
erator conducting reconnaissance, and others� Sharpening the spear in this sense 
means identifying the best human operators and enhancing their performance to 
peak levels� SOF truths are the perfect model to guide us in applying these ideas 
to human operators outside of SOFs�
Another big cultural change involves how we go about making these ideas a 
reality� As mentioned earlier—and proudly reaffirmed here—the military has a 
long tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of 
background, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor, Marine, or air-
man� The current operational model is akin to that of a factory machine� The goal 
is to take raw material and conduct training until all aspects of that raw material 
perform and function in the same way� For more-specialized operations, we se-
lect people for the necessary roles on the basis of existing capabilities: Can they 
pass the test, or survive the experience?
Our take on precision selection directly contradicts this process� We do not 
provide the same training to everyone; rather, we identify individual strengths 
and weaknesses and train individuals to reach a given standard� Identifying 
training opportunities that address individual weaknesses enhances the training 
process� We help the individual achieve the necessary standard faster by identify-
ing his or her current individual capabilities and focusing on those areas that are 
not yet up to standard� Sailor Smith and Sailor Jones no longer get all the same 
procedures—some, to be sure, but not all� Sailor Smith receives the training he 
needs, and Sailor Jones receives the training she needs�
This process can be focused all the way down to a cognitive level because per-
formance problems can occur for many reasons, such as insufficient sleep or low 
morale or poor cognitive functioning� The roadblock that must be negotiated is 
the identification of the criteria on which we would make these precision selec-
tion and training assessments� We need new procedures that identify cognitive 
skills and capabilities that current training does not address directly�
This approach can achieve optimal human performance, and it represents the 
greatest opportunity for the Third Offset Strategy to have a real and long-lasting 
impact on U�S� military operations� However, it will require a basic shift in how 
we consider and pursue selection and training—a shift that can begin by adapting 
SOF principles and truths to a wider array of military activities�
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COMPARING OFFSET STRATEGIES:  
WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN FROM PREVIOUS INSTANCES?
As its name makes obvious, the Third Offset Strategy is not the first of its kind� 
We have been down this road and used this approach to great effect throughout 
the latter half of the twentieth century� The previous examples can provide more 
than just historical context� Lessons learned from the previous strategies can be 
applied to the Third Offset Strategy to ensure its greatest possible effect�
The discussion that follows of the First and Second Offset Strategies will ad-
dress the following questions: 
1� What constitutes an offset strategy?
2� In the previous offset strategies, what considerations were given to the 
human operator?
3� What factors created the longest-lasting benefits?
4� What factors created the most-volatile situations?
Defining an Offset Strategy
While the term offset strategy has entered military jargon fully, there does not 
appear to be a consensus on what qualifies an approach as an offset strategy� 
Recent communications from senior DoD officials have called for a Third Offset 
Strategy, but these mostly provided a general direction and a common language 
for discussions about military R&D priorities in the early twenty-first century�23 
Other writings have described a variety of technologies that the Third Offset 
Strategy should pursue�24 Perhaps the only universally agreed-upon point with 
regard to the Third Offset Strategy is that we are reaching an era in which Ameri-
can dominance on multiple fronts—sea, sky, space, and cyberspace—no longer 
can be taken for granted�25 But what is an offset strategy, and why would having 
one help us now?
One definition of an offset strategy as a military tactic relies on the following 
three criteria:
1� Asymmetrical advantage: A nation seeks to compensate for a military 
disadvantage or force disequilibrium by attaining an advantage the 
adversary cannot match�
2� Unconventional approach: Simply increasing the size of existing forces 
to achieve the desired military advantage is not an option owing to fiscal, 
political, or practical constraints� Instead, a nation pursues some novel 
approach—through tactics, technology, or some combination thereof—to 
achieve the advantage�
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3� Long-term sustainability: The novel solution must be sustainable over the 
long term, without an excessive drain on the national economy or military 
budgets�26
An interesting note is that, when taken together, the latter two criteria produce 
a maxim for an offset strategy: maximum deterrence at minimal cost� An offset 
strategy gives a military an advantage that an opposing country cannot match; it 
accomplishes this goal by using unconventional means, primarily aimed at deter-
rence; and the military maintains this advantage for a long period� This maxim 
also indicates why a nation might pursue a particular course of action� Generally 
speaking, practicing deterrence is an economically efficient approach that does 
not require a nation to relinquish its military advantage�
Historical Context of the Previous Offset Strategies
Two previous cases in U�S� history often are held up as examples of offset strate-
gies� The First Offset Strategy originally was called the New Look� The most 
narrow sense of the term merely described the DoD budget for fiscal year 1955�27 
During the Cold War, the United States faced a monolithic adversary in the Soviet 
Union� Matching Soviet conventional resources would have cost the United States 
more than three times its entire defense budget, which would have led to an “un-
bearable security burden leading to economic disaster�”28 President Eisenhower 
and his administration decided to shift tactics� They found a military advantage 
that would deter the Soviets without needing to match conventional forces—the 
First Offset Strategy�29 In short, they offset a conventional weapons disadvan-
tage with a nuclear weapons advantage� The United States thus opted to pursue 
nuclear deterrence via a policy of massive retaliation rather than by matching 
conventional forces�30 The First Offset Strategy appears to have been successful 
for a time—military expenditures, as a percentage of the total budget, declined, 
without sacrificing overall U�S� military strength�31
The Second Offset Strategy began to emerge once the Soviet Union neutral-
ized the U�S� nuclear advantage� With mutually assured destruction a reality, both 
nations could rely on conventional forces only, and in that area the Soviet Union 
still held a mammoth advantage over the United States�32 Again, matching those 
conventional forces would have bankrupted the United States and NATO� (Thus, 
economic concerns emerge yet again as a critical factor in determining why a na-
tion would pursue an offset strategy instead of conventional superiority�) The so-
lution came not in nuclear yield but through precision� The trick was to take hu-
man error—the inaccuracy of human operation of the targeting systems—out of 
the equation, so as to guarantee mission accomplishment� The role of the human 
operator changed in the Second Offset Strategy; precision accuracy was achieved 
through technology, not via human aim� The result exceeded all expectations� By 
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1984, a top Soviet official called one Second Offset program, Assault Breaker, a 
“military-technical revolution,” a formulation that morphed into the American 
axiom “a revolution in military affairs�”33 American precision capabilities could 
destroy two thousand Soviet tanks, from miles from the front lines, in less than 
a day�34 Second Offset advantages put American capabilities ahead of Soviet con-
ventional forces—yet again without having to attempt the unsustainable invest-
ment necessary to match forces soldier for soldier�
Ultimately, the United States managed to maintain a military advantage with-
out experiencing economic collapse, whereas the Soviet Union did not fare so 
well� Many different factors contributed to the eventual dissolution of the Soviet 
Union—which factor was most influential is debatable—but economic issues 
certainly contributed�35
Second Offset Strategy advantages proved durable over decades, leading to 
continued U�S� military successes� Both Gulf Wars demonstrated the advantage 
of Second Offset technologies over adversaries unable to match that technology�
Lessons Learned: The Role of the Human Operator in Previous Offset Strategies
With regard to the First Offset Strategy, human operators armed with conven-
tional weapons represented an unsustainable economic weakness—the United 
States could not attempt to match its forces against Soviet-led capabilities� It also 
could be argued that large armies represented a tactical vulnerability; after all, in 
the nuclear world, large standing armies became optimal targets that could be 
eliminated with a few nuclear bombs� Another consideration of the First Offset 
Strategy was a secondary, but no less important, liability: the dependence on 
error-prone, sometimes unpredictable, human operators�
The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated this issue, although the specific inci-
dent in question is not widely known� Typically, Soviet submarines could launch 
nuclear weapons if the captain and political officer agreed to the action� Aboard 
B-59, however, nuclear launch required the approval of a third officer: Vasili 
Arkhipov� He was second in command of B-59, yet also commander of the sub-
marine flotilla� This authority made him equal in rank to the captain and gave 
him a say in whether nuclear weapons could be launched� When several practice 
signaling depth charges dropped by USS Beale (DD 471) struck the boat’s hull 
on October 27, 1962, the captain and political officer wanted to launch a nuclear 
torpedo against the U�S� fleet�36 Only Arkhipov disagreed—thereby preventing an 
action that likely would have escalated the confrontation into full-scale nuclear 
war�37
Because of the tactics involved in the application of the First Offset Strategy, 
tens of millions of American lives came down to the actions of a single man—
and not even a member of the American military� He easily could have acted 
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differently; in fact, two of the three men in his situation, on the same submarine, 
did act differently� While we are all thankful for Arkhipov’s discretion, the events 
on B-59 reveal the potential danger of trusting so many individual human opera-
tors to execute reliably a First Offset Strategy that relied on a consistent willing-
ness to use the apocalyptic power of nuclear weapons when necessary� Thus, 
the human operator represented a multifaceted liability within the First Offset 
Strategy�
For the Second Offset Strategy, the human operator shifted from being a li-
ability to a cog in the machine—a button pusher� Precision guidance required 
taking the human out of the targeting systems as much as possible and letting 
computer systems guide our birds to their targets� While the extent to which pre-
cision guidance relegated human operators to being mere button pushers could 
be argued, it is clear that the role of the human operator changed significantly� In 
many cases, once a decision to engage the enemy was made the human operator 
was consigned to being a bystander�
Beyond considering the role of the human operator in each strategy, we can 
learn from what each strategy did effectively� The First Offset Strategy did suc-
ceed, although its advantages were volatile and short-lived� Its continuing contri-
bution is the concept of mutually assured destruction; however, today this reality 
affects our immediate and practical operations very little� A weakness of the First 
Offset Strategy was that its tactical contributions were eliminated almost entirely 
once other countries achieved nuclear parity� The Second Offset Strategy fared 
much better in that regard� Specifically, precision weapons are as useful today 
as they were in the 1980s� We have not discarded these capabilities, and they 
continue to impact our ongoing operations� The Second Offset Strategy had to 
start fresh because it could not build on the advantages the First Offset Strategy 
had achieved� The Third Offset Strategy can build on Second Offset Strategy 
advantages, and that aspect should be considered as we plan for the new strategy� 
Our long-term goals should be to develop capabilities that future developments 
cannot simply eliminate or overwhelm� This idea further confirms enhanced 
human performance as an ideal focus for the Third Offset Strategy, because the 
performance procedures we develop now will continue to be useful long after the 
Third Offset Strategy itself enters the history books�
Another important difference between the emerging offset strategy and its 
predecessors involves how we will pursue these technologies� Unlike the earlier 
approaches, we are well aware that a new strategy is emerging; whereas the pre-
vious strategies scrambled to address existing challenges, this time we have the 
opportunity to be proactive� This awareness allows us to design our approach 
in a more deliberate fashion than with the previous methodologies� This point 
becomes more important given that the Third Offset Strategy is really a series 
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of smaller strategies all working toward the eventual overall goal of enhanced 
human performance� To that end, we can construct a more theoretical guide to 
identify, describe, and structure concurrent efforts�
The United States employed two offset strategies during the twentieth century 
as means of creating viable and sustainable military deterrents� The First Offset 
Strategy developed principles of nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation that, 
while effective at the time, were flawed in that they treated the human being as a 
necessary liability� Both offset strategies were employed to great effect and main-
tained a military advantage throughout the latter twentieth century at a minimal 
cost� This fiscal component proved vitally important, as the continual buildup of 
conventional military forces contributed to the collapse of the Soviet economy, 
while the U�S� economy endured�
Unfortunately, the significance of precision weapons in maintaining a military 
advantage is dwindling as other nations develop similar technologies� The revolu-
tion in communication and information technologies as well as the involvement 
of nonstate actors has created challenges never before seen� Additionally, the 
advent of fourth-generation warfare and cyber warfare threatens to make Second 
Offset technologies less relevant�38 A new offset strategy is required� Although the 
Third Offset Strategy remains in its earliest stages of development, central to its 
success will be the human operator� Current and future battle spaces will be glob-
al and multidimensional, with the only common element across the dimensions 
Offset Strategy U.S. Personnel Adversary Personnel
First Offset: nuclear 
deterrence
Liability: The economic and logistical 
challenges of fielding U�S� personnel in the 
numbers necessary to win a conventional 
war made them a liability�
Tyranny of numbers: The Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact could field an army 
in Europe substantially larger than NATO 
was willing to support�
Second Offset: precision 
conventional weapons
Source of error: The complexity of the 
modern battle space exceeded the capa-
bilities of the human being to engage the 
enemy effectively and rapidly without un-
acceptable errors, requiring development 
of strategies to remove the human element 
to the extent possible�
Remote and hidden: Nonstate actors strike 
from locations hidden in urban environ-
ments, while more-traditional state enemy 
forces hide behind a shield of overwhelm-
ing numbers of conventional weapons� 
Both scenarios create a tremendously 
complex battle space�
Third Offset: enhanced 
human performance
Strategy focus: Astonishing advances in 
information technologies allow presenta-
tion of an overwhelming array of data to 
human operators and their commanders� 
Enhancing the physical, cognitive, and 
decision-making capabilities of the human 
operator becomes central to successful 
military operations�
Flexible: Advances in cyber (Internet, 
mobile communications, etc�) and other 
technologies allow enemy personnel to 
operate without the limitation of state 
borders� Management and synthesis of 
complex data from multiple sources are 
required to track and target enemy per-
sonnel effectively�
THE HUMAN IMPACT ON OFFSET STRATEGIES
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being the human being� By emphasizing the human element, the Third Offset 
Strategy can create an asymmetrical advantage that potential adversaries will be 
unable to match� Previous offset strategies limited the human element; the First 
Offset Strategy viewed the human operator as a fiscal liability (i�e�, maintaining 
conventional strength could be considered too expensive compared with main-
taining nuclear weapons), and the Second Offset Strategy tried to minimize hu-
man error by removing the human from the equation as much as possible�
Now we propose the opposite: to maximize human performance through 
emerging technology and new systems, from human-machine combat teaming to 
assisted human operations�39 This new offset strategy incorporates distinct roles 
for both technological innovation and the human operator, as well as leveraging 
the capabilities of both to create an advantage greater than either could achieve 
alone�40 To provide platforms for these new capabilities, we propose efforts in 
three key areas� 
• Cyber initiatives and “big data” can sustain operations in previously denied 
environments, process information more quickly than human operators 
could, and ensure that the most-reliable and most-accurate information is 
delivered to the operator�
• Human-machine teaming will become essential for both operations and 
training, but this integration presents a host of new challenges for which 
Third Offset Strategy initiatives must prepare�
• Precision selection and training can produce the individual enhancement 
and flexibility our future forces will require, and we should build this preci-
sion model on the truths embraced by SOFs and using all available tools, 
including those being pioneered as part of the precision medicine revolution� 
Ultimately, the Third Offset Strategy should take a new tack, one that seeks 
to maximize human performance by using new evidence-based technologies to 
provide task-specific personnel selection; create individualized, competency-
driven training; optimize the operator’s physical, cognitive, emotional, and 
decision-making abilities; and augment warfighter capabilities in the field 
through well-researched and proven human-machine integration� In short, as 
the fundamental framework for a successful Third Offset Strategy, we propose a 
Performance Enhancement Triad consisting of cyber initiatives, human-machine 
integration, and precision selection/training� Constructing each component of 
the triad will require a broad strategic investment in an equally broad array of 
technologies� Working across these three domains, the ultimate goal will be the 
enhancement of human performance� Although constituting a dramatically dif-
ferent philosophical approach and practical application from the previous offset 
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CHARTING A NEW COURSE
The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professional Education, 
1919–23
David Kohnen
David Kohnen is director of the John B. Hattendorf 
Center for Maritime Historical Research at the Na-
val War College. He received his PhD at King’s Col-
lege London. Among his published works, Kohnen 
is the editor of 21st Century Knox: Influence, Sea 
Power, and History for the Modern Era (Naval In-
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the transatlantic alliance between the British Em-
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Naval Institute Press will be Two Kings and a Navy: 
The U.S. Navy of Admiral Ernest J. King and the 
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Naval War College Review, Summer 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3
 Education occurs in many forms within the context of military organizations, whether during peace or war. Training often reflects the prevailing doctrines, 
as prescribed within the hierarchical context of rank-oriented organizations. The 
nexus between education and training remains an uncharted area of historical 
interest among contemporary military thinkers. As we look beyond the present 
to the unexplored frontier of the future, the past may offer some perspective on 
the question of professional military education.
Given these broad assertions, this article focuses on the problem of educa-
tion within the U.S. Navy of the First World War era. In considering the efforts 
of Captains Dudley W. Knox and Ernest J. King of a century ago, contemporary 
practitioners may recognize familiar trends concerning the future of professional 
military education. Throughout their careers of 
more than fifty years, Knox and King challenged 
fellow American naval professionals to open 
their minds in addressing the strategic problem 
of education. With Commander William S. Pye 
contributing, Knox and King studied the problem 
in detail on their return from Europe after the First 
World War.
Knox and King presided in compiling their 
recommendations, while Pye gathered evidence 
to substantiate their conclusions concerning the 
problem of education within the Navy. Knox, King, 
and Pye characterized U.S. naval professionals, 
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particularly at the higher levels of command, as having been fundamentally 
unequipped, from an educational perspective, to perform within the context 
of the First World War� Broadly, USN officers suffered from ignorance after 
being educated by the Naval Academy “only in preparation for the lowest com-
missioned grade�”1 In making this provocative assertion, Knox and King drew 
inspiration from their personal interactions with a variety of ranking officers� In 
particular, King and Knox recalled the “salt horse” culture that had prevailed in 
their First World War dealings with such figures as Royal Navy (RN) admiral Sir 
David Beatty and USN admirals Henry B� Wilson and Hugh Rodman� Reputa-
tions centered on questions of seamanship and years of practical experience; 
King railed against this in his characterizations of Beatty and with his observa-
tion that “Wilson, like Rodman and some other senior officers, distrusted ‘book 
learning�’”2 Acting on their assertions, Knox and King collaborated with Pye to 
stage an educational revolution from within the middle ranks of the Navy after 
the First World War�
Admirals Henry T� Mayo and William S� Sims provided inspiration and bu-
reaucratic “top cover” for their protégés Knox and King� In keeping with the 
tribal culture that defined the American naval service at that time, the individu-
als in question all maintained strong professional connections with each other� 
Transcending their initial Naval Academy education, they adopted the prevail-
ing Navy-wide culture that viewed the service more as a fraternal society than a 
lifelong vocation�3 During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, American 
naval officers demonstrated such commitment that Henry L� Stimson character-
ized them as being almost religious about their profession� Having served in a 
number of presidential administrations (twice as Secretary of War and once as 
Secretary of State), Stimson grew to respect the “peculiar psychology of the Navy 
Department, which frequently retired from the realm of logic into a dim religious 
world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States 
Navy the only true church�”4
JUST BELOW THE SURFACE OF NAVAL HISTORY
The problem of education and its underlying strategic importance to the U�S� 
Navy was reflected in efforts to define the naval profession� The unresolved fight 
over professional education in the Navy of the nineteenth century also defined 
the early twentieth-century perspectives of Knox, Pye, and King�5 To place their 
perspectives into a historical context: Navies traditionally had required person-
nel with technical expertise in the sciences, rather than the humanities, for the 
practical purposes of operating and maintaining ships� Drawing from the ideas of 
British historians such as Sir John Knox Laughton and Spenser Wilkinson, Rear 
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Admiral Stephen B� Luce, USN, stirred debate after he established the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884�6 His protégé Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan also considered the problem in one of his earliest writings, in 1879� In an 
article entitled “Naval Education,” Mahan challenged the prevailing attitude of 
the Navy Department bureaucracy, arguing that the historical functions of the sea 
services should be considered a national investment�7 He encouraged Americans 
to seize a future economic stake in the international context� To this end, Mahan 
pressed for the development of a strong merchant marine and a credible navy to 
participate in the global maritime arena�8
Historically, navies comprised seagoing practitioners of multiple social back-
grounds and cultural identities� In considering the historical and social dimen-
sions of maritime strategy, Mahan warned the U�S� Navy to avoid overemphasiz-
ing the “necessarily materialistic character of mechanical science,” which “tends 
rather to narrowness and low ideals�”9 He also considered the historical nexus of 
peace and war to be an uncharted area of consistent strategic interest for future 
historical discussion� By comparison with other navies in the global maritime 
arena, the U�S� Navy was among the least remarkable from a technical perspective 
in 1890, when Mahan gained international fame with the publication of his The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan acknowledged technologies as a vari-
able, but he encouraged fellow naval professionals to seek a deeper understand-
ing of the maritime arena� “Nevertheless,” Mahan lamented, his fellow American 
naval professionals tended to suffer from a “vague feeling of contempt for the 
past, supposed to be obsolete, [that] combine[d] with natural indolence to blind 
men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of 
naval history�”10
The culture of the American naval service reflected the scientifically oriented 
curriculum of the U�S� Naval Academy� Naval Academy training conditioned 
midshipmen to follow the rules, adopt a mathematical approach to solving prob-
lems through a “concentration on fractions,” and accept rote doctrinal solutions� 
The Naval Academy engineered the development of practitioners to become tac-
tically minded masters of seamanship� Before the First World War, the formulaic 
approach of the Naval Academy curriculum fueled a counterproductive culture 
within the Navy, beginning when the “average midshipman, reluctant to admit 
his ignorance, would stand at the blackboard chewing chalk rather than ask a 
question�”11 On graduation, junior practitioners sought to earn reputations for 
competence by offering scientifically framed empirical answers in their interac-
tions with the more seasoned, seagoing salt horses among the senior ranks of the 
Navy�12 Junior officers refuted their senior-ranking counterparts at their peril, 
which tended to stratify further the ranks of the Navy�
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Thus, the Naval Academy indoctrinated graduates to take a mathematical ap-
proach to solving abstract problems, and the hierarchical system of bureaucracy 
and ranking by lineal seniority governed the culture of the service; however, these 
tendencies only somewhat overshadowed the underlying nuances and informal-
ity that operated among individual personalities� These group dynamics among 
associated individuals that characterized the underlying culture of the service 
also influenced the development of professional education in the Navy� William 
S� Sims served as one nexus for such informal but important associations�
Having spent thirteen years in Canada in his youth, Sims returned to the Unit-
ed States shortly after the Civil War� In his youth he constantly sought adventure, 
avoided working for grades in school, and assumed the nickname “Bloody Bill�”13 
He considered pursuing a career as an artist� But as the U�S� Navy went through 
a technological transformation from the era of wooden ships and sail to that of 
steel and steam, Sims also found inspiration in the progressive vision of the Navy, 
which provided opportunities to operate on the cutting edge of technology, and 
he successfully sought an appointment to the Naval Academy� He performed 
well as a student but poorly as a midshipman, earning a reputation for collecting 
demerits� Sims proudly remembered running afoul of one instructor: Lieutenant 
Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan� Standing watch on campus, Mahan sternly 
punished Sims for being “disorderly on the quarterdeck and disrespectful to the 
officer of the deck�”14 Sims nearly failed to meet the requirements for graduation 
from the academy, but long before he graduated in 1880 he had earned a reputa-
tion within the ranks�
Sims directly participated in a period of revolutionary changes in both tech-
nology and American strategy� For him, rank held no great significance in the 
pursuit of a shared vision of a U�S� Navy “second to none�”15 Combat experiences 
further solidified the unique connections among individuals that characterized 
the culture of the American sea services� During the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in 
Asiatic waters, Sims became a close mentor to Knox and friendly with King� Be-
yond their shared interests in naval gunnery and battleship design, Sims enjoyed 
discussing esoteric subjects in naval history with Knox and King� Later, as naval 
aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, Sims continued nurturing ties with Knox 
and King� In particular, Sims frequently traveled from Washington to Annapo-
lis, where he called on King while the latter served as an instructor at the Naval 
Academy�
With Sims acting as a common mentor, Knox and King developed a lifelong 
friendship that originated in their shared fascination with maritime history� Both 
served with Lieutenants Harry E� Yarnell and William S� Pye under Rear Admiral 
Hugo W� Osterhaus in the Second Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet after 
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1909� Knox and King collaborated with Yarnell and Pye in planning gunnery 
exercises with the Royal Navy during a cruise to European waters in 1910� At 
that time, Commander Sims reported into the Second Battleship Division in 
command of the predreadnought USS Minnesota (BB 22)�
Junior-ranking personnel frequently gained insight into the higher-ranking 
politics of the Navy when they served on fleet staffs� Assignment under Oster-
haus in the Atlantic Fleet provided such a perspective for Knox, King, and Pye� 
Among other matters, they observed higher-ranking officers discussing the 
controversial appointment of Sims to command Minnesota� In 1910, Sims stood 
seventieth on a list of 120 officers in the rank of commander; such an assignment 
usually was reserved for officers of a higher lineal seniority or of lower senior-
ity in the rank of captain�16 Captain William S� Benson warned Sims to tread 
carefully as skipper in Minnesota, as Sims’s connections to Roosevelt clearly had 
influenced his assignment� Benson warned Sims that many naval officers thought 
that the appointment “established a dangerous precedent of giving battleships to 
Commanders�”17 On reporting for duty in Minnesota, Sims met with Osterhaus 
and his relief, Rear Admiral Joseph B� Murdock� As the higher commanders set 
all the details for the forthcoming cruise to European waters, they gossiped; and 
observing from the corners were Knox, King, and Pye�18
Sims nurtured his reputation and carried himself with a cosmopolitan de-
meanor to attain celebrity status within the service� Beyond his close association 
with Roosevelt, Sims had significant political influence through his wife, Anne, 
and his father-in-law, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the American ambassador to the 
tsarist court of the Russian Empire� In addition, Sims boasted close friendships 
with famous RN personalities, including the First Sea Lord, Sir John A� “Jackie” 
Fisher; Captains Sir Percy M� Scott and Sir John R� Jellicoe also counted Sims 
among their closest friends�19 The American officer anticipated the development 
of a transatlantic relationship between the British Empire and the United States�
In celebrating the unique connection between the two maritime powers dur-
ing a celebratory dinner at the Guildhall in London in December 1910, Sims 
muddled his way into an international controversy� The scope of his remarks went 
beyond official American policy, extending to a prospective Anglo-American 
alliance� The New York Times characterized the Anglo-American celebrations at 
the Guildhall as a “Love Feast�” “Had that speech been made by any other officer 
below the rank of Captain in the Atlantic Fleet, except Sims,” one USN officer 
suggested to the New York Times, “it’s dollars to doughnuts that no attention 
would have been paid to it, but coming from Sims, who despite his rank and 
youth is one of the best-known officers in the service, made it different�”20 For 
his indiscretion, rivals within the service ensured that Sims was removed from 
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command of Minnesota, which resulted in his extended exile away from the fast 
track to higher command—as a student at the Naval War College in 1911.21
Sims recognized the assignment to the College as a punitive setback, which 
likely carried personal consequences in the fierce competition for higher com-
mand among the seagoing ranks of the Navy. But Sims accepted his fate and com-
mitted himself to his studies. He soon recognized the broader value of historical 
studies, informed debates in a classroom setting, and provocative argument in 
written form.
The issue of professional education within the U.S. Navy remained unresolved 
by the time Mahan died in 1914 and Luce in 1917. Sims took up their cause, as the 
future of the Naval War College seemed bleak—particularly under the adminis-
tration of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
“REMAIN CHEERFUL”
Sims’s dashing reputation, coupled with his unique willingness to 
buck the system, automatically inspired great respect from many ju-
nior officers within the ranks. In particular, Knox considered Sims 
to be the “model of an American naval officer.”22 Personal corre-
spondence between Sims and King also reflected a close friendship, 
although King disingenuously recalled in his memoirs that he “was 
never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”23
As the First World War raged in Europe and Asia, Sims secured 
orders to command the then-named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer and 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla in 1914. In this role, Sims employed Naval War 
College methods to inspire subordinate protégés to carry forward 
the cause of educating other seagoing practitioners of the Navy.
Pulling every bureaucratic string, Sims circumvented the Navy Department’s 
detailing processes to arrange orders for a very select team of junior officers to 
serve under his command in the flotilla. In particular, he pulled Knox from ser-
vice in the tender USS Dixie (AD 1) and King from his assignment as skipper of 
USS Terry (DD 25). In this role, King fell under the immediate operational com-
mand of Commodore Henry T. Mayo during the conduct of convoy-escort duties 
in support of operations against the Mexican insurgency off Veracruz. Sims asked 
King to leave command of Terry, with the enticement of “coming to the flotilla 
to lend us a hand in the schemes we are trying to develop.”24 Sims sweetened the 
proposal by offering King command of USS Cassin (DD 43). With Sims assuming 
the Nelsonian role of senior mentor among equals, Knox and King assumed their 
roles in the flotilla—the “band of brothers.”25
Service in the “Sims flotilla” inspired strategic connections among key per-
sonalities as the U.S. Navy carried out the transformation of its fleet from one 
Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN.
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy North 
Sturtevant
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dominated by coal-burning battleships to one of oil-powered warships of various 
types and specialized capabilities� Among others on Sims’s flotilla staff, Com-
manders William V� Pratt, Joel R� P� Pringle, and Harry Yarnell helped foster 
close bonds among the individual destroyer skippers, including Lieutenant Com-
manders Harold R� Stark, William F� “Bill” Halsey Jr�, and Joseph K� Taussig�26 In 
their personal correspondence, veterans of the Sims destroyer flotilla tended to 
use the phrase “remain cheerful” as their parting salutation, denoting their mu-
tual membership in a unique fraternity within the ranks of the Navy�27
Sims inspired subordinates to focus on a common vision and work together 
as a team� He issued mandatory reading lists for his skippers to enable them to 
participate in open wardroom discussions, whether on topics in naval history, 
including reconstructions of past battles, or the testing of their current theories 
during tabletop wargames� Sims referred to the atmosphere established among 
the officers in the flotilla as a “War College afloat�”28 Through such open discus-
sions, Sims and his staff developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroy-
ers in unison, using a wireless communications system of fewer than thirty-one 
words�29 The cost savings resulting from conducting the developmental tests with 
destroyers rather than the larger battleships enabled Sims and his men to pioneer 
new tactics that could be applied to larger 
fleet operations�
In the process, Sims himself transformed 
from being a seagoing salt horse into a zealot 
for the Naval War College brand of profes-
sional education� Such commitment to this 
cause put him out of step with the political 
agenda of Navy Secretary Daniels; Sims’s 
relationship and dealings with Admiral 
William S� Benson as the first Chief of Naval 
Operations also remained tenuous� Given 
the costs involved with maintaining a sepa-
rate Naval War College, Daniels and Benson 
judged the institution’s curriculum to be suf-
ficiently analogous to that of the Army War 
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania� Given the 
pressures of balancing budgets and political 
horse trading within Congress, Daniels and 
Benson endorsed the idea of a unified Army 
and Navy war college, which could be estab-
lished closer to the capital�30
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy (left), and Admiral William S. Benson, 
Chief of Naval Operations (right).
Naval History and Heritage Command
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For Sims the idea of closing the Naval War College seemed outrageous, as 
the U�S� Navy stood on the brink of potential involvement in the global conflict 
already raging among the empires of Europe and Asia� He considered the funda-
mental differences between armies and navies so profound that the “Naval War 
College should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service�”31 Against 
the overarching emphasis that Daniels and Benson placed on the maintenance 
of seagoing forces, Sims argued for the potential necessity of placing warships 
“out of commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education 
of our officers�”32 Sims challenged fellow naval professionals to recognize the 
strategic advantages to be derived from supporting the educational mission of 
the Naval War College� With a clear purpose in mind, Sims articulated his points 
in an article published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in mid-1916 under the 
provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War College�”
In the article, Sims cited complaints from some within the seagoing ranks that 
many of their colleagues needed a “dictionary to tell them the meaning of the 
commonest terms�” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggesting 
that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance,” then broadened his 
charge: “When I went to the college � � � the service was very generally ignorant 
of its purposes and the practical value of its teachings�” He deplored the failure 
of many officers to understand “its vital importance to the efficient conduct of 
our fleet�”33
Sims stated that he wished to “make plain that he [was] a thorough and enthu-
siastic advocate of the college�” The article characterized the Naval War College as 
an educational forum wherein practitioners enjoyed freedom of discussion� Sims 
offered the seemingly counterintuitive argument that there was
no War College, as the term “college” is usually understood� There is no president or 
corps of professors who remain during life and good behavior and whose duty it is to 
impose their conclusions upon the pupils� � � � [The] assemblage of officers is practi-
cally a board convened each year for the purpose of determining the best manner of 
conducting naval warfare with vessels and weapons of ever-changing characteristics� 
The staff of the college, generally fresh from the fleet and a course at the college, 
pre sents the accepted principles of war, and the accepted manner of writing orders, 
issues the rules of the war games to be played, and helps the pupils play them�34 
After their interactions with officers of higher rank, Knox and King frequently 
compared notes about their discussions of organizational and naval leadership� 
Reflecting on his personal experiences, King noted that “Captain Sims himself 
was an officer of extraordinary energy, but given to speaking with exaggeration”; 
he observed that, for Sims, “all matters were clear white or dead black�” Although 
King claimed to be less committed, Knox remained cheerfully associated with 
Sims throughout the First World War and beyond� As head of the Planning 
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Section in USN Headquarters in Europe, Knox frequently collaborated with 
King and Pye, both of whom served on the seagoing staff of Admiral Henry T� 
Mayo, the wartime commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet� Characterizing his 
mentors, King thought that “Sims was flighty, Osterhaus steady, and Mayo was 
the man for me�”35
Debates surrounding the practical functions of the Naval War College and 
the role of higher education raged in the seagoing wardrooms and officers clubs 
ashore, even as the U�S� Navy sailed over the horizon to participate in the first war 
requiring American forces to operate within a strategic context of multinational 
operations in foreign waters� Having assumed the presidency of the Naval War 
College in the rank of captain in February 1917, Sims within weeks became com-
mander of USN forces in Europe—largely by accident�36 By June, he was serving 
in the temporary wartime rank of vice admiral (three stars)� Yet Sims lacked a 
clear prerogative to assert control over the warships now participating in ongoing 
operations; instead they fell under the immediate command of his lineal senior 
in rank, Mayo of the Atlantic Fleet�37
Nonetheless, Mayo and Sims collaborated in developing American naval 
strategy by pioneering organizational means to harness the advantages of wireless 
Admiral Henry T. Mayo with Atlantic Fleet staff. Mayo’s chief of staff, Captain Ernest J. King, is at far left; his fleet intelligence officer, Commander William 
S. Pye, is third from left, on the steps behind Mayo.
U.S. Navy photograph
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communications and to enable naval 
headquarters ashore to orchestrate the 
interactions of operations and intel-
ligence. To their great credit, Mayo and 
Sims unified their collective strategic 
efforts, empowering their immediate 
subordinates to act with their authority 
in planning multinational strategy, mak-
ing recommendations governing USN 
tactical forces in European waters, and 
executing operational decisions. Relying 
on their previous associations with those 
who were now their subordinates, Mayo 
and Sims empowered them to overcome 
problems of command organization. 
From within the “London Flagship” 
headquarters, Sims authorized Knox 
to work with King and Pye in mobiliz-
ing the forces of Mayo and the Atlantic 
Fleet. However, while Mayo and Sims 
established a great rapport, subordinate 
Atlantic Fleet commanders such as Wilson and Rodman frequently challenged 
Sims’s authority, which just as frequently required Mayo to promulgate directives 
to enforce those of Sims.38
In dealings with foreign allies, the U.S. Navy suffered from intramural fighting 
among its various disjointed commands. The parochialism and patriarchalism 
within USN culture ultimately convinced Mayo to sign a memorandum concern-
ing the Atlantic Fleet staff that had been drafted by Captains King and Donald 
C. Bingham, with assistance from Commander Pye, under the title “Education 
and Training of Officers for Staff Duty.”39 On February 20, 1919, in one of his last 
acts as Atlantic Fleet commander, Mayo submitted the recommendations to the 
Bureau of Navigation in Washington.
“Officers assigned to ‘staff duty’ should,” Mayo argued, have the “same view-
point and perspective as that to which flag officers . . . have attained by reason of 
their study, training, and long experience throughout their careers in the service.” 
Mayo criticized the prevailing system of educating officers to master tactical 
doctrines and technical functions governing shipboard routines rather than 
subjects focused on higher strategic levels. He observed that the Navy suffered 
from the “present lack of arrangements for the education and training of officers 
for ‘staff duty.’” Mayo endorsed the Naval War College approach, arguing that the 
Vice Admiral William S. Sims, USN, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe 
during World War I.
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy Dr. Nathaniel Sims
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curriculum represented a prerequisite for 
practitioners to succeed at higher levels 
of command� He noted that the College’s 
curriculum was “generally reserved for 
the instruction of higher ranking offi-
cers”; as a result, the Naval War College 
lacked “facilities of sufficient general 
scope for the education and training of 
officers for ‘staff duty�’”40
Mayo returned from the First World 
War determined to address the funda-
mental problem of education within the 
U�S� Navy� In 1919, he accepted reduction 
from four- to two-star rank and a sun-
set advisory assignment to the General 
Board of the Navy� He also arranged or-
ders for his protégé King to assume com-
mand of the Naval Postgraduate School 
at the Naval Academy in Annapolis� 
After reporting for duty on May 1, King 
immediately lobbied the Navy Depart-
ment for an expanded budget and additional personnel for the school�41
EDUCATION BEFORE THE MAST
The special bond among American naval practitioners influenced the develop-
ment of professional identity within the Navy� Within the structured culture 
of the naval service, sailors all stood essentially equal in the unique context of 
shipboard life at sea� Skippers traditionally took responsibility for nurturing their 
subordinates so that eventually they would earn commands of their own�
Seagoing experience prevailed in establishing reputations for higher com-
mand within the ranks of the Navy� Mayo and Sims stood out as advocates for 
professional education among the salt-horse culture that persisted after the 
First World War among the members of the elder generation of practitioners� 
By contrast, their contemporaries in rank—particularly Benson, Rodman, and 
Wilson—resisted challenges to the status quo� “The opinion has been generally 
held in the Navy,” King noted, that the “only way to learn things is to do them,” 
whereas “[b]ook learning [and] abstract knowledge is like fertilizer,” he observed; 
it “does not of itself produce anything, but it stimulates growth and advance when 
the live seed [of] practical experience is instilled into the soil�”42
Admiral William S. Sims with Admiral Henry T. Mayo in 1918. 
U.S. Navy photograph
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Wartime experiences inspired King to enter the fray in efforts to establish 
higher professional education standards in the U�S� Navy� He first broadened the 
Naval Postgraduate School curriculum, focusing on the mission of preparing 
student practitioners for assignment to receive graduate education at civilian 
universities� He fostered partnerships between the school and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Northwestern, the University of 
Chicago, and the state universities of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan� King de-
veloped the curriculum to focus on transcendent concepts of permanent value 
rather than empirically framed staff school solutions� King assumed the function 
of teacher, rather than examiner, at the school� His approach contrasted with the 
traditional culture of military discipline that prevailed on “the Yard” at the Naval 
Academy� In the spring of 1919, King solicited assistance from his mentors Mayo 
and Sims�
While peace negotiations dragged on at Versailles, outside Paris, after the 
armistice, USN forces demobilized from wartime operations and returned to 
American waters� But in wartime propaganda Sims had attained heroic status as 
the personality most associated with victory in the First World War and inter-
national fame as the widely mythologized personification of the spirit of future 
Anglo-American collaboration� With Sims having been promoted from captain 
in 1917 to four-star admiral by 1919, it appeared politically inevitable that he 
would remain in four-star rank as Chief of Naval Operations�
However, after the American declaration of war Sims had performed his war-
time service in a temporary status, so technically he remained in his permanent 
assignment as President of the Naval War College� And over drinks with his 
friend Knox in Paris in January 1919 Sims learned about the Navy Department’s 
plans to proceed with the disestablishment of the separate Army and Navy War 
Colleges; Captain William V� Pratt had written to Knox earlier about the plans 
of Navy Secretary Daniels and Secretary of War Newton D� Baker to establish a 
consolidated war college in Washington, DC� With this most recent news, Sims 
requested immediate orders to return to the Naval War College� In the course 
of his reassignment, he accepted demotion from his temporary wartime rank of 
four stars to a permanent peacetime rank of two stars�43
Sims recruited his protégé Knox and his former intelligence officer in London, 
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, to join the faculty of the College� Sharing 
similar concerns about the future of professional education within the Navy, Sims 
and Knox developed a strategy to save the Naval War College� Sims also worked 
through the good offices of King at the Postgraduate School and Mayo on the 
General Board in Washington� Together, they drew from the model that Sir Julian 
Corbett had designed at the Admiralty in London, wherein historically trained 
analysts associated with the Historical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division 
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examined issues of contemporary importance to the 
RN staff. In June, Sims empowered Knox and Kittredge 
to organize at the Naval War College an analogous sub-
division known as the Historical Section. The section’s 
immediate charter was to synthesize analytical re-
quirements supporting the higher educational mission 
to align with those of the Operations Navy (OpNav) 
planning staff in Washington.
Rather than proffering overt challenges to the au-
thority of Daniels or the Navy Department, Mayo and 
Sims worked outside the General Board and the Naval 
War College—through their protégés. Mayo and Sims 
empowered these more junior officers to incite a bu-
reaucratic revolution from below. Mayo acted through 
King at the Postgraduate School in Annapolis to initi-
ate actions, which provided the pretext for Sims in his 
turn to initiate a study of the problem of education.44 
Knox, the Naval War College chief of staff, recom-
mended the establishment of a board to study the criti-
cal issues and offer recommendations for future action. 
King subsequently shared Knox’s recommendations with the superintendent of 
the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Archibald H. Scales.45 In turn, Scales endorsed 
the idea of organizing a board to examine the issues, offer findings, and provide 
a strategy for professional education.46
This methodology granted Mayo and Sims bureaucratic immunity, as it was 
Knox and King who influenced Scales to endorse a recommendation to the 
Bureau of Navigation to establish a board consisting of Naval War College and 
Naval Postgraduate School personnel to study the strategic problem of profes-
sional education. Knox worked the ropes with other members of the Naval 
War College faculty while King and Pye gathered evidence to substantiate their 
arguments.
In particular, King drew inspiration from the works of Professor Edgar James 
Swift of Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri. King would use Swift 
and his 1918 book, Psychology and the Day’s Work: A Study in the Application of 
Psychology to Daily Life, as tools in the longer battle for educational reform in 
the Navy. King invited Swift to lecture at the Postgraduate School and influenced 
Sims to sponsor Swift on a regular basis as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War 
College. Swift offered a critical argument that not “until facts have been accu-
mulated and ordered are suggestions that are worth while likely to appear.” He 
maintained that “[k]nowledge gives the raw material for solving problems, but in 
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USNR.
Courtesy Branden Little
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addition to knowledge there must be a sensitive, open mind anxious to see things 
as they are, instead of as we should wish them to be�”47
Meanwhile, the bureaucratic wheels of the Navy Department churned blindly 
among the various bureaus� Since the establishment of the Navy Department in 
1794, whenever the seagoing forces navigated the uncharted waters in the nexus 
between peace and war, the department had followed a sustained administra-
tive course fueled by politics and mediocrity� Having muddled through the First 
World War, the Navy Department bureaucracy under Secretary Daniels settled 
back into its traditional peacetime routines�
Before the First World War, Daniels had used naval education as a means to 
amalgamate immigrants and the lower economic classes, encouraging them to 
embrace their identity as American citizens� As part of shaping the future in 
general, he considered the U�S� Navy an ideal platform to advance the broader 
military policy of the United States� “It is my ambition to make the Navy a great 
university,” Daniels reported, “with college extensions afloat and ashore�” He sug-
gested that every warship “should be a school � � � [and] every enlisted man and 
petty and warrant officer should receive the opportunity to improve his mind, 
better his position, and fit himself for promotion�”48
Although Daniels somewhat shared Sims’s vision about the role of education, 
their opinions on civil-military relations proved radically different� Daniels wor-
ried that Navy professionals might use education as a means to undermine tradi-
tional American civil-military ideals� He wanted the Navy to support education 
to create American citizens, rather than merely to satisfy the applied purposes 
of military or naval practitioners�49 Given these concerns, Daniels endorsed the 
recommendation by the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Thomas 
Washington, to organize a board comprising Knox, King, and Pye to examine the 
question�
Traveling between Newport and Annapolis during the summer of 1919, Knox, 
King, and Pye gathered their evidence� Knox later recalled the moment when 
their report came together at King’s hand, explaining that while Knox “was theo-
retically the senior member � � � and many ideas were contributed by Pye,”
the principal man was King� After much deliberation, King suggested that we write 
the report� King sat down at a desk and wrote that report in the course of perhaps a 
day� Scarcely any change [was] made from [the] preliminary draft� He wrote it and 
followed the details through in his logical way� The report came out of King’s head 
primarily� There was a great deal of ground work by Pye, but the stringing together 
and the argument that you make in such cases was all King’s� No one without out-
standing ability could have done what he did there�50
King attempted to frame the board’s findings in objective, empirical terms 
within a thirty-one-page treatise that bore the awkward title “Report and 
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Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding 
the Instruction and Training of Line Officers�” The authors formally submitted 
their findings to the Bureau of Navigation on October 16, 1919�
The original, typewritten report circulated among the various bureaus of the 
Navy Department� While Admiral Washington acknowledged receipt of the re-
port with thanks to Knox, King, and Pye, he considered their recommendations 
impractical because they would have required the Navy Department to sustain 
a forty-year strategy for educating individual naval practitioners throughout 
their careers� He declared that inadequate bureaucratic and budgetary resources 
to maintain educational programs ashore, amplified by the shortage of officer 
personnel for service afloat, prevented the Bureau of Navigation from acting on 
the board’s recommendations� Washington effectively suppressed the report; the 
original vanished into the black hole of the Navy Department bureaucracy after 
its last reported sighting in April 1920�51
Undeterred by the report’s purported loss, Knox and King conspired to force 
the Navy Department to address the strategic problem of education within the 
service� Acting with the confidence of their convictions, Knox and King launched 
a bureaucratic revolution from below, within the ranks of the service� Six years 
Sims with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the Navy Department in 1920.
U.S. Navy photograph
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earlier, on the advice of Sims and Knox, King had accepted the voluntary position 
of secretary-treasurer of the Naval Institute. In this role, he edited and reviewed 
articles in the institute’s professional journal Proceedings. Thus, King’s position 
Original signatures from K-P-K Report of 1919.
Library of Congress
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was one of significant influence� Following the disappearance of the board’s origi-
nal report to the Bureau of Navigation, King used a duplicate copy to arrange the 
report’s publication in the Proceedings issue of August 1920�52 King later admitted 
to “arranging” the publication of the report� In the published version, King added 
the caveat “Published by permission of the Navy Department for the information 
of the service� The Report of the Board has been approved, but the shortage of of-
ficers will not permit the recommendations to be carried into effect at present�”53
With some editorial adjustments, the published version in Proceedings re-
flected the original narrative of the typewritten original� Even though he was the 
report’s primary author, King claimed no immediate responsibility for its pub-
lication; the article appeared in Proceedings without any attribution to authors� 
Even so, the report would become widely known within the Navy as that of the 
Knox-Pye-King Board, or K-P-K Board�54
In the article, the supplemental recommendations to the Navy Department 
to take action on the question of education appeared in starkly framed prose� 
Between the lines of the article’s narrative, the K-P-K Board railed against the 
problems of bureaucracy, the dogmatic deference to doctrine among service 
practitioners, and the coercive intent and power of orthodoxy in the education 
of USN professionals�55 By its construction in two sections, the article makes the 
assertions in the original report resonate more sharply�56 Unlike the published 
Proceedings variation, the signed original reads like an indictment against the 
bureaucratic culture of the Navy�
Given the timing of the article and Sims’s close association with the authors of 
the K-P-K Board report, Secretary Daniels associated such criticisms with Sims� 
In effect, Sims was daring Daniels to ignore the findings and recommendations 
of the K-P-K Board—and the oily politician Daniels disliked the watery practi-
tioner Sims for challenging the policies of the Navy Department� The ensuing 
bureaucratic duels between Daniels and Sims became infamous, inspiring formal 
congressional inquiries and embarrassing the Navy Department—but remained 
a persistent influence on the development of the U�S� Navy�
The rivalry between Daniels and Sims must be considered when placing the 
K-P-K Board report into the broader context of historical discussions concern-
ing the still unresolved historical question of professional education and the U�S� 
Navy� Notwithstanding that, the findings of the K-P-K Board defined a progres-
sive vision of professional education� Publication of the report achieved the 
K-P-K Board’s design: it sparked heated debate within the tribal culture of the 
Navy about that progressive vision� Lines of division became clear as the debate 
on naval education stratified relations between policy makers such as Secretary 
Daniels and practitioners such as Admirals Mayo and Sims�
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Ultimately, the K-P-K Board offered a coldly honest portrayal of fellow naval 
professionals as being insufficiently prepared for the broad spectrum of chal-
lenges facing the naval profession. For those serving at the lowest levels to the 
highest levels of command, the K-P-K Board provided a lasting warning against 
allowing the U.S. Navy to sail under the command of officers who were “‘edu-
cated’ only to the lowest commissioned grade.” The solution to this fundamental 
problem actually preceded the original setting out of the question, as Mayo and 
Sims worked through Knox and King in a roundabout strategy to first acknowl-
edge the problem of ignorance before addressing the transcendent question of 
professional education within the Navy.
One emphasis in the report was a requirement for officers to attend the Naval 
War College twice in their careers. The authors of the report led that charge; 
for example, King completed the College’s correspondence course in 1924, then 
graduated from the residence course in 1933. Among others, the K-P-K Board 
directly influenced the Naval War College studies of future admirals Thomas 
Hart, Harold Stark, Harry Yarnell, Edward C. Kalbfus, and Chester W. Nimitz.
With King orchestrating Anglo-American combined strategy and simulta-
neously supervising U.S. naval operations on an unprecedented global scale after 
1941, Knox attained one-star rank as a commodore while organizing the Office 
of Naval History. In 1943, Knox and King again joined forces with the President 
of the Naval War College, Pye, to revisit the question of professional education 
in the U.S. Navy. Twenty-five years after the original K-P-K Report, Knox and 
King contributed to the recommendations found in the “Pye Board” Report of 
1944, which influenced combined and joint professional education into the Cold 
War era.57
Sims and the Naval War College class of 1923. Future Chiefs of Naval Operations Commander Chester W. Nimitz and Commander Harold R. Stark are at 
fourth row, center, no. 54, and third row, fourth from left, no. 36, respectively.
Naval War College photograph
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By attacking the problem of education openly and without deference to 
higher-ranking personalities or bureaucratic protocols, the K-P-K Board helped 
place the U�S� Navy on the course that would educate the personnel who would 
secure the strategic victories of the Second World War� Pursuant to the vision of 
ensuring an American “navy second to none,” the K-P-K Board report remains a 
critical foundation to establishing the fundamental role that higher professional 
education has played in framing the future strategy of the U�S� Navy into the 
twenty-first century and beyond�
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in pursuit of a disappearing paradigm
Martin N. Murphy
U.S. Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of 
American Maritime Power, by Sebastian Bruns� London: Rout-
ledge, 2018� 270 pages� $155�
The past quarter century has not been a happy one for the U�S� Navy� It has been 
a period of almost continuous contraction: of budgets, ships, manpower, bases, 
influence—at sea and in Washington—and military superiority� The Navy has 
been forced to watch the rise of China to a position of near equivalence and the 
return of Russia from near death� It has been humiliated by ship collisions that 
were brought about by sacrificing operational standards in an attempt to main-
tain its can-do reputation� It has become the service that must “just say no” if it 
is to stay afloat�
The Navy has been through periods before when it was understood poorly 
and undervalued: the treaty years in the 1920s, the era of massive retaliation in 
the 1950s, and during and after the Vietnam War� In each case it was saved by 
national policy changes, first under President Franklin Roosevelt, who viewed 
naval construction as part of the New Deal; second, under President Kennedy, 
whose turn to flexible response released the surface navy from its deterrence 
responsibilities, allowing it to resume its sea-control mission; and third, under 
President Reagan, who adopted the Maritime Strategy� Since then the Navy has 
been wandering in the strategic wilderness, find-
ing it difficult—indeed, almost impossible—to 
rediscover its voice as it searches for the formula 
that will return it to its rightful place in the defense 
firmament�
Martin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett 
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College 
London and an associate fellow of the Royal United 
Services Institute.
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The story of that search is the subject of this book� Its author, Sebastian Bruns, 
serves as head of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security at the University 
of Kiel, Germany; is the coeditor of the recently published Routledge Handbook 
of Naval Strategy and Security; and has served his time on Capitol Hill� His book 
covers the trials and tribulations of this period with an almost forensic eye, plac-
ing each of the numerous relevant capstone documents—starting with the hope-
fully entitled “The Way Ahead” in 1991—in its political and operational setting 
before examining its evolution and resulting strategic concept�
Pointing a finger at what has gone wrong is not difficult� Since the end of the 
Cold War, the Navy for the most part has suffered from a lack of leadership at 
its most senior level� Admittedly, leading the Navy in an era when the nation’s 
leaders stumbled from one misjudgment to the next cannot have been easy� Fur-
thermore, the Cold War–era Goldwater-Nichols measures subordinated each of 
the service chiefs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and relieved them of 
responsibility for strategy� As Bruns writes, it was the Navy—whose strategy lies 
uniquely between the political and operational levels—that was affected most�
Making matters more difficult was that the seemingly interminable and de-
bilitating land wars in Asia placed the focus squarely on the Army and Marine 
Corps, and to a considerable degree the Air Force, but not the Navy, save for the 
thousands of bluejackets who were sent to serve in the dusty wastes of Afghani-
stan and Iraq� Not that service ashore for sailors is unusual; it was the regular fate 
of their Royal Navy predecessors in the nineteenth century to fight and die beside 
their army colleagues in defense of the empire� What the Royal Navy of that era 
did not suffer, however, was seeing its capacities and capabilities worn down by 
the need to pay for these wars, as the U�S� Navy’s were worn down to pay for the 
war in Vietnam, and as they have been more recently as well�
Can the Navy rebuild itself now as it did after the Vietnam conflict and the 
hostile interlude of the Carter years? On its current course, and given the prevail-
ing bureaucratic realities of the defense establishment, this appears unlikely� The 
Maritime Strategy came about thanks to an unusually fortuitous alignment of 
factors: first, a sympathetic national policy, in this case the determination of the 
Reagan administration not merely to contain Communism but to defeat it; and 
second, an exploitable enemy weakness, in this case the surprise discovery that 
the Soviet navy prioritized protection of its High North submarine bastions over 
attacks on Atlantic convoys� The combination meant that the U�S� Navy could 
build on a range of thought lines—of which Admiral Thomas B� Hayward’s earlier 
Sea Strike initiative was probably the most influential—to go on the offensive, 
pursuing a carrier-based plan of attack that accorded with the Navy’s own view 
of itself as a warrior community built for the big—and global—fight� As Bruns 
recounts, the Navy was willing to accept enormous strategic and operational risks 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   143 5/1/18   11:11 AM
149
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
1 4 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
to make that happen; in particular, its conviction that global conventional war 
would not turn nuclear, although based on intelligence of Soviet nuclear policy, 
must be open to question�
Bruns describes the outpouring of purposeful naval thinking that accom-
panied the Maritime Strategy as a “renaissance�” With it, the Navy achieved its 
Cold War “zenith�” It was certainly close to a revival� The Maritime Strategy was, 
Bruns writes, “a product of its 1970s context,” embracing the missions, concepts, 
and practices that were already on the shelf and matching them with the Reagan 
administration’s newly assertive national security strategy and with the plans and 
operational requirements of regional commanders� It succeeded not because it 
was innovative but because it fitted with what the Navy wanted to do� It reached 
back to Vice Admiral Forrest P� Sherman’s immediate post–World War II plan 
for “at source” attacks on Soviet naval bases and infrastructure and, beyond that, 
to the Navy’s successful Pacific War campaign against Japan� It fitted perfectly 
with the American way of warfare, which prefers decisive battle over patient 
persistence�
The post–Cold War world proved to be very different from what had gone 
before� It may have been a “new world order,” as President George H� W� Bush 
put it, but the order to which he referred remained elusive� In this new context, 
innovative thinking was required, and the Navy responded—even though, too 
often, good ideas that appeared in the formative stages of strategy formulation 
never made the final cut�
Bruns’s survey of the strategic vision pieces that have followed the Maritime 
Strategy, however, reveals a service divided among competing schools of naval 
and maritime thought� The result is that none of the strategic vision pieces the 
Navy has published since 1990 have come close to winning support at a level 
similar to that achieved by their 1980s predecessor, and most have gained none 
at all� The Maritime Strategy may have been disputed, criticized, and disparaged, 
but it nonetheless succeeded in uniting the Navy Department, the White House, 
and Congress behind a single vision�
When the Navy did advance a radically different exposition of its role, a decade 
and a half later, in “A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower” 
(CS21), it failed to gain enough traction within the Navy and on the Hill to sur-
vive the political and economic fallout of the 2008 financial crisis� CS21 argued 
that in the post–Cold War world it would be by defending the institutional, sys-
temic dimension of sea power that the Navy would be restored to relevance, and it 
elevated war prevention to the same level as war winning; in doing so, it sidelined 
all the strategic concepts that had been formulated since the Maritime Strategy� 
Unfortunately, the message of CS21 failed to inspire a service that viewed the 
Maritime Strategy as the zenith of its conceptual accomplishments�
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Bruns’s book demands to be read� It reaches no conclusions about which direc-
tion is right for the Navy—that is for readers to decide� What he does make plain 
is that only a “strategy addressing political ends in naval warfare can be assured 
some impact�” Both the Maritime Strategy and CS21 did that, but from sharply 
different perspectives�
The sea’s strategic and economic importance is increasing at a time when the 
nations intent on challenging the U�S� Navy are gaining in confidence, compe-
tence, and strength� To be able to counter them effectively, it is vital that the Navy 
finds again the clear, united, and distinctive voice that has commanded attention 
in the past, but one that this time puts past triumphs behind it, reflects the reali-
ties of our changing world, and addresses the complex of military and nonmili-
tary challenges its competitors present� Now is the time for strategic imagination, 
for the creation of a strategy that transcends the narrow confines of shipboard life 
and engages with the political as well as the military realities that are emerging 
in the twenty-first century�
All USN officers, joint commanders, and national policy makers who are con-
scious of the sea’s continuing importance, genuinely concerned about the decline 
of the Navy, and fearful for the service’s future need to read this book and absorb 
its lessons�
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FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post–Cold War Era, by Michael Mandelbaum� New York: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2016� 485 pages� $29�95�
“You Americans are so naive” is one 
of the opening quotes that Michael 
Mandelbaum uses to introduce Mission 
Failure (p� vi)� The quotation does 
not come, as one might expect, from 
a foreign world leader, but from Steve 
Martin on Saturday Night Live� Thus, 
one sees from the first Mandelbaum’s 
objective: to narrate and explain U�S� 
foreign policy from 1991 to 2014 
in a way that can be understood by 
interested general readers who might 
recognize Martin more than they would 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (the 
source of another opening quotation)� 
In the backdrop of this narrative is the 
theme of the failure of humanitarian 
interventionism—the inclination to 
intervene in world affairs to promote 
values rather than for direct self-
interests—to achieve meaningful results�
Mandelbaum describes his intent for the 
book rather accurately: “Together the 
chapters tell the story of good, some-
times noble, and thoroughly American 
intentions coming up against the deeply 
embedded, often harsh, and profoundly 
un-American realities of places far from 
the United States� In this encounter 
the realities prevailed” (p� 13)� In his 
perspective, post–Cold War American 
decision makers viewed the world 
through a distorted lens that only their 
country’s enormous relative power made 
possible� This distorted view caused 
them to believe that democratic values 
and human rights could be exported 
by interventions using armed force� 
Mandelbaum describes this as “mission-
ary work” transferred from the religious 
to the political sphere, and links it to the 
same impulse that established the Peace 
Corps� He then begins a general histori-
cal narrative of American relations with 
Russia and China, humanitarian 
interventions from Somalia to Kosovo, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, all during the 
1991–2014 period� In his final chapter, 
entitled “Restoration,” he argues that 
the rise of Chinese economic power 
and the reemergence of Russia have 
put an end to the post–Cold War 
world; the United States no longer 
has the power to attempt to make 
changes in other political cultures�
To illustrate the enormous relative power 
that America held at the beginning 
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Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post–Cold War Era, by Michael Mandelbaum� New York: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2016� 485 pages� $29�95�
of this period, Mandelbaum starts his 
introduction with the surrender of the 
Iraqi army to General Norman Schwarz-
kopf and the other coalition military 
leaders on March 3, 1991� The author 
maintains that, up to then, America’s 
latent desire to educate the world on the 
benefits of democracy and human rights 
had been held in check only by the ex-
istence of powerful rivals—specifically, 
one powerful rival: the Soviet Union� 
Suddenly, with that entity collapsed, 
China apparently quiescent, and the U�S� 
armed forces having demonstrated their 
absolute military dominance on (what 
was considered) the modern battlefield, 
American political and social leaders 
could indulge themselves in doing what 
they perceived to be in the interest of 
the collective global good� The United 
States “chose to spend some of its vast 
reserves of power on the geopolitical 
equivalent of luxury items: the remaking 
of other countries” (p� 7)� The differ-
ence from previous eras was that now 
the United States became involved in 
crises in which it had no direct national 
interest—crises that, no matter their 
result, would have little if any impact on 
American freedom or prosperity� The 
outcome, according to Mandelbaum, 
has been “mission failure,” given that 
much of the world has different cultural 
values concerning the “good” and that 
the results have been temporary or they 
have let loose more destructive forces�
Mandelbaum postulates that the cross-
over point at which the aim of American 
foreign policy changed from achieving 
national interests to performing 
“missionary work” occurred between the 
administrations of George H� W� Bush 
and Bill Clinton� He sees the subsequent 
actions of Clinton, George W� Bush, and 
Barack Obama as a foreign policy of 
continuing humanitarian intervention 
(albeit with differing degrees of overt 
force), with a shared goal of relieving hu-
man suffering and exporting democracy�
Mandelbaum identifies the expansion 
of NATO—an action that President 
George H� W� Bush promised the 
Russians would not occur—as the most 
catastrophic of mistakes� Against the 
advice of concerned experts, President 
Clinton promoted NATO expansion, 
believing that it would solidify demo-
cratic governance throughout Europe 
without alienating a Russia assumed 
to have adopted democratic capitalism 
permanently� The decision “squandered 
� � � much of the windfall that had come 
to the United States as the result of the 
way the Cold War had ended� � � � It did 
this in return for no gain at all, making 
NATO expansion one of the greatest 
blunders in the history of American 
foreign policy” (p� 69)� The author iden-
tifies other mistaken actions (such as the 
Iraq War) and skewers some inept policy 
makers along the way (Secretaries of 
State Warren Christopher and Madeleine 
Albright are particular targets), but the 
alienation of Russia—which facilitated 
that country’s return to internal  
authoritarianism—was the factor that  
ultimately ended hopes for a “new world  
order�”
Mandelbaum, professor of American 
foreign policy at the Paul H� Nitze 
School of Advanced International 
Studies at Johns Hopkins, maintains 
a solid and comfortable—if relatively 
uninspiring—writing style, making his 
argument in measured terms� As in his 
other recent books, he aims at a broad 
audience� He gives no indications, how-
ever, that his previous work—such as his 
collaboration with journalist Thomas 
L� Friedman, the most successful
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troubadour of globalization—argued for 
a spirit of liberal internationalism that 
leads logically to efforts at humanitarian 
intervention� To Mandelbaum, the 
apparent difference between liberal 
internationalism and the humanitarian-
interventionist approach that some U�S� 
presidents have chosen is that the United 
States decided to use its resources to res-
cue people (metaphorically) rather than 
to concentrate on defending the global 
system of economic liberalism� However, 
how one “defends a system” without 
intervening in particular crises within 
that system remains rather unclear� 
Liberal internationalism supposedly is 
an antidote to great-power politics, but 
ultimately Mandelbaum concludes that 
America’s failure at preserving its benefi-
cial role in the international system (and 
its interests) was the result of not paying 
most of its attention to, and sometimes 
accommodating, the reemerging 
great powers� The “malign effects” of 
an angry Russia and a contemptuous 
China, Mandelbaum writes on his final 
page, “will be felt long after the failed 
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and even Afghanistan and Iraq 
ha[ve] faded from memory” (p� 381)�
SAM J� TANGREDI
The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships 
in Counter-Insurgency, by Walter C� Ladwig III� 
New York: Cambridge Univ� Press, 2017� 360 
pages� $34�99 (paperback)�
The advent of a new U�S� presidential 
administration has resulted in a series 
of new defense guidance and strategy 
documents—ranging from the National 
Security Strategy to the National Defense 
Strategy and the Nuclear Posture 
Review—all of which have placed a 
clear emphasis on the risks posed 
by the recrudescence of great-power 
rivalry� The National Defense Strategy, 
in particular, garnered praise from the 
national security commentariat for 
its terse declaration that great-power 
competition, rather than terrorism, 
now constituted “the primary focus of 
U�S� national security�” Indeed, for an 
American public increasingly weary of 
costly and protracted counterinsurgency 
(COIN) campaigns in the Middle East, 
there was something inherently ap-
pealing about this apparent reordering 
of American defense priorities�
Unfortunately, however, events over the 
past year have demonstrated repeatedly 
that this much-touted focal rearrange-
ment is not something that simply can 
be wished into existence� Indeed, despite 
running on a platform promising greater 
disengagement from the Middle East, 
President Trump has found himself 
compelled to deploy ever more soldiers 
to Afghanistan and the Levant� Mean-
while, cabinet officials have suggested 
that Washington may need to maintain 
an open-ended military presence in 
Syria, partly as a means of countering 
growing Iranian influence� Last but not 
least, the deadly ambush of a unit of U�S� 
special operations forces (SOFs) in the 
deserts of Niger revealed to many baffled 
American citizens the full extent of their 
nation’s global counterterrorism foot-
print: eight thousand SOFs active on any 
given day in more than eighty countries�
All this underscores the need for 
U�S� security managers to con-
tinue to plan for and debate extended 
counterterrorism and stabilization 
campaigns—however much they 
may pine privately for a post-COIN 
era� It also renders Ladwig’s recent 
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book—which engages in a thoughtful 
and historically informed study of the 
patron-client relationship in irregular 
warfare and counterinsurgency—all the 
more timely� Dr� Ladwig, a professor in 
the Department of War Studies at King’s 
College London, has provided an erudite 
and intellectually stimulating book, 
one that does a fine job of shedding 
light on some of the shortcomings of 
the more recent COIN literature�
Ladwig’s central premise is that one of 
the assumptions at the heart of recent 
American writings on COIN—that 
a security patron and its client will 
enjoy a variety of shared goals and 
interests—is misplaced� “In fact,” he 
notes, “the historical record suggests 
that maintaining power is frequently a 
competing priority for an incumbent 
regime, which means that many of 
the standard reform prescriptions 
for counterinsurgency—streamlining 
the military chain of command, 
ending patronage politics, engaging 
in economic reform, and embracing 
disaffected minority groups—can appear 
as threatening to a besieged government 
and its supporters as the insurgency 
itself�” When dealing with regional 
partners—particularly those afflicted 
with nepotism, deeply factionalized 
internal power structures, and tense 
civil-military relations—there always 
will be a strong potential for strategic 
misalignment or dyssynchrony, or both�
Paying attention to a client’s inner 
travails and patterns of dysfunction 
is only the first step, however, in 
convincing it to conform to U�S� 
wishes� Ladwig outlines two archetypal 
“influence strategies” that patron states 
traditionally have employed as a means 
of persuading their junior partners to 
enact more-effective and convergent 
policies� The first, inducement, aims to 
reassure and win over the client with 
generous flows of aid and unqualified 
professions of U�S� support� The second 
approach, conditionality, takes more 
of a “tough love” approach: calibrat-
ing and rationing U�S� support in 
accordance with the client’s ability or 
willingness to cooperate and deliver�
The book contains three detailed 
historical case studies of past U�S� 
support efforts: one that can be qualified 
as a success (the Philippines during the 
Hukbalahap Rebellion, from 1946 to 
1954); one that is an all-too-well-known 
failure (South Vietnam under Ngô Đình 
Diệm, from 1955 to 1963); and one that 
falls somewhere in between (El Salvador 
during the 1979–91 civil war)� Each case 
study is richly textured, drawing on ex-
tensive archival research and declassified 
government materials� Given enough 
potential material for three books, the 
author was wise to select these three 
cases to juxtapose; they provide a useful 
kaleidoscopic study of the successes and 
failures of U�S� foreign internal defense 
(FID) policies during the Cold War�
Unsurprisingly, the author notes that 
there are no simple solutions to the 
issues that traditionally have plagued 
patron-client relationships� FID always 
winds up being a more complex 
and challenging undertaking than 
originally planned� That said, policies of 
conditionality—which “require making 
credible threats to a client and careful 
managing of commitments”—are clearly 
preferable to policies of pure induce-
ment, which not only are ineffective 
but can have pernicious second-order 
effects� The challenge is to maintain a 
degree of strategic consistency while 
devising conditionality-based 
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approaches that can survive not 
only different administrations and 
electoral cycles but interagency dif-
ferences and bureaucratic turf wars�
One of this reviewer’s only regrets is 
that—barring a few segments in the 
introduction and conclusion—the 
author chooses not to apply his findings 
to the study of more-contemporary 
COIN campaigns� Dr� Ladwig has 
acquired a reputation in the field of 
South Asia studies for his careful, 
methodical approach to the region’s 
security challenges, and it would have 
been useful for the reader to get a better 
sense of his take on the past, present, 
and future of U�S� policy on Afghanistan� 
It also might have been interesting to 
explore the challenges that come with 
more-multidirectional proxy wars, 
such as that currently unfolding in 
Syria, which involves multiple potential 
clients and competing “candidate 
patron” states, ranging from Turkey to 
Russia and Iran� These are all minor 
quibbles, however, and ones that Ladwig 
no doubt can address in a follow-on 
study, should he wish to do so�
All in all, this is an excellent and 
well-timed contribution� Moreover, 
despite being an academic work, it 
also is an example of the virtues of the 
more interdisciplinary, even subtle, 
approach to security studies embraced 
by European institutions such as King’s 
College� Drawing not only on well-
researched history but on other social 
sciences such as economic theory, The 
Forgotten Front is refreshingly jargon-
free and clearly written, thus making it 
an ideal study companion for readers 
of the Naval War College Review�
ISKANDER REHMAN
Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every 
War It Starts, by Harlan Ullman� Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� $29�95�
When former Secretaries of State 
General Colin Powell and John Kerry 
and former Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe Marine general Jim Jones (for 
whom I worked when I commanded 
the International Security Assistance 
Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan when it 
expanded across the whole country) 
call Harlan Ullman’s Anatomy of Failure 
a must-read, people should pay atten-
tion� And for those who worry about 
policy books being boring, House of 
Cards creator Michael, Lord Dobbs 
deems Anatomy, in another blurb, a 
combination of the works of best-selling 
thriller novelist Tom Clancy and Carl 
von Clausewitz� All are correct�
In the interests of full disclosure, the 
writer and I have been friends and 
colleagues since my time at ISAF� As 
Britain’s Chief of the General Staff and 
then Chief of the Defence Staff, I worked 
with Ullman on many issues� Irrespec-
tive of this, Anatomy is essential reading 
for practitioners and students of foreign, 
defense, and national security policy�
The book’s center of gravity is the asking 
and answering of the vital question 
of why, since World War II, America 
arguably has lost all the wars it started 
and has failed in military interventions 
in which it did not have just cause 
to participate� This question alone 
directly challenges the accepted view 
in Washington that America has the 
best and most formidable military in 
the world� If that is the case, despite 
some stunning tactical successes, why, 
at the strategic level, has its record in 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   150 5/1/18   11:11 AM
156
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 5 1
using that military been so apparently 
dismal over the past seventy years?
Of course, Ullman records, we won the 
big wars: World War II and the Cold 
War� And, as he notes, George H� W� 
Bush was entirely successful in winning 
the First Gulf War in 1991� But in Korea 
and especially Vietnam, Iraq the second 
time, Afghanistan, and numerous lesser 
operations—ranging from Grenada 
and Beirut in 1983 to Libya in 2011 
and the ongoing campaign in Syria—he 
argues persuasively that the results 
range from simply bad to catastrophic�
In the first two-thirds of the book, 
Ullman examines—in depth and with 
personal insights, in what he calls 
vignettes—why America’s resort to 
using military force has been so poor� 
He produces three overarching reasons 
that apply not only to the United States 
but to many other countries—including, 
most certainly, my own� First, America 
elected too many presidents who were 
inexperienced, unprepared, and 
unready to handle what may be the 
most difficult job on earth� Through 
the lens of the use of military force, 
the book analyzes the strengths and 
weaknesses of every president since 
World War II, noting along the way 
John F� Kennedy’s rueful observation 
that “there is no school for presidents�”
Second, administrations that failed 
applied poor, or simply wrong, strategic 
judgment in determining whether to 
go to war or to use force� The Kennedy-
Johnson decision makers truly believed 
that monolithic Communism had to 
be stopped on the Mekong River so it 
would not spread to the Mississippi� Bill 
Clinton believed a few bombs would 
force Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic to stop 
killing Kosovars� George W� Bush had 
the flawed vision that the geostrategic 
landscape of the Middle East could be 
changed forever by democratizing Iraq, 
although he justified the decision to 
go to war on nonexistent weapons of 
mass destruction� Barack Obama drew 
“redlines” and demanded that Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad stand down—
to no effect—and he “led from behind” 
in bombing Libya, bringing about 
Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s downfall—thereby 
provoking a brutal civil war� Who 
knows what Donald Trump could do?
Third, the book shows how the lack of 
sufficient knowledge or understanding 
of the regions and conditions where 
force might be used guaranteed failure, 
from Vietnam to the current misnamed 
“war on terror�” What gives this book an 
added and authoritative dimension is the 
author’s personal insights that comple-
ment the book’s theme� As a Swift boat 
skipper in Vietnam, his stories of that 
war underscore the folly of America’s 
intervention� At times during the Cold 
War, whether in discussions with former 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara or 
the Pentagon leadership under Ronald 
Reagan, or in later years with those 
dealing with terrorism, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan, he reveals the damage that 
lack of knowledge and understanding 
will inflict on any policy and strategy�
The vignette that struck me in particular 
was a sensitive mission that Ullman un-
dertook in Vietnam as part of Operation 
PHOENIX, an assassination program that 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
South Vietnamese mounted to terminate 
with prejudice (i�e�, kill) suspected 
Vietcong and North Vietnamese agents� It 
was a metaphor for why the war was lost�
In the remaining third of the book, 
Ullman itemizes a series of recom-
mendations to overcome or reduce the 
likelihood of failures in using military 
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force that arise from electing unready 
presidents and using poor or flawed 
strategic judgment, and to ensure that 
sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of the reasons for using or rejecting 
military force are in place� He calls for 
a “brains based approach” to strategic 
thinking—a term that I, as army and 
defense chief, borrowed shamelessly� 
He proposes a “Bletchley Park–like 
capacity” for using open-source material 
available on social media and unclas-
sified avenues such as Google Earth to 
enhance knowledge and understanding�
Some of Ullman’s recommendations are 
unique to the United States, but in the 
main any and all leaders and students 
of national security will benefit greatly 
from this book� Indeed, to reinforce 
the recommendation of Messrs� Powell, 
Kerry, and Jones, read this book! And, 
as Lord Dobbs adds, this is a very 
good and intriguing read as well�
LORD RICHARDS OF HERSTMONCEUX
Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Im-
perial Germany, 1871–1914, by Xu Qiyu, trans� 
Joshua Hill� Foreword by Graham Allison� Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017� 368 pages� $32�
Once in a great while, a book allows the 
familiar to be viewed through new eyes� 
Fragile Rise is such a volume� On its 
surface, it is an account of imperial Ger-
many’s catastrophic grand strategy be-
tween the nation’s founding in 1871 and 
the onset of the First World War� While 
this is well-tilled ground, Fragile Rise 
provides a clear and convincing account 
of how Otto von Bismarck mitigated the 
tensions created by Germany’s newfound 
power within the European system, and 
how his successors failed at the same 
task� But what makes Fragile Rise unique 
is less what it says than who is saying 
it� The author, Xu Qiyu, is an active-
duty colonel in the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) who serves 
as deputy director of the Institute for 
Strategic Studies at the National Defense 
University in Beijing—the counterpart 
to the U�S� National Defense University�
USN readers who harbor cartoonish 
images of our PLA counterparts may 
be surprised at the depth of research 
and insight offered in this volume� Xu 
has been a visiting fellow and guest of a 
number of prestigious Western institu-
tions, including the Naval War College, 
where he is respected as a subtle and 
engaging thinker� His research and writ-
ing reflect that experience, informed by 
international scholarship and primary-
source material from across Europe�
Throughout the book, Xu draws no 
explicit parallels between the German 
and Chinese experiences, although the 
book’s translator points out that the 
cover of the Chinese edition features the 
words “When it is difficult to see clearly 
into the future, looking back into his-
tory, even the history of other peoples, 
might be the right choice�” In China 
there is a long tradition of using histori-
cal examples to offer implicit criticism 
of what may not be criticized officially, 
and how Fragile Rise can be viewed in 
this light is apparent upon reading�
Xu characterizes the newly unified 
Germany as following a “hide and bide” 
strategy, recalling Deng Xiaoping’s 
guidance that an emerging China 
should hide its capabilities and bide its 
time, avoiding international leadership 
and the complications that come from 
displays of power� By 1878, however, 
Germany found itself a factor and a 
source of concern in the international 
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arena, despite its preference for the 
low-key� Bismarck’s active management 
mitigated the international friction 
that this shift in power engendered� If 
one seeks a hopeful message, Graham 
Allison observes in his foreword that 
Xu proposes that skilled leaders can 
“reshape unfavorable situations�”
Nonetheless, Xu notes that Bismarck was 
managing a “fundamental” conflict, one 
woven into the fabric of a possible power 
transition� The environment was rife 
with suspicion, and the European system 
offered little tolerance for strategic error� 
Xu assesses that, following Bismarck’s 
dismissal, Germany committed two 
significant blunders� First, it embarked 
on an expensive naval expansion that 
was tangential to its core interests� Its 
appetite for such an effort was fed by 
a consistent insensitivity to the value 
Great Britain placed on sea power� 
Dismissing arguments that German 
overseas trade and colonial possessions 
justified the risk of strategic confronta-
tion, Xu notes that Tirpitz’s “luxury 
fleet” cost Germany any chance of 
accommodation with Britain� By 1907, 
as Germany’s primary strategic  
adversary—despite significant 
economic and cultural ties—Britain 
embraced what was effectively 
a containment policy�
Second, Xu is similarly critical of the 
German army’s failure to subordinate its 
military planning to Germany’s wider 
political ends� Given that Xu serves a 
military controlled by a single political 
party, there is perhaps no more pointed 
criticism in the PLA vernacular�
Fragile Rise devotes lengthy and 
thoughtful attention to the role of 
popular opinion in driving Germany 
to unwise strategic choices� Germany’s 
rapid rise was a source of pride among 
the German people, but it created 
pressures that German institutions were 
poorly prepared to mitigate� Indeed, Xu 
argues that the Weltpolitik policy of the 
late Wilhelmine period was primarily 
a product of domestic pressures� In a 
China in which the ruling Communist 
Party makes massive investments in 
managing, shaping, and controlling 
public opinion, such concern resonates�
At least one American reviewer has been 
critical of the tendency for U�S� readers 
to view Fragile Rise through the lens of 
United States–China power dynamics, 
arguing that it should be respected as a 
contribution to the historical literature 
in its own right� While this is true, 
naval professionals naturally—given the 
author’s association with China’s senior 
military college—will be less interested 
in issues of historical interpretation  
than of Chinese perceptions of historical  
corollary�
It is possible that an American reader 
will be left with the impression that a 
lively debate over the wisdom of China’s 
present course is ongoing� In fact, Fragile 
Rise was completed in 2011 during the 
closing days of Hu Jintao’s rule, when 
the environment in Beijing was more 
open and China’s course less certain� Xi 
Jinping effectively has ended this debate� 
Recent pronouncements of the ruling 
Communist Party leave no doubt that 
China has embraced its expanding role 
in the world and the naval expansion 
that supports it� All that remains to see is 
whether China can produce a Bismarck 
who can navigate around the shoals 
along the way� In the meantime, Fragile 
Rise presents a small window into a 
debate that largely has passed into his-
tory already, as well as the thinking that 
accompanied the charting of that course�
DALE C� RIELAGE
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Tin Can Titans: The Heroic Men and Ships of 
World War II’s Most Decorated Navy Destroyer 
Squadron, by John Wukovits� Boston: Da Capo, 
2017� 352 pages� $18�99�
In this, his newest work, distinguished 
naval historian John Wukovits traces 
the history of USN Destroyer Squadron 
(DesRon) 21’s Pacific theater opera-
tions from 1942 to 1945� According to 
Wukovits, DesRon 21 was one of the 
most highly acclaimed and decorated 
squadrons in the entire U�S� Navy during 
World War II� DesRon 21 destroyers are 
noted for advancing on the Solomon Is-
lands in the Pacific and holding back the 
Japanese navy until U�S� reinforcements 
arrived� The squadron also launched 
assaults against the Gilbert and Marshall 
Islands, into the Philippines, and at 
Iwo Jima and Okinawa� During the 
squadron’s three years of service, these 
exploits and more—including dozens 
of minor clashes, countless patrols, and 
naval escort missions—earned DesRon 
21 “three Presidential Unit Citations, 
one Navy Unit Commendation, and 
118 battle stars” (p� 5), making it a most 
worthy subject of this exceptional book�
However, while Wukovits’s work is a 
study of DesRon 21, it is the people, 
rather than the ships, who brought about 
the unit’s wartime success� Wukovits 
states that “[w]hile DesRon 21’s 
achievements were impressive, it was 
not a squadron of ships that registered 
an inspiring resumé, but the people 
serving aboard those destroyers” (p� 5)� 
Subsequently, this particular emphasis 
on the men of DesRon 21—Commander 
MacDonald, Doc Ransom, Seaman 
Chesnutt, Seaman Whisler, and so many 
more—is what makes Wukovits’s book 
so uniquely engaging for the reader� This 
historical study—like all history—is, at 
its core, a story about people�
Wukovits tells the story of DesRon 21 
and the sailors who served on its vessels 
in their various battles and campaigns 
in the Pacific� He introduces the reader 
to the squadron and its sailors circa 
mid-1942, in the midst of a gloomy 
period of operations within the 
Pacific theater� The reader is taken 
on a journey throughout the entirety 
of the squadron’s wartime operations 
up to its ultimate triumph, including 
having the honor of leading the U�S� 
Navy, under the guidance of Admiral 
William F� Halsey, into Tokyo Bay to 
receive the Japanese surrender in August 
1945� This honor was bestowed on 
the ships and sailors of DesRon 21 by 
Admiral Halsey, who credited victory 
in the Pacific to the courage and skill 
of DesRon 21 and its personnel�
Wukovits divides his work into three 
parts, with each part containing roughly 
three chapters, making the reading 
of this book quite manageable� Part 1 
covers the origins of DesRon 21 and 
the beginning of its campaign in the 
Solomon Islands, including the battle 
of Guadalcanal (Operation WATCH-
TOWER)� Wukovits also does an excellent 
job of describing the squadron’s function 
and its organization, as well as the 
origins of the various vessels� Wukovits’s 
attention is well spent here, given the 
length and difficulty of USN operations 
in this geographical subset of the Pacific 
theater during the war� Then, as the 
book moves forward through parts 2 
and 3, the reader is drawn into DesRon 
21’s bloody and hard-fought campaign 
that extended all the way from Gua-
dalcanal to Tokyo—and, of course, the 
lives of its crewmembers, which perhaps 
constitutes the highlight of the book�
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In telling the fascinating story of 
DesRon 21 and its crew, Wukovits 
demonstrates without a doubt that, as 
a scholar and historian, he rivals such 
naval historians of the Pacific theater 
as James Hornfischer and Samuel 
Eliot Morison� The book might have 
included more maps to ensure correct 
and continued orientation to the 
events, places, movements, and battles 
it describes� Nonetheless, Wukovits has 
compiled an excellent study of DesRon 
21, one that is demonstrably the product 
of lengthy research into wartime naval 
records; academic research; and personal 
oral interviews with those DesRon 21 
crewmembers still living, which bring 
an intimate and personal quality to 
this historical study� In sum, Tin Can 
Titans unquestionably is a must-have 
addition for any armchair World War II 
history buff or student of naval history�
BLAKE I� CAMPBELL
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones� Vol� 1, From the V-
Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964. 
London: Routledge, 2017� 547 pages� $155�
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones� Vol� 2, The Labour 
Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–
1970. London: Routledge, 2017� 559 pages� $155�
No inquiry into British nuclear his-
tory can be undertaken in isolation 
from the presence of an intimate U�S� 
involvement� It therefore is worth 
taking notice of the publication of the 
two-volume Official History of the UK 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent� Matthew 
Jones, professor of international history 
at the London School of Economics, 
was granted unprecedented access 
to hitherto unavailable materials 
to produce this official history�
At the beginning of both volumes, 
Professor Jones graciously pays tribute to 
the pioneers of British nuclear historiog-
raphy, Professor Margaret Gowing and 
her associate Lorna Arnold� Gowing, 
official historian of the United Kingdom 
(U�K�) Atomic Energy Authority and 
professor of the history of science at 
Oxford, authored the studies that set the 
scholarly standard: Britain and Atomic 
Energy, 1939–1945 and, a decade later, 
her two-volume Independence and 
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 
1945–1952. Arnold assisted Gowing, 
then in 2001 published her own book, 
Britain and the H-bomb. Jones’s two 
new volumes are worthy sequels�
America’s initial monopoly over the 
atomic bomb fed the British sense of 
technological exclusion� Determined 
then to “go it alone,” Britain asserted an 
initial nuclear doctrine of sovereign and 
independent control over its nuclear 
weapons� It was only after Britain had 
demonstrated a unilateral mastery of 
thermonuclear weapons development 
in May 1957 that the United Kingdom 
was granted access to specific U�S� 
nuclear weapons technologies� For 
Jones, the ensuing 1958 U�S�-U�K� 
mutual-defense agreement remains 
“one of the most remarkable examples 
of pooling of sensitive national security 
information by two sovereign states, 
and has rightly been seen as one of the 
fundamental pillars of the post-war 
Anglo-American relationship�”
The United Kingdom’s capacity to 
inflict assured nuclear destruction, 
independent of the United States, 
allowed it to behave as a “second centre 
of decision�” In this position, Britain 
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secured the ability not only to “leverage” 
the United States politically but also 
to command a seat at the geostrategic 
“top table�” Jones presents the Skybolt 
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of 
this nuclear-based political leverage over 
the United States� Aiming at updating 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United 
States promised delivery of the Skybolt 
system� A nuclear, standoff, air-to-
ground missile, Skybolt was designed to 
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of 
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile 
(ABM) capability� When President 
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agree-
ment in November 1962, he did so 
ostensibly on technical grounds� In truth, 
the United States opposed, on political 
grounds, any extension to the life of the 
U�K� nuclear deterrent� Seeing through 
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan 
was instrumental in resolving the crisis 
at the Nassau conference in December 
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy 
on its own petard� The United States 
was forced to concede the nature of 
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and 
instead to offer a replacement—which 
paradoxically became Britain’s second-
generation nuclear deterrent: the Polaris 
missile system� Not only had Britain’s 
first-generation deterrent not been 
curbed, but the United States in fact had 
become father to a second generation�
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of 
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold 
Wilson and the Labour Party� The 
necessity for a Polaris Improvement 
Program takes center stage in this 
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile 
was becoming obsolescent, just as the 
second-generation Polaris system was 
coming on line� There is a fascinating 
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy 
at work in the constant race to maintain 
a semblance of qualitative nuclear 
parity with the United States�
In the wake of the U�S� shift to the 
Poseidon’s advanced technology of 
the multiple independently targetable 
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under 
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin 
exploitation of an intermediate technol-
ogy, Antelope, that the United States had 
developed but later abandoned in favor 
of MIRVs� The climax of the U�K� Polaris 
Improvement Program was reached with 
Chevaline, a unique configurational 
change to alter the front end of the 
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it 
all but invulnerable to interception by 
deployed Soviet ABMs� But the history 
of that program will have to await the 
projected third volume in this series�
Meantime, Professor Jones has 
written an excellent description of 
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and 
independent strategic nuclear deterrent� 
Completely mastering his sources, 
Jones has produced a compelling work 
of lasting significance� He has come 
full circle, following in the footsteps 
of his larger-than-life role models, 
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold�
MYRON A� GREENBERG
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a 
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with 
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris 
Fussell� New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015� 290 
pages� $29�95�
During the years he spent hunting 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling 
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets 
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley 
McChrystal turned the Joint Special 
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Operations Command into a remarkably 
lethal, efficient, and effective killing 
machine� To do so he performed an 
extraordinary feat of social engineer-
ing, one that required modification of 
very insulated cultures, delegation of 
significant decision-making to very 
low levels of the organization, and 
widely sharing information in a manner 
few would have predicted possible�
Team of Teams makes it clear that this 
experience had a profound impact on 
McChrystal� In the ensuing years of 
reflection and serious study, the onetime 
four-star general has concluded that 
in a world of ever-increasing complex-
ity, networks offer the best chance for 
organizational success� The book both 
tells the story of the joint interagency 
task force and shows how modern 
leaders can achieve similar results�
McChrystal argues that technologically 
linked, extraordinarily nimble networks 
increasingly will run rings around 
organizations built around nineteenth-
century norms of hierarchy and 
efficiency� The quest for efficiency must 
give way to the pursuit of effectiveness� 
Yet speed is still a virtue, and the 
network must share vast amounts of 
information in short amounts of time� 
Accelerating the cycle of assessment, 
decision, implementation, and reassess-
ment to a pace not previously considered 
possible will enable cutting inside 
the decision loops of the competition 
and ensure victory� In positing this, 
McChrystal does not lack for boldness�
As the title suggests, McChrystal’s 
twenty-first-century organizational 
model constitutes a “team of teams�” In a 
true team, the members fully understand 
and deeply trust one another� However, 
no small team, however gifted, can 
deliver the expertise and products 
that the entire network demands� 
McChrystal’s prescription involves cross-
assigning team members, colocating 
previously isolated functions, and greatly 
increasing the sharing of information� 
Such connections are vital, for they 
build trust as well as what are described 
as organizational “neural networks�”
To his credit, McChrystal identifies 
some potential weaknesses in run-
ning such a network� For example, 
the risk of massive compromise, as 
occurred with Chelsea Manning and 
Edward Snowden, is always pres-
ent� McChrystal takes the bold and 
debatable position that the damage a 
Manning or a Snowden may cause is 
still a price worth paying, considering 
the benefits of a modern network�
With sweeping changes in organizational 
style come sweeping changes in leader-
ship� In a modern network, decision-
making is pushed down to a level where 
a leader may become uncomfortable 
with the degree of delegation� The results 
of those decisions flow to the leader, 
who, possessed of a more holistic view 
of the organization, can push informa-
tion and context back down to leaders 
far lower in the chain of command�
Questions persist about whether 
McChrystal’s model will work 
universally� A few organizations, such 
as NASA (for a time) or the Office of 
Naval Reactors, might be able to achieve 
and maintain the degree of dedication, 
reliability, and intense commitment that 
McChrystal expected and got from his 
operators, but these are rare examples�
The book does not address other 
essential aspects of organizations� How 
does a networked organization promote, 
reward, recruit, and retain its personnel? 
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How does a leader deal with a workforce 
that is increasingly transient and for 
which organizational loyalty is no longer 
a hallmark of professionalism? How are 
questions involving public relations, 
legality, and political involvement and 
interest handled? These problems are 
not unique to the military� There is no 
discussion of how leaders cope with pe-
riods of disruption, challenge, or failure�
Two other issues deserve mention� The 
first is the book’s method of citation: 
there are no footnotes or traditional end-
notes� This aids the casual reader but not 
the serious scholar, student, or executive 
who needs to delve deeper� Perhaps the 
publisher insisted on this methodology; 
if so, one hopes it is for the last time�
The other issue is more challenging� 
McChrystal goes to significant lengths 
to present Team of Teams as a collabora-
tive effort� This is commendable, and 
there may be portions of the book that 
represent a collective effort that is so 
interwoven it defies any assignment of 
individual credit� However, McChrystal 
is the only author who truly can explain 
the senior leader’s perspective and feel-
ings� As such, his voice should dominate 
the work, or at least be given clearly 
identified and dedicated portions of the 
book to provide solely his point of view�
Despite these shortcomings, Team 
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf 
devoted to modern works on leadership� 
It asks important questions, has more 
than a few sensible recommenda-
tions, and provokes useful follow-on 
conversations� Its readability also will 
be a plus for business school students, 
who increasingly will be likely to find 
it on their list of required texts�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval 
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 224 
pages� $29�95�
The average American’s view of 
naval aviation likely is informed by 
the movie Top Gun or, for those with 
some historical knowledge, the carrier 
battles of World War II in the Pacific� 
Unknown even to most naval aviators 
is a larger and equally dramatic story: 
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation 
accident rate under control� The number 
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents 
over the course of naval aviation’s history 
is staggering—in the tens of thousands, 
far more than ever were lost to combat�
A critical segment of that history 
occurred during the period that retired 
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book� 
After World War II, tectonic changes 
occurred in naval aviation, including 
the introduction of jet aircraft and 
the advent of nuclear weapons� The 
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in 
the rapidly evolving environment of the 
1950s and ’60s was intense� The need to 
fight in Korea with new and inadequate-
ly understood aircraft technology, as well 
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent 
posture day or night, in almost any 
weather, produced horrendous accident 
rates� In 1954 alone the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents, 
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers 
were killed� There was legitimate doubt 
that naval aviation would survive if that 
rate of mishaps could not be reduced�
But survive it did, through reducing 
accident rates—step by painful step� It 
is a complex, multifaceted story that 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   158 5/1/18   11:11 AM
164
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 5 9
Dunn, a former commander of the 
Naval Safety Center and Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, 
is uniquely qualified to tell� This is 
a book most easily understood and 
appreciated by those who have been a 
part of naval aviation� However, while 
the book’s second half gets rather 
technical, the author does provide both 
explanatory endnotes and appendices 
that offer background information to 
help the lay reader make sense of it�
Dunn appears to be on a mission to 
glorify those who made key contribu-
tions to the reduction in mishaps� This 
is entirely justified, as the efforts of such 
luminaries as James Flatley, Dr� Ashton 
Graybiel, and Bob Osborne helped to 
bring the accident rate down from the 
hundreds of planes and crewmen lost 
each year in the 1950s to the occasional 
mishap that naval aviation experiences 
now� Their efforts, and those of many 
others, not only saved thousands of 
lives and aircraft but ensured that 
the nation would be able to maintain 
command of the seas� The book is a 
mixture of narrative and analysis that 
forms a coherent explanation of how 
naval aviation shifted from being a 
freewheeling, daredevil operation to a 
disciplined and professional enterprise�
The book is well organized and the 
author’s writing is straightforward 
and clear� However, the book contains 
some small issues that casual readers 
likely would miss but that can nag at an 
experienced naval aviator (such as this 
reviewer)� One is the presence of contra-
dictory statements about the potential 
utility of the canceled supercarrier USS 
United States; another is what appear to 
be typos� The latter subtly change the 
meaning of certain paragraphs, such 
as the statement on page 22 that the 
helicopter community’s mishap experi-
ence was “atypical” for the day, when the 
word should have been “typical,” or the 
incorrect statement that the Frenchman 
Paul Bert’s hypoxia experiments took 
place in the twentieth century versus 
the nineteenth� There are enough of 
these “nits” in the first few chapters 
to distract the knowledgeable reader, 
although later chapters are cleaner�
The real issue is the book’s laudatory 
tone� Dunn is forthright in describing 
the various issues that led to the Navy’s 
awful accident rates, and correctly iden-
tifies the measures that eventually fixed 
the problem� Still, he fails to address 
what is, in this reviewer’s opinion, a key 
issue: the rate at which the Navy reduced 
its accident rate in comparison with the 
Air Force� In 1950, the Navy’s accident 
rate was one and one-half times that 
of the Air Force; by 1960 and through 
1970, it was four times higher than that 
of the Air Force, despite a concurrent 
reduction in the overall accident rate 
for both services� Even in 1980, the 
Navy rate remained three times that 
of the Air Force� However, by 1990 
the relative accident rates for the Navy 
and Air Force were equal—and have 
remained so ever since� Any analysis of 
naval aviation safety improvement in 
the period the book covers should take 
on this matter, and the failure to do so 
is a key drawback of the book� Had the 
Navy adopted the Air Force’s methods 
in the 1950s, thousands of additional 
lives and aircraft might have been saved� 
Why the service did not do so is an 
important part of the story, one that 
should be told� Dunn does a good job of 
describing the various threads that led to 
the Navy’s victory over mishaps and the 
book is worthwhile reading for anyone 
who has ever been involved in naval 
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aviation, but in the end it falls short of 
delivering more-thorough reporting�
ROBERT C� RUBEL
Navy Football: Return to Glory, by T� C� Cameron� 
Charleston, SC: History Press, 2017� 189 pages� 
$21�99�
As both a U�S� Military Academy 
(USMA) graduate and the father of 
a USMA graduate, I jumped at the 
chance to read a book about the 
success of the U�S� Naval Academy 
(USNA) football team� Let’s face it: 
Navy has a winning program that has 
dominated Army football in recent 
years, even though both teams draw 
from the same pool of talented high 
school athletes� T� C� Cameron traces 
the history of USNA’s football team, 
including its comeback, or “return to 
glory,” over the past fifteen years�
Bill Belichick, the legendary coach of 
the New England Patriots, wrote the 
foreword, in which he pays tribute to 
the Navy coaches and midshipmen 
who taught him the game of football� 
“When I think of Navy football, my 
early role models were some of the 
biggest legends in the program’s history” 
(p� 7)� Belichick grew up in Annapolis 
and his father, Steve Belichick, was an 
assistant football coach at the Naval 
Academy for thirty-four years�
Cameron first traces the history of Navy 
football� He describes the period from 
1950 to 1963 as its “Camelot” years� 
The Navy football team was successful 
under Coach Eddie Erdelatz and his 
assistant coach Wayne Hardin, who 
later succeeded him� During these years, 
Navy also built the Navy–Marine 
Corps Memorial Stadium� The Navy 
football team was winning consistently, 
and legends such as Tom Lynch and 
Heisman Trophy winners Joe Bellino 
and Roger Staubach were winning 
the hearts and minds of football fans 
across the country� Even President John 
F� Kennedy, himself a Navy veteran,
supported the Navy team� Kennedy’s
assassination in November 1963 was a
tremendous blow to the team, and many
wondered whether the Army-Navy
game would even be played the week
afterward� Ranked number two in the
country, Navy won the game, then went
on to lose to top-ranked Texas in the
Cotton Bowl� After the following season,
as Cameron puts it, “Camelot was over�
Without knowing it, a long cold winter
descended on the Navy program� It
would last almost forty years” (p� 26)�
Cameron characterizes the years 
between 1995 and 2001 as the “Big 
Tease�” Under Coach Charlie Weather-
bie, Navy football initially did well, 
experiencing winning seasons� However, 
as Cameron writes, “[h]is finish was a 
disaster, as Navy lost seventeen of the 
last eighteen” games he coached, “and 
twenty of twenty-one overall” (p� 51)� 
Navy football’s true renewed success 
began when Coach Paul Johnson, the 
offensive coordinator in 1995–96, 
returned, and Cameron portrays 
2002–2007 under the heading “Johnson 
Returns�” Johnson’s record at Navy was 
43-27, with five bowl appearances in six
seasons� More importantly, Johnson’s
teams crushed both Army and Air
Force, losing only once against another
service academy� The football team
has continued to have winning seasons
under Coach Ken Niumatalolo from
2008 to the present, a period Cameron
characterizes as a “Ball of Fire” because
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of the coach’s dynamic personality on 
the field� Cameron makes the point that 
“[i]f Ken Niumatalolo is your neighbor, 
you think he’s a great guy� But if you 
play football for Navy, in an instant, he 
can be your worst nightmare” (p� 107)�
Cameron does a superb job recounting 
the intense rivalries that Navy has with 
not only Army and Air Force but Notre 
Dame� He describes the 2007 win over 
Notre Dame—after forty-three consecu-
tive losses—as follows: “The night ‘the 
Streak’ died—the longest streak in 
NCAA history—eighty thousand fans at 
Notre Dame Stadium watched in stunned 
silence as Navy let go of forty-three years 
of misery, embarrassment, and frustra-
tion” (p� 136)� He details the joy—and 
other emotions—of football games with 
Army and Air Force, with the overall 
winner receiving the Commander in 
Chief ’s Trophy� Few other writers can 
match Cameron’s insights into and ap-
preciation of the distinctive qualities of 
the Army-Navy game� “The annual bit of 
military theater, greater than any other 
game, makes the Army-Navy legacy a lit-
tle sweeter� The nation’s game” (p� 106)�
Nonetheless, I struggled somewhat 
with the book� I found it difficult that 
Cameron seems to be telling two stories, 
in that as he writes about the chronol-
ogy of Navy football he intersperses 
the story of Navy’s fierce rivalries with 
Army, Air Force, and Notre Dame� 
At times the story was challenging to 
follow because I was reading about 
things from two different perspectives: 
one that portrayed a chronology, and 
another that recounted memorable 
games with Navy’s leading rivals�
The appendices highlighting Navy’s 
unforgettable games, unforgettable 
seasons, GOATS (read the book), play-
ers, coaches, and a potpourri of other 
topics all add value and make this book 
a must-read for football fans across the 
country� Cameron has shined a spotlight 
on Navy’s football program through its 
highs and lows, with colorful com-
mentary that makes it an enjoyable read�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and 
Capital Ship Design, by Robert C� Stern� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� 
$42�95�
Robert Stern, a writer of more than 
twenty books on naval matters over 
three decades, opens his latest effort by 
admitting that he is tackling a subject on 
which much has been written already� 
The Battleship Holiday explores the 
history and technical design of capital 
ships that the five signatories to the 
1922 Five-Power Treaty—Great Britain, 
the United States, Japan, France, and 
Italy—plus Germany built during and 
after the “battleship holiday” that the 
treaty imposed� His fresh approach 
to analyzing capital ship design and 
construction during this period 
addresses the ships and their innova-
tions chronologically rather than along 
national lines� Throughout this chronol-
ogy, he explores three major threads: 
diplomacy, technology, and operational 
performance� Stern offers that, while 
other treatments address one or two of 
these threads, his assessment of all three 
provides “more complete insight into 
the interplay of factors that led different 
nations to build different ships” (p� 10) 
to achieve their respective national goals�
Divided into two parts, the book first 
explores how capital ships evolved to the 
point at which the world’s naval powers 
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decided to limit them� Beginning with 
the 1862 battle of Hampton Roads, Stern 
traces the evolution of capital ships 
up to the 1916 battle of Jutland� His 
threads run through ship design and 
construction as each nation emphasized 
characteristics important to its vision 
of the battleship’s role� Stern steers 
clear of analyzing strategy and tactics 
except where necessary to show how 
different technical decisions combined 
with tactical developments, such as to 
produce Jutland’s outcome� The chapter 
“The Art and Practice of Main-Battery 
Fire Control in 1916” demonstrates 
Stern’s in-depth analysis of technological 
advancements by the various bel-
ligerents� In addition to gunnery and 
fire control, each country drew from 
Jutland different lessons on armor, 
propulsion, and machinery—many of 
them incorrect� Stern concludes the 
first section by describing the tension 
between liberal politicians and naval 
leaders as they attempted to curtail the 
exorbitant cost of maintaining a fleet 
of modern battleships� The resulting 
Washington Naval Treaty system placed 
specific restrictions on capital ships� The 
subsequent battleship building holiday 
succeeded in preventing unconstrained 
shipbuilding, but it did not inhibit 
ambitions to build better battleships�
The second half of the book tracks 
capital ship design and construction 
from 1922 to 1946� The idea of naval 
disarmament began to fray less than five 
years after its initiation, slowly at first 
and later accelerating to the point of dis-
solution� During the intervening years, 
naval architects fought to design ships 
that maximized war-fighting capability 
within the treaty’s 35,000-ton restriction� 
Stern spends significant time discussing 
the technical details of various designs, 
including the sacrifices, benefits, and 
political ramifications involved� He gives 
equal coverage to all the navies building 
capital ships, including their decisions 
on whether to follow the constraints the 
Washington Treaty system imposed� He 
also includes significant discussion of 
ships not built, and why� The chrono-
logical approach demonstrates how the 
different design decisions responded to 
or ignored the efforts of other nations�
Stern’s assessment culminates with an 
analysis of the effectiveness of these 
battleships’ offensive and defensive 
capabilities in combat� Direct com-
parison is nearly impossible, since only 
three engagements occurred that pitted 
new-generation battleships against each 
other� The German battleships Bismarck 
and Scharnhorst succumbed to their 
peers HMS Prince of Wales and HMS 
Duke of York, respectively, in battle at 
sea, but those actions included other 
vessels or aircraft that prevented a “fair 
fight�” The other direct action between 
new-generation battleships consisted of 
USS Massachusetts (BB 59) battering the 
incomplete French battle cruiser Jean 
Bart, holed up in Casablanca’s harbor� 
Stern assesses other surface actions, in-
cluding the battleship duel in which the 
post-Jutland battleships USS Washington 
(BB 56) and USS Alabama (BB 57) sank 
the Japanese pretreaty battle cruiser 
Kirishima, and the cornering and scut-
tling of the German Graf Spee by British 
cruisers at the Río de la Plata� In almost 
every case, whether they resulted in 
sinking or survival, battleship-protection 
schemes underperformed� Surface action 
was no longer the norm—the majority 
of battleship damage and losses in the 
Second World War resulted from air 
attack, especially with aerial torpedoes�
Stern provides a fresh and highly 
technical assessment of the pinnacle 
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of naval warship design� But in doing 
so he demonstrates the futility of this 
construction� Bent on applying the 
lessons of Jutland to ensure victory in 
the next great naval battle, nations built 
the ultimate dreadnoughts, only to see 
them relegated to convoy protection and 
antiaircraft duty, untested in the fleet 
actions for which they were designed� 
While America, Britain, France, and 
Italy continued to operate battleships 
after the Second World War, the design 
and construction costs of battleships 
proved exorbitant in relation to their 
utility in the era of the aircraft carrier�
JAMES P� MCGRATH
Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled 
Alliance, by Kemal Kirişci� Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2018� 309 pages� $34�
Turkey’s oscillation between the West 
and East is nothing new, nor is there 
a lack of literature on the topic� But 
what Kemal Kirişci accomplishes in 
his most recent work is an insightful 
analysis of Turkey’s history and its 
foreign policy by-products through the 
lens of the current security quandary� 
Most valuably, the book demonstrates 
the interaction among the various 
currents within Turkey and how they are 
creating an increasingly anti-Western 
foreign policy� Given the author’s goal 
of elucidating Turkey’s history up to the 
present day and reducing the confusion 
about what is behind its government’s 
decision-making, his book offers the 
most authoritative work available�
Not long ago the United States was 
touting Turkey as a model for countries 
seeking to join the international liberal 
order, in particular for those trying to 
reconcile Islam and democracy� Early in 
his tenure Recep Erdoğan gave a speech 
at Harvard in which he quoted Thomas 
Jefferson, praised democracy, and 
extolled the virtues of Turkey’s eventual 
European Union (EU) accession� As re-
cent as 2011, Erdoğan delivered a speech 
in Cairo that emphasized democracy 
and secularism as qualities intrinsic to 
Turkey� Yes, things can change in a hurry 
in the Middle East, but why and how 
did the esteem in which Turkey was held 
around the world recede so quickly?
The author provides an engaging 
picture of all the factors at play, many of 
which are rooted in domestic politics� 
He traces Turkey’s history since World 
War II, focusing particularly on the 
period since the Gezi Park protests in 
2013� Turkey has banned consumption 
of alcohol in public spaces, altered 
the content of educational materials 
in schools to align them more with 
Islam, curtailed personal freedoms, and 
detained journalists� Nowadays Erdoğan 
makes public comments demeaning the 
founder of the modern Turkish republic, 
Kemal Atatürk� Erdoğan is deploying 
an increasingly majoritarian form 
of democracy that excludes the 48�6 
percent of the country that did not vote 
for his increased power in the April 2017 
referendum� The situation in Turkey 
portends a mutually reinforcing nexus 
in which growing authoritarianism 
within the country’s borders moves in 
parallel with a foreign policy increas-
ingly at odds with that of the West�
In analyzing the international factors at 
play in Turkey’s shift, Kirişci gives due 
attention to the war in Syria and the 
migration crisis� But in addition to these 
better-known fault lines, what the author 
does exceptionally well is to explain how 
Europe and the United States are not 
without blame for fostering skepticism 
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of Western sincerity among the Turkish 
population� The 2003 invasion of Iraq—
in the face of Turkey’s objections and its 
perceptive and rather dire predictions— 
inflated an already-strong sense of 
distrust toward the United States� The 
EU’s halfhearted attempts at accomplish-
ing Turkish accession predictably have 
come to a standstill, which removes 
the pull of Europe and the pressure 
for democratic reform� Perceived 
insensitivity on the Kurdish question, 
and even overt sympathy among some 
for increased Kurdish autonomy, 
represents another source of contention� 
The author also brings context to some 
overlooked fault lines, such as the EU’s 
acceptance of Cyprus as a member even 
though that country refused to support 
the UN-backed reunification plan, 
on the support of which the Turkish 
government had expended significant 
political capital� Other examples include 
the 2014 failure of Turkey to be reelected 
as a nonpermanent member of the UN 
Security Council and Western govern-
ments’ delayed and lukewarm condem-
nations of the 2016 coup attempt�
This book is immensely helpful in 
understanding Turkey’s foreign policy 
and the myriad of factors that influence 
it� A major theme of the book is why 
Turkey continually shows signs of shift-
ing its orientation away from Europe 
and the United States toward China, 
Iran, and Russia� The author provides a 
strong argument that if this shift were to 
culminate in a complete reorientation— 
especially at a time when the Middle  
East is more of a flash point than 
usual and the aggressiveness of Russia 
is trending upward exponentially—the 
consequences to the international 
liberal order would be grave�
No magic solutions are provided, and 
the book’s candid assessment is that 
the relationship will get worse before it 
gets better� The book’s central argument 
is that the United States and the EU 
should maintain robust engagement 
with Turkey� Kirişci also offers a flexible 
framework for analysis and several 
recommendations for narrowing the 
fault lines� Turkey remains anchored 
in the political, military, and market 
economy–based institutional structures 
of the West—at least for the time being� 
Moreover, in the long run, who is 
Erdoğan or his eventual successors going 
to trust more, the EU and the United 
States or China and Russia? The history 
of Turkey reveals indicators of orienta-
tions in both directions, but more so a 
Western bent� The question is whether 
that history of Western integration can 
survive the rising Islamism in the coun-
try and Erdoğan’s seemingly perpetual 
authoritarian rule� Reading this book 
might not enable one to predict correctly 
Turkey’s final direction, but one’s guess 
at least would be much better informed�
JEREMY SNELLEN
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Blake I. Campbell is an independent researcher and reviewer, book review editor, and adjunct 
professor�
Thomas J. Gibbons has worked for the associate provost at the Naval War College since 2008� Be-
fore retiring from the U�S� Army in the grade of colonel, he was a rotary-wing aviator, flying from 
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USN ships in Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD� He commanded the 1st Battalion, 
10th Aviation Regiment (ATTACK) and served as J1 of the U�S� Pacific Command before coming 
to the Naval War College as the Army adviser� He has a BS from the U�S� Military Academy, an 
MS from George Washington University, an MA from the Naval War College, and an EdD from 
Johnson & Wales University�
Myron A. Greenberg is a contracting officer with the Defense Contract Management Agency in Day-
ton, Ohio� The Naval War College Press published his Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The 
British Approach as Newport Paper 8� He published a review essay in the Autumn 2000 Naval War 
College Review� He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and an MPIA 
degree from the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs� Dr� 
Greenberg also participated in the Naval War College’s nonresident correspondence program�
Jamie McGrath is a military professor in the Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War 
College� He is a graduate of Virginia Tech and received graduate degrees from the Naval War Col-
lege and Norwich University�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� He is a retired 
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University� 
His most recent publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps 
University Journal.
Iskander Rehman is a senior fellow in international relations at the Pell Center for International 
Relations and Public Policy�
General Lord Richards of Herstmonceux formerly served as Britain’s Chief of the Defence Staff, the 
professional head of the country’s armed forces and their strategic commander, as well as the prime 
minister’s military adviser and a member of the National Security Council� Prior to that he com-
manded the British Army� He also led operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan�
Dale C. Rielage serves as director for intelligence and information operations for the U�S� Pacific 
Fleet� He is the author of Russian Supply Efforts in America during the First World War�
Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus of the Naval War College� He 
served on active duty as a light attack / strike fighter aviator� At the Naval War College he served 
in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser, 
chairman of the Wargaming Department, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies� 
Retired in 2014, he continues to serve on occasion as a special adviser to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions� He has published over thirty journal articles and several book chapters�
Jeremy Snellen currently works at the Center for Law and Military Operations in Charlottesville, 
Virginia� In addition to being a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College, he also holds a 
law degree from Syracuse University and a master’s degree from the Maxwell School of Citizenship 
and Public Affairs at Syracuse University�
Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, and maritime strategy at the Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies, Naval War College� He is the author of Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD 
Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and two earlier books on the future security environment�
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   165 5/1/18   11:11 AM
171
Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
n early March 2018, the Naval War College responded to direction from the Un-
der Secretary of the Navy to host a workshop entitled “Breaking the Mold: Strat-
egy and War in the 21st Century�” The Honorable Thomas Modly traveled to the 
College to deliver a rousing keynote address to over sixty scholars and operators 
from across the Navy and the wider defense intellectual community� He chal-
lenged each participant to “break the mold” of conventional thinking to develop 
new war-fighting concepts in the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace domains�
Under Secretary Modly said, in part:
In a word, I believe that breaking the mold will require a preeminent focus on the 
need for agility� Agility is the term which I believe best describes the overall organiza-
tional quality that has determined, and will determine, who and what survives in any 
increasingly competitive, rapidly changing, and unpredictable environment� This is 
the environment our Navy faces today, so I think we will ultimately be judged by how 
well we transition our forces and our supporting organizations to a future in which 
agility is their defining characteristic� Therefore, we must advance agility when we 
think about, and build, our future force structure� We need more ships and aircraft 
and vehicles, but that equipment must provide flexibility, adaptability, faster develop-
ment cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an industrial 
strategy that sustains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base�
The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) 
is replete with books that focus on agility, flexibility, innovation, and “mold-
breaking” thinking� The following descriptions, adapted from material provided 
by each book’s publisher, explain why the books are of interest to military officers, 
government civilian leaders, and others�
• The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant
Technologies, by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (W� W� Norton,
2014)� The authors—two thinkers at the forefront of their field—reveal the
forces driving the reinvention of our lives and our economy� As the full
I
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impact of digital technologies is felt, we will realize immense bounty in the 
form of dazzling personal technology, advanced infrastructure, and near-
boundless access to the cultural items that enrich our lives� Drawing on years 
of research and up-to-the-minute trends, Brynjolfsson and McAfee identify 
the best strategies for survival and offer a new path to prosperity� These 
include revamping education so it prepares people for the next economy 
instead of the last one, designing new collaborations that pair brute process-
ing power with human ingenuity, and embracing policies that make sense in 
a radically transformed landscape�
• The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way
You Do Business, by Clayton M� Christensen (HarperBusiness Essentials,
2003)� This is a revolutionary business book that has changed corporate
America forever� Based on a truly radical idea—that great companies can fail
precisely because they do everything “right”—this Wall Street Journal, Busi-
ness Week, and New York Times Business best seller is one of the most provoc-
ative and important business books ever written� Entrepreneurs, managers,
and CEOs ignore its wisdom and its warnings at their great peril�
• Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2011)�
In this international best seller, Kahneman, a renowned psychologist and
winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, takes us on a groundbreaking tour
of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think� System
1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and
more logical� The impact of overconfidence on corporate strategies, the dif-
ficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the profound
effect of cognitive biases on everything from playing the stock market to
planning our next vacation—each of these can be understood only by know-
ing how the two systems shape our judgments and decisions� Engaging the
reader in a lively conversation about how we think, Kahneman reveals where
we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits
of slow thinking�
• Inviting Disaster: Lessons from the Edge of Technology; An Inside Look at
Catastrophes and Why They Happen, by James R� Chiles (HarperBusiness,
2002)� Weaving a dramatic narrative that explains how breakdowns in
systems result in such disasters as the chain-reaction crash of an Air France
Concorde and the meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear power station,
Chiles vividly demonstrates how the battle between man and machine may
be escalating beyond manageable limits—and why we all have a stake in
its outcome� Included in this edition is a special introduction providing a
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behind-the-scenes look at the World Trade Center catastrophe� Combining 
firsthand accounts of employees’ escapes with an in-depth look at the struc-
tural reasons behind the towers’ collapse, Chiles addresses the question, Were 
the towers “two tall heroes” or structures with a fatal flaw?
These books, and many others within the CNO-PRP, can help military readers 
(and would-be innovators) take a detailed look at the inner workings of minds 
facing sometimes overwhelming challenges� They may help you to “break the 
mold” of conventional thinking and develop an agile mind, as encouraged by the 
Under Secretary of the Navy�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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